I respectfully dissent.
In In re Lisa R. (1975) 13 Cal.3d 636 [119 Cal.Rptr. 475, 532 P.2d 123], cert. den. sub nom., Porzuczek v. Towner, 421 U.S. 1014 [44 L.Ed.2d 682, 95 S.Ct. 2421], this court adopted a balancing test for review of due process challenges to a conclusive presumption of paternity. That test requires a case-by-case weighing of the state’s interests in maintaining the presumption against the competing private interests in rebutting it. (In re Lisa R., supra, 13 Cal.3d at pp. 648, 651, fn. 17.)
The majority assert that substantial state interests are promoted in this case by maintenance of the conclusive presumption in Evidence Code section 621, subdivision (a).1 That assertion is completely without support, either in the majority’s opinion or in the record. Appellant Hall has a legitimate private interest in establishing that Cornelious was her natural father. In the absence of competing state interests entitled to equal or greater weight, it is a violation of due process to deny Hall the opportunity to rebut the presumption.
The recognized interests of the state in maintaining the conclusive presumption of paternity are (1) to preserve the integrity of the family unit (In re Lisa R., supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 650; Kusior v. Silver (1960) 54 Cal.2d 603, 619 [7 Cal.Rptr. 129, 354 P.2d 657]); (2) to safeguard the welfare of minor children by protecting them from the stigma of illegitimacy (In re Lisa R., supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 650), and by ensuring that parents fulfill their support obligations (County of San Diego v. Brown (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 297, 303 [145 Cal.Rptr. 483]); and (3) to ensure that titles to property and rights of inheritance will not be disturbed on the basis of evidence which is scientifically unsubstantiated (id., at p. 306), or which is unduly difficult to obtain (S. D. W. v. Holden (1969) 275 Cal.App.2d 313, 316-317 [80 Cal.Rptr. 269]). None of these interests are advanced by application of the conclusive presumption in this case.
First, permitting Hall to rebut the conclusive presumption would not threaten the integrity of an existing family unit. Her presumed father, Fuller, is dead. Since the family unit composed of Fuller, Hall, and Hall’s mother no longer exists, it cannot be disrupted by Hall’s effort to establish that Cornelious was her father. Nor would the integrity of the continuing *469relationship between Hall and her mother be jeopardized, since Hall’s mother supports her efforts to establish that Cornelious was her natural father.
Hall commenced this proceeding without Fuller’s knowledge. If Fuller had learned of her effort to prove that another man was her biological father, the integrity of their family might indeed have been threatened. However, that problem is not before this court. Fuller died without learning of this proceeding, apparently still believing that he was Hall’s natural father. On these facts, the state’s interest in preserving the integrity of family units is not advanced by application of the conclusive presumption.2
The majority appear to suggest that Hall’s action impinges on some ill-defined interest of Fuller in preserving, even from his grave, the integrity of his family unit. However, this court has held that the state’s interests in promoting marriage and preserving the integrity of family units are not served by application of the conclusive presumption when both the presumed father and the mother are dead. (In re Lisa R., supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 650.) In this case, the presumed father is dead and the mother supports her daughter’s efforts to establish her true paternity. Application of the conclusive presumption in these circumstances does nothing to preserve or promote the institutions of marriage and family.
The state’s interest in providing for the support of minor children is also inapplicable in this case. Application of the conclusive presumption of paternity may be justified to prevent a man from contesting his paternity of, and responsibility to support, a minor child who was born during his marriage to the child’s mother. Once the child has developed—and is conscious of—a familial relationship with the presumed father, applying the presumption against the presumed father serves to protect the welfare of the child. (In re Marriage of B. (1981) 124 Cal.App.3d 524, 530-531 [177 Cal.Rptr. 429].) This is true regardless of whether the man who has acted as a father is in fact the biological father. (See ibid.)
Here, however, the conclusive presumption is challenged not by the presumed father, but by the child, who is a married adult. The state’s interest *470in providing minor, dependent children with a father’s support is not implicated by Hall’s attempt to establish her true paternity.
Similarly, the policy of protecting children from the stigma of illegitimacy does not apply to an adult “child’s” voluntary and informed challenge to the conclusive presumption of paternity. An adult who voluntarily chooses to place her own legitimacy in question is capable of making an informed, mature choice to accept any attendant risks, and should be permitted to do so.
Finally, the majority suggest in passing that the conclusive presumption of paternity advances a state interest in ensuring the stability of titles and inheritance. (Majority opn., ante, at p. 465.) This pronouncement is apparently based on two decisions of the Court of Appeal: County of San Diego v. Brown, supra, 80 Cal.App.3d 297 and S. D. W. v. Holden, supra, 275 Cal.App.2d 313. Neither case actually turned on a question of title or inheritance, and neither is applicable to the facts of this case.
Brown was a county action to compel payment of child support. The child was conceived while the defendant, who was not impotent, was cohabiting with his wife. The parents later separated. The defendant made an offer of proof that it was “racially impossible” that he was the child’s father, since his wife and child were white and he was black. The trial court, applying the conclusive presumption of paternity in section 621, barred receipt of the proffered evidence. The Court of Appeal affirmed. Without citation to any authority, the court stated that “the stability of titles to property and rights of inheritance” should not be disturbed “by scientifically unsubstantiated genetic assertions.” (80 Cal.App.3d at p. 306.)
In the present case, the trial court assumed, for purposes of its ruling on the conclusive presumption issue, that Hall could prove by reliable scientific evidence that Fuller was not her biological father. Thus, Brown is inapposite here.
