dissenting.
I am somewhat astounded by the majority’s suggestion that we are, for the first time, “establishing a rule for Georgia” with respect to whether an option to purchase real estate contained in a lease is violative of the rule against perpetuities. Although the majority of the cases before this court concerned with the validity of options to purchase realty have involved options which are not contained in a lease, the rule of law upon which these cases rest is as follows: “An option to purchase realty or an interest therein which [fails to meet the requirements of Code § 85-707] as to the time within which the option may be exercised constitutes a perpetuity and is prohibited under the statute.” Smith v. Aggregate Supply Co., 214 Ga. 20, 22 (102 SE2d 539) (1958); see Code § 58-707; Brown v. Mathis, 201 Ga. 740, 745 (41 SE2d 137) (1947); Turner v. Peacock, 153 Ga. 870 (113 SE 585) (1922). This statement of Georgia law makes no distinction whatever between options in gross and options appendant. In “establishing a rule for Georgia,” the majority simply disregards *365existing Georgia law.1
In McKown v. Heery, 200 Ga. 819, 820 (38 SE2d 425) (1946), this court was concerned with the validity of an option to purchase realty contained within a lease. The court stated: “In the absence of a specified date for exercising the right of purchase, the option will be construed as operative for the term of the lease or renewal thereof, and such option would not be void as containing no time limit within which the right to purchase might be exercised. A lease agreement for a specified term of two years, containing in addition provisions for the purchase of the property, which lease and option agreement were renewed, it is contended, by action of the parties thereto for a like term of two years, would not be violative of the rule against perpetuities.” What possible concern could this court have had with the term of the lease in McKown if options to purchase were altogether exempt from the rule against perpetuities? The court obviously interpreted Turner as did the trial court in the case at bar, as did the Court of Appeals, and as do I.2 In the instant case, we have the additional benefit of the McKown decision. The majority, however, simply disregards McKown.
We must bear in mind that the rule against perpetuities is not merely a rule of judicial origin, but a statutory command. “It is true that ‘stare decisis’ is a matter of judicial policy rather than judicial power. In this regard the common law is not immutable, but flexible, and upon its own principles adapts itself to varying conditions. However, even those who regard ‘stare decisis’ with something less than enthusiasm recognize that the principle has even greater weight *366where the precedent relates to interpretation of a statute. Once the court interprets the statute, ‘the interpretation . . . has become an integral part of the statute.’ Gulf C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Moser, 275 U. S. 133, 136 (48 SC 49, 72 LE 200); Winters v. New York, 333 U. S. 507, 514 (68 SC 665, 92 LE 840). This having been done, any subsequent ‘reinterpretation’ would be no different in effect from a judicial alteration of language that the General Assembly itself placed in the statute.” Walker v. Walker, 122 Ga. App. 545, 546 (178 SE2d 46) (1970). Jones v. Swett, 244 Ga. 715, 717 (261 SE2d 610) (1979); Williams v. Ray, 146 Ga. App. 333, 334 (246 SE2d 387) (1978).
The General Assembly has had many opportunities to limit the applicability of Code § 85-707. Indeed, on one occasion, it has done so. Ga. L. 1953, p. 42 was enacted “to amend Section 85-707 of the Code of Georgia of 1933 so as to exempt from the rule against perpetuities pension, profit-sharing, stock bonus, death benefit and disability benefit trusts created by an employer for the benefit of his employees or their beneficiaries, and to permit accumulation of trust income from the same...” See Code Ann. § 85-707 (b). The legislature has not seen fit to modify the rulings of this court as to the applicability of the rule against perpetuities to options to purchase. “We must assume that its failure to do so is a matter of considered choice.” Williams v. Ray, supra at 334.
The policy arguments advanced by appellants and accepted by the majority are, in my view, meritorious.3 However, this court has previously “ascertained” the intention of the legislature with regard to whether options to purchase (whether they be in a lease or elsewhere) fall within the rule against perpetuities. The legislature has not altered that position; therefore, neither should we.
See also Thomas v. Murrow, 245 Ga. 38 (262 SE2d 802) (1980); Gearhart v. West Lumber Co., 212 Ga. 25 (90 SE2d 10) (1955); Lufburrow v. Williams, 152 Ga. App. 674 (263 SE2d 535) (1979); Floyd v. Hoover, 141 Ga. App. 588 (234 SE2d 89) (1977).
Prior to Turner, the Maryland Court of Appeals had rendered opinions on the applicability of the rule to both options to renew and options to purchase contained in a lease. See Hollander v. Central Metal &c. Co., 109 Md. 131 (71 A 442) (1908); Banks v. Haskie, 45 Md. 207 (1876). In Turner, supra at 874, the court states: “Certain cases decided by the Court of Appeals of Maryland, dealing with certain principles affecting lease systems, do not necessarily conflict with what is ruled in the cases to which we here have referenced; but if they do, they will have to yield to what seems to be the sounder view and the one supported in the cases first referred to. ” (Emphasis supplied.) The court then cites Starcher v. Duty, 61 W. Va. 373 (56 SE 524) (1907), which holds that options to purchase realty are subject to the rule against perpetuities. The language of Turner strongly suggests that the rule is applicable to options to purchase realty regardless of whether the option is in gross or appendant to a lease. The majority, however, chooses not to address the significance of this language.
This is not to say, however, that the views expressed in Turner and subsequent Georgia cases are without support. See First Huntington Nat. Bank v. Gideon-Broh Realty Co., (79 SE2d 675) (1953) and cases cited therein; see also the English cases of Worthing Corp. v. Heather, 2 Ch. 532 (1906); Woodall v. Clifton, 2 Ch. 257 (1905). Although the rule announced in First Huntington is no longer the law of West Virgina, the case was “overruled,” not by judicial fiat, but through an act of the West Virginia legislature. See W. Va. Code Ann. § 36-1-24. I submit that a legislative enactment similar to the one enacted by the West Virginia legislature is the only proper way to alter Georgia law on the matter currently before this court.