dissenting.
I regret that I must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion in this case. I believe that by declaring, as a matter of law, that incarceration resulting in the reduction or elimination of income or assets does not constitute such a material change of circumstances as to warrant the temporary termination of a child support obligation, the court has created many more problems than those which it believes it has solved. Unlike the majority, I am persuaded by the reasoning of the Court of Appeals for the State of Oregon in the case of Edmonds and Edmonds, 53 Or. App. 539, 633 P.2d 4 (1981), and the Oregon Supreme Court in the case of Tice v. Tice, 207 Or. 247, 295 P.2d 866 (1956).
We obviously recognize that the child support judgment will not be paid during the time that the parent is incarcerated, and therefore the judgment will simply accrue with interest. Such a situation provides little or no benefit to anyone. The children do not receive the benefit of the proceeds during the time they require the funds, and the parent is simply confronted with a large, nondischargeable judgment upon release from prison, at a time when the prospect of paying a large judgment with interest is extremely unlikely. At current interest rates the judgment will double every 6 or 7 years. How this can be in the children’s best interest is difficult for me to imagine.
I am further persuaded by the reasoning of the Oregon court which concludes that a court should not be permitted to impose a judgment and itself make the payment of that judgment impossible. We would not permit such a result to exist in any other situation.
In dissenting I do not for a moment ignore the fact that the parent against whom the judgment runs has been convicted of violating a law and has brought the problem into being by reason of his own act. Nevertheless, the violation of the *278criminal law was a matter which the State addressed, and for which the individual is now paying the penalty. To impose an additional penalty is not appropriate.
One need only consider the situation of two inmates in a penal institution, one of whom is divorced, the other who is not, both of whom are responsible in the law for the support of their children. The parent who is not divorced will likely not be required to provide support for his children, though apparently, under the provisions of Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 43-512.01 et seq. (Reissue 1984), a support order could be obtained. Upon release from prison that parent, though legally responsible for the support of his or her children, will not be confronted with this large, unpaid judgment. The second inmate who, by reason of the fact he or she is divorced and a child support judgment entered, will, however, leave the penitentiary with this large judgment owing. This does not strike me as being equitable or appropriate. Certainly the pressures of paying a child support judgment, in many cases where the children have long since grown, do little, if anything, to assist in rehabilitating the prisoner.
The majority opinion notes that the dilemma which Ohler finds himself in at the moment is one of his own doing. The fact, however, that a nonsupporting parent has intentionally committed an act which prevents that parent from providing support has never been a reason for us to deny a reduction or temporary cessation in child support payments where it was clear the nonsupporting parent could not pay. A parent who is seriously injured by reason of intentionally operating a motorcycle in a race would, in all likelihood, be relieved of the obligation to pay child support even though the injury was a result of the nonsupporting parent’s intentional act. In Cooper v. Cooper, 219 Neb. 64, 361 N. W.2d 202 (1985), we permitted a physician to reduce the amount of his child support payments because of a reduction in income, even though the reduction in income was brought about by the intentional desire of the parent to change his occupation. We have never previously held that the fact that a parent voluntarily changes his or her occupation, thereby reducing his or her income, may not be considered by a court as a material change of circumstances. *279The fact that a parent is incarcerated should likewise not, in and of itself, preclude a district court from considering whether the facts justify a reduction in child support. Certainly, if the evidence reflects that the incarcerated parent has any assets, those assets should first be made available for the support of the child. But where, as here, it is made clear that at the present time the incarcerated parent has no assets and can do nothing about paying the child support judgment, the district court should, at a minimum, be permitted to consider that fact and not be automatically barred as we have now held. I would have reversed.