I dissent. The substantial circumstantial evidence presented in this case supports the verdict of the jury that the homicide was committed by defendant in his attempted performance or actual performance of lewd or lascivious acts upon the body of the child victim in violation of Penal Code section 288 and therefore constituted first degree murder under the felony-murder rule (Pen. Code, §189).
The jury could reasonably infer from the evidence adduced that the underlying motive of the crime was sexual gratification : defendant chose a time when he was alone in the house with the little girl; the window blinds were down and the doors locked; he pursued the child throughout the house inflicting one wound after another; he ripped out the crotch of her panties; he tore her remaining clothes from her; he had *37removed his own clothes excepting his socks—there was no other logical explanation for the absence of other bloody male clothing and he took a shower immediately after the crime; furthermore, at one time during the assault he had the child on the bed as evidenced by the large blood stain found in the center of the mattress; and, finally, a number of the wounds inflicted upon the child could be considered sexual in nature, particularly the thrust of the knife into her vagina, the cutting through to the anal canal and the numerous cuts and contusions of her private parts and thighs.
In the face of this supportive evidence it is not the function of this court to reweigh the evidence. (People v. Hillery, 62 Cal.2d 692, 702-703 [44 Cal.Rptr. 30, 401 P.2d 382].)
Although I believe there is credible evidence from which the jury could find a premeditated homicide, e.g. the locking of the doors (whether before or after the actual killing is a matter of conjecture), the duration of the assault, the pursuit through many rooms with a quantity of blood being left in each room, the extensive stabbings many of which would have sufficed as fatal, the removal of the murder weapon from one room and the apparent repeated use of it in other rooms, it is not necessary to rest the jury’s determination of first degree murder on that ground since the evidence is substantial that the homicide was first degree murder under the felony-murder rule.
This ease is clearly distinguishable from People v. Granados, 49 Cal.2d 490 [319 P.2d 346], relied on by the majority. In Granados, there was every indication of a killing by a sudden blow from a machete and no evidence whatsoever of any molestation, cutting, stabbing of the private parts of the child. The only physical suggestion of a possible sex offense motive was that the child’s dress was pulled up above the vaginal area. However, this area was concealed underneath an apron which she wore over the dress. There was no evidence of deliberate or forceful removal of all clothing as in the ease before us.
The majority also rely upon People v. Craig, 49 Cal.2d 313 [316 P.2d 947], but here, again, there are substantial differences between the two cases. Craig does not even deal with a Penal Code section 288 situation. The victim in Craig was not a child but an adult woman and as the opinion points out there was “No evidence of a sexual attack on the body of the decedent.” There were no blood smears on defendant’s levis or shorts. The victim had on her raincoat, a night gown or slip and panties and although they had been torn, open to expose *38the front part of the body a review of the evidence supports the conclusion of this court in Craig that the victim died from a vicious beating and that there was no evidence of an attempted rape or sex crime, despite defendant's statement earlier in the day that he was seeking a girl for sex purposes.
In the instant case the question of whether the evidence showed that the defendant had the requisite intent to commit lewd acts upon the child victim was for the jury to determine from all the surrounding circumstances. (People v. Meichtry, 37 Cal.2d 385, 389 [231 P.2d 847].) In the face of the physical evidence produced in this case I submit it cannot be said that no reasonable ground was shown to support an inference that such intent existed.
I would affirm the judgment.
McComb, J., concurred.