concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I respectfully dissent with respect to all but Division 1, with respect to which I concur.
Upon being apprehended, defendant admitted being in the truck with the victim and breaking out the windows. His statement also referred to the fact that the men had been paroled. Prior to trial, he moved in limine to prevent the state’s use of that portion of the statement. The court ruled that the parole reference was inadmissible on the ground that the status of defendants as parolees was irrelevant to the case and was highly prejudicial.
Despite this ruling, the police officer testified as to the defendant’s parolee status. Upon objection, the court instructed the jury “to absolutely disregard that testimony.” Defendants’ motion for mistrial on this ground was denied, which is claimed as error.
Immediately after the police officer finished testifying, the state tendered into evidence Lumpkin’s birth certificate and his parole grid sheet. Lumpkin objected to the grid sheet, but the court allowed it because it was found in the wallet. This, too, is cited as error because of the parole reference.
After the jury began deliberations, it requested that the police officer’s testimony be repeated. Over objection, the testimony was read back by the court reporter. It is unclear from the record whether only the unobjected-to portion of the testimony was reread or whether all of the testimony as well as the objection, ruling and instruction concerning the parole status were included. This is the third claimed error in regard to the parole evidence.
The trial court ruled the grid sheet admissible as having been found in the wallet and therefore identifying defendant as the perpetrator. Yet the court had previously held that the parolee status of *508the defendant was not admissible because that status was irrelevant to the issue and the reference was highly prejudicial.
Decided March 19, 1987 Rehearing dismissed April 3, 1987. Shepherd L. Howell, for appellant. Darrell E. Wilson, District Attorney, for appellee.Georgia favors the admission of any relevant evidence, no matter how slight its probative value. Sprouse v. State, 242 Ga. 831, 833 (3) (252 SE2d 173) (1979). There is an exception for evidence of independent crimes. However, “[wjhile the general rule is that a separate and independent offense is inadmissible on the prosecution for another crime, exceptions to the rule exist where there is a logical connection between the two crimes from which it can be said that proof of one crime tends to prove the other.” Harper v. State, 249 Ga. 519, 531 (292 SE2d 389) (1982). But that does not give blanket authority to admit such evidence. “[I]t has long been the rule in Georgia that evidence of an independent crime is never admissible unless the prejudice it creates is outweighed by its relevancy to the issues on trial. [Cits.]” Robinson v. State, 246 Ga. 469, 470 (2) (271 SE2d 786) (1980) cited in Cook v. State, 179 Ga. App. 610, 611 (3) (347 SE2d 664) (1986).
Where, as here, the trial court had specifically held that the parolee status sought to be introduced was highly prejudicial, it was error to admit the grid sheet over objection. It improperly injected the defendant’s character into the trial. OCGA § 24-9-20 (b); see Howell v. State, 164 Ga. App. 321 (1) (296 SE2d 367) (1982). Nothing changed to make its admission necessary to prove identity, because it was cumulative of the unobjectionable birth certificate which was also in the wallet. Moreover, there was evidence that defendant admitted he had gotten in a fight with the victim and thus there was no issue of identity. Its prejudicial nature outweighed its probative value in tending to prove the crime, in these circumstances.
While there are situations where such evidence is relevant, as in Saleem v. State, 169 Ga. App. 952 (315 SE2d 487) (1984), that is not the case here. Saleem denied being involved or present and the evidence of the independent crime was found probative of guilt in that it showed identity. Under those circumstances, the evidence was not objectionable. In the present case, the pendulum swings the other way.