In S. D. W. v. Holden, supra, 275 Cal.App.2d 313, the Court of Appeal reversed a judgment entered after a jury trial in a paternity action. The jury determined that the defendant was the father and was responsible for the support of a minor child born during the mother’s marriage to another man. In reversing, the Court of Appeal held that the trial court had erroneously admitted certain evidence offered to prove that the husband could not be the biological father. (275 Cal.App.2d at p. 315.) Admission of the evidence was considered erroneous since the husband should have been conclusively presumed to be the child’s father under section 621. (Id., at pp. 314-317.)
*471The impact of the presumption on matters of inheritance was touched upon by the Holden majority in response to a point raised by the dissent. The dissent argued that the defendant should be required to supply proof of the potency of the husband in order to rely on the conclusive presumption. (Id., at pp. 319-320 (dis. opn. of Christian, J.).) The majority disagreed. Although no issue of inheritance was presented by the facts of the case, the majority expressed concern that proof that a deceased husband had not been impotent at the time of the child’s conception would often be unavailable due to the passage of time. (Holden, supra, 275 Cal.App.2d at p. 317.) In addition, the court noted that such evidence—when it was available—would often be uncertain and speculative, and that its intimate nature would present “opportunities for recrimination, fraud and blackmail.” (Ibid.)
Those concerns are irrelevant here. Hall does not seek to rebut the presumption that Fuller was her father by proof that he was impotent. Rather, she seeks to present reliable scientific evidence relating to the genetic trait for sickle cell anemia.
In any event, the state’s interest in ensuring the stability of rights of inheritance is adequately protected by various provisions of the Probate Code which require the prompt assertion and determination of claims of heirship and entitlements to distribution of estates. (See Prob. Code, §§ 1025.5, 1080, 1082.) The state’s interest is in promoting orderly distribution of estates in accordance with the order of succession required by Probate Code section 200 et seq. It has no interest in preventing any particular person from establishing that he or she is a member of one of the statutory classes entitled to inherit. It makes little sense to erect an additional barrier to a child’s claim that she is an heir entitled to distribution of an estate. The comprehensive statutory scheme specifically provides for such a claim and restricts any potential destabilizing effect that may result from its assertion.
The majority also suggest that Hall’s claim to the Cornelious estate must be weighed against the competing private interests of Cornelious’ sisters. While such a weighing of competing private interests is proper, only those interests which outweigh those asserted by the person seeking to rebut the presumption should prevail. (See Vincent B. v. Joan R. (1981) 126 Cal.App.3d 619, 625-626 [179 Cal.Rptr. 9], app. dism. (1982) 459 U.S. 807 [74 L.Ed.2d 45, 103 S.Ct. 31]. In the distribution of intestate estates, the Legislature has determined that public policy favors distribution to the closest relative. (See Prob. Code, § 200 et seq.) In light of that public policy, appellant Hall’s interest in the estate appears to outxyeigh the interests of Cornelious’ sisters.
*472The majority devote considerable space to a discussion of the recently adopted exceptions to the conclusive presumption of paternity in section 621. (Majority opn., ante, at pp. 465-466.) Those exceptions permit the mother or the presumed father to rebut the presumption by blood test evidence. The majority place particular stress on the statute of limitations applicable to those exceptions, which requires that the blood test evidence be offered within two years of the child’s birth. (§ 621, subds. (c) & (d).) The policies supporting the two-year limitation period concern the continuity of parental care and support of minor children—concerns that arise most often in the context of a presumed father’s effort to deny his paternity and avoid support obligations. (See Recent Developments, California’s Tangled Web: Blood Tests and the Conclusive Presumption of Legitimacy (1968) 20 Stan.L.Rev. 754, 761-765.) Those policies have no relevance here, where an adult “child” seeks to establish her true paternity and where parental care and child support are not in issue.
The majority stress the relatively weak private interest of appellant Hall, who seeks only to inherit property and not to establish the legal basis for an ongoing parent-child relationship. I object to characterizing her attempt to establish that Cornelious was her natural father as one undertaken “not for reasons of filial piety but solely for financial considerations. ...” and as the product of a “somewhat baser” impulse. Those gratuitous remarks fail to take into account Hall’s offer of proof that she developed a social relationship with Cornelious after being told as a teenager that he was her natural father. They also unfairly denigrate her desire to establish her true paternity, a desire no less legitimate because the most tangible benefit to be obtained is an inheritance.
Hall has a legitimate private interest in establishing that Cornelious was her natural father. The alleged state interests supporting application of the conclusive presumption of paternity do not outweigh her private interest. Under this court’s holding in In re Lisa R., supra, 13 Cal.3d 636, it is a violation of due process to deny her the opportunity to rebut this presumption. Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment.
Unless otherwise specified, all statutory references are to the Evidence Code.
Even if Fuller had learned of this proceeding and a disruption of family relations had resulted, Hall’s interest might well have outweighed the state’s interest in preserving the integrity of family units. The Legislature has already recognized that, once a child becomes an adult, the state’s interest in preserving the family unit is diminished. For example, an adult may sever the parental relationship by electing to be adopted, even without the consent of the natural parents, by any person older than the adoptee. (See Civ. Code, § 227p, subd. (a); compare Civ. Code, § 224 [consent of parents generally required for adoption of minor child].) Thus, where an adult is concerned, the state in its own laws does not recognize the interest the majority purport to protect.