concurring in the result only.
The present appeal arises out of the hearing conducted by the trial court on remand, pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69 (1986), to determine whether the prosecutor’s explanation for his peremptory challenge of juror Beverly Askew was race-neutral. I write separately to express my belief that the procedures used at the hearing violated defendant’s right to reciprocal fairness.
At the hearing all of defendant’s witnesses, upon taking the witness stand, were required to take an oath and were subjected to cross-examination by the State. On the other hand, when the State’s *8only witness, the prosecutor, was called to the stand, he was not required to take an oath and was not subjected to cross-examination, despite the defendant’s ultimate burden of proving the existence of purposeful discrimination. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. at 98, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 88-89.
Defendant contends the trial court’s differing treatment of the State’s witness, as opposed to the defendant’s witnesses, violated the defendant’s right to reciprocal fairness. I agree. Like the majority, however, I believe the procedural aspects of this case are governed by the clear and unequivocal holding of our Supreme Court in State v. Jackson, 322 N.C. 251, 368 S.E.2d 838 (1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1110, 104 L. Ed. 2d 1027 (1989).
Defendant argues persuasively that the trial court erred by failing to require the prosecutor to be sworn, and in addition, by refusing to allow the prosecutor to be cross-examined.
North Carolina courts have consistently held a defendant is entitled to have the testimony offered against him given under the sanction of an oath. See, e.g., In re Byers, 295 N.C. 256, 258, 244 S.E.2d 665, 667 (1978) (“it is well established that before a witness can testify he must swear or affirm to tell the truth”); State v. Dixon, 185 N.C. 727, 730, 117 S.E. 170, 172 (1923) (“defendant is entitled to have the testimony offered against him given under the sanction of an oath”); State v. Davis, 69 N.C. 383 (1873).
The North Carolina Rules of Evidence provide that: “[bjefore testifying, every witness shall be required to declare that he will testify truthfully, by oath or affirmation administered in a form calculated to awaken his conscience and impress his mind with his duty to do so.” N.C.R. Evid. 603. A witness is one who is called to testify before a court. Black’s Law Dictionary 1603 (6th ed. 1990). North Carolina Rule of Evidence 603 is applicable to all actions and proceedings of the court except where excluded by statute or North Carolina Rule of Evidence 1101(b). Neither statute nor Rule 1101(b) expressly exclude Batson hearings from the rules of evidence. Therefore, I believe it is clear that a prosecutor who voluntarily elects to take the witness stand, like any other witness, must be sworn before he or she testifies.
I believe the prosecutor in the instant case was serving in the capacity of a witness and should have been required to take an oath. The prosecutor requested Ms. Graves appear at the hearing on behalf *9of the State. Ms. Graves “call[ed]” the prosecutor to the witness stand to give his explanation for the peremptory challenge. The prosecutor voluntarily took the witness stand and proceeded through direct examination to offer his explanation for the peremptory challenge. At one point during direct examination, defendant raised a hearsay objection, which the trial court overruled. All parties proceeded as if the prosecutor were an ordinary witness. At the end of Ms. Graves’ direct examination of the prosecutor, defendant’s attorney renewed his objection to the manner in which the hearing was conducted, and once again was overruled by the trial court.
Within the context of the present case, however, I agree with the majority opinion that the defendant waived his right to have the prosecutor sworn by failing to make any objection to the trial court’s failure to administer an oath.
Defendant also contends the trial court erred in not allowing the prosecutor to be cross-examined.
In State v. Jackson, 322 N.C. 251, 368 S.E.2d 838 (1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1110, 104 L. Ed. 2d 1027 (1989), our Supreme Court held defendant did not have the right to cross-examine the prosecuting attorney during a Batson hearing. The Court explained:
In balancing the arguments for and against such an examination, we believe the disruption to a trial which could occur if an attorney in a case were called as a witness overbears any good which could be obtained by his testimony. We do not believe we should have a trial within a trial. The presiding judges are capable of passing on the credibility of prosecuting attorneys without the benefit of cross-examination.
Id. at 258, 368 S.E.2d at 842. The Court indicated this same rule would apply to the prosecutor appearing as counsel at a post-trial hearing. Id. The holding in State v. Jackson was followed in State v. Green, 324 N.C. 238, 376 S.E.2d 727 (1989).
The right of confrontation includes the right to cross-examine witnesses, State v. Perry, 210 N.C. 796, 797, 188 S.E. 639, 640 (1936), on any subject covered in their direct examination. Id. at 798, 188 S.E. at 640; State v. Dixon, supra. Compare N.C.R. Evid. 611(b) (“witness may be cross-examined on any matter relevant to any issue in the case, including credibility”). Indeed, the right of cross-examination is a common law right and is guaranteed by the North Carolina Constitution and the United States Constitution. State v. Watson, 281 *10N.C. 221, 232, 188 S.E.2d 289, 295, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1043, 34 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1972); State v. Bumper, 275 N.C. 670, 674, 170 S.E.2d 457, 460 (1969).
During the Batson hearing Assistant Attorney General Debra Graves acted as counsel for the State. In order to explain why the prosecutor had excused Askew during voir dire examination, Ms. Graves “call[ed]” the prosecutor as a witness. Ms. Graves conducted a direct examination of the prosecutor. At one point during the direct examination of the prosecutor, defendant’s attorney raised a hearsay objection which the trial judge overruled. Put simply, all parties behaved as if the prosecutor were an ordinary witness.
The State voluntarily elected to call the prosecutor to the witness stand and conducted direct examination. Arguably, the prosecutor “waived” his right under State v. Jackson to not be subjected to cross-examination by voluntarily taking the stand and subjecting himself to direct examination. Because the trial court subjected all of defendant’s witnesses to cross-examination, I find the defendant’s argument persuasive that this same procedure should have been followed when the State’s only witness, the prosecutor, voluntarily elected to take the witness stand.
The reciprocal unfairness inherent where the prosecutor is not subjected to cross-examination has been recognized. In Williams v. State, 767 S.W.2d 872 (Tex. App. 1989), the Texas Court of Appeals held that in order to provide defendant with an opportunity to rebut the prosecutor’s race-neutral explanation for exercising peremptory strikes, the accused should be permitted to cross-examine the prosecutor. Id. at 874. The Williams court reasoned that, “the denial or improper curtailment of cross-examination denies the accused the right to a fair trial.” Id.
I believe the formulation of appropriate procedures to resolve Batson inquiries is generally best left in the sound discretion of the trial courts, see United States v. Garrison, 849 F.2d 103, 107 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 996, 102 L. Ed. 2d 591 (1988); United States v. Tucker, 836 F.2d 334, 340 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1105, 104 L. Ed. 2d 1018 (1989), which must be allowed considerable discretion in conducting Batson hearings. United States v. Davis, 809 F.2d 1194, 1202 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1007, 97 L. Ed. 2d 740 (1987). Likewise, I believe it is clear a defendant is not absolutely entitled to an evidentiary hearing on a Batson objection in every case. United States v. Tindle, 860 F.2d 125 (4th Cir. *111988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1114, 104 L. Ed. 2d 1038 (1989); United States v. Garrison, 849 F.2d 103 (4th Cir. 1988).
Nevertheless, where the defendant makes aprima facie showing of purposeful discrimination in the selection of the jury, as this Court concluded in Hall, I believe fundamental reciprocal fairness mandates that all witnesses be treated equally at any evidentiary hearing conducted to determine whether the defendant has carried his ultimate burden of proving the existence of purposeful discrimination. Put simply, either all witnesses should be sworn and subjected to cross-examination, or no witness should be sworn and subjected to cross-examination. Otherwise we sanction procedures which derogate from longstanding fundamental principles of reciprocal fairness inherent within our adversarial system of justice. Nonetheless, I believe this Court is bound by our Supreme Court’s clear and unequivocal holding in State v. Jackson. I therefore concur in the result of the majority opinion.