¶ 53. (dissenting). I cannot join the majority's opinion because it fails to accord to the legislature's classification the presumption of constitutionality to which it is entitled. Nothing that Nankin or the majority has presented convinces me that Wis. Stat. § 74.37(6) is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. By focusing on procedural differences, rather than the rationale for allowing property owners in less populous counties the additional remedy of court review of their tax assessments, the majority has second-guessed a presumptively reasonable statute that has guided this state for 45 years. The legislature chose to allocate remedies regarding review of property tax assessments on the basis of population. Less populated counties received three remedies; counties with 500,000 or more people received two remedies. This statute is constitutional because the population distinction is intended to relieve the judicial burden in populous courts.
¶ 54. Through its holding the majority has also called into question the myriad of other statutes which are based upon population differences. The legislature needs to be able to make policy decisions based upon the various demands which accompany differences in population. Here, the legislature made a policy decision to give one more remedy to less populated counties than to the populous counties, in order to prevent overburdening the populous counties' courts. So long as there is any reasonable basis for this legislation, we should uphold it.
¶ 55. Wisconsin Stat. § 74.37 allows all property owners the following avenues of review of their prop*119erty tax assessments. Property owners can have their assessment reviewed by a board of review under Wis. Stat. § 70.04. They can then have the board's decision reviewed by certiorari to a circuit court under § 70.47(13). Alternatively, if the assessment is under $1 million, they can file a complaint with the Wisconsin Department of Revenue in accord with § 70.85. Those who own property in counties with less than 500,000 have the additional option under § 74.37 of submitting a claim for excessive assessment, and, if the tax district or county disallows that claim, they may seek de novo review by initiating a claim in circuit court to recover the allegedly excessive assessment. This additional option does not, contrary to the majority's conclusion, mean that the legislature has irrationally deprived property owners in counties with a population of 500,000 or more of equal protection under the law.
¶ 56. As the majority acknowledges, this court must examine whether the legislature's choice to classify according to population is supported by a rational basis. Majority op. at ¶ 11. If the legislative history does not provide the rational basis, the court must construct one, if possible. Sambs v. City of Brookfield, 97 Wis. 2d 356, 371, 293 N.W.2d 504 (1980). The legislative history of Wis. Stat. § 74.37(6) does not articulate a rationale for the population classification, so it is unclear why the majority discussed the legislative history at such length.
¶ 57. The rationale for Wis. Stat. § 74.37(6) seems clear from an analysis of the statute itself. The additional process of de novo review would be too burdensome on the more populous counties. The burden on a populous county, and the concomitant burden on its courts, is already evident as only Milwaukee County Circuit Court has 47 branches, 29 more than the next *120busiest circuit court, Dane County. Wis. Stat. App. pp. 5849-5850 (1999-2000). Furthermore, Milwaukee County alone comprises a judicial administrative district, Amicus Curiae Br. at 4 n.3, and Court of Appeals District I also serves only Milwaukee County. Wis. Stat. App. p. 5645. Currently, Milwaukee County alone experiences this burden of population, but other counties are certainly growing in population, and will likely join the classification in the future. Over 120 years ago, the United States Supreme Court recognized the burden of population on the courts and that the legislature should be able to take this into consideration.
"... A uniformity which is not essential as regards different States cannot be essential as regards different parts of a State, provided that in each and all there is no infraction of the constitutional provision. Diversities which are allowable in different States are allowable in different parts of the same State... .Large cities may require a multiplication of courts and a peculiar arrangement of jurisdictions. It would be an unfortunate restriction on the powers of the State government if it could not, in its discretion, provide for these various exigencies."
State ex rel. Johnson v. Cady, 50 Wis. 2d 540, 551, 185 N.W.2d 306 (1971) (quoting Missouri v. Lewis 101 U.S. 22, 25 (1879)). As the United States Supreme Court has recognized how population places a burden on the courts, this court should have considered whether the legislature reasonably wanted to ease the additional burden of § 74.37 on populous counties.
¶ 58. For nearly a century, this court has held that the legislature may classify counties according to population. State ex rel. Scanlan v. Archibold 146 Wis. 363, 131 N.W. 895 (1911); see also Village ofWhitefish *121Bay v. Milwaukee County, 224 Wis. 373, 377, 271 N.W. 416 (1937). "That counties may be classified according to population has been said to be no longer open to doubt." Scanlan, 146 Wis. at 370. Furthermore, for the last five years, S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Town of Caledonia, 206 Wis. 2d 292, 308, 557 N.W.2d 412 (Ct. App. 1996), rev. denied, 208 Wis. 2d 212, 562 N.W.2d 602 (1997), has specifically held that Wis. Stat. § 74.37(6) does not violate equal protection, because there is a rational relationship between the classification and a legitimate governmental purpose. The majority's decision today unfortunately has the effect of overruling this line of cases that support the legislature's classification based on population.
¶ 59. In addition to overruling clear precedent, the majority now makes numerous other statutes vulnerable to an equal protection challenge. There are at least 175 Wisconsin Statutes that classify according to population. Of those, there are at least 24 that, without dispute, explicitly regulate activity based on the same population classification of "counties having a population of 500,000 or more." Wis. Stat. §§ 45.058 (memorials in populous counties), 46.215 (county department of social services in populous counties), 46.48 (grants for community programs), 48.07 (additional sources of court services), 48.561 (child welfare services in populous counties), 48.58 (county children's home), 49.025 (relief block grant to populous counties), 51.08 (maintenance of mental health complex), 59.20 (election of county officers), 59.60 (budgetary procedures), 59.79 (county board functions), 59.80 (crime commission), 59.82 (cash flow designation), 60.05 (razing buildings and excavations), 75.67 (procedures for authorized cities), 167.27 (capping and filling wells or similar structures), 228.02 (certification of records), *122228.03 (copy deemed original record), 228.04 (inspection and copies of records), 228.05 (marginal references in records), 228.06 (corrections and alterations of records), 252.076 (joint county home and county tuberculosis sanatorium), 799.05 (language of small claims summons), and 938.06 (services for court). These statutes are further justification for the conclusion that population is a distinguishable characteristic for legislation. In fact, there is an entire chapter in the statutes dealing only with the treatment of records in populous counties and cities. Wis. Stat. Ch. 228. Because the majority neglects to provide guidance regarding what is a rational distinction, these statutes, as well as all other classifications based on population, are now vulnerable to future equal protection challenges.
¶ 60. In arriving at its conclusion, the majority assumes that towns and villages in counties with a population of less than 500,000 are similarly situated to those in counties with a population greater than 500,000. Since this is just an assumption, it can reasonably be argued that towns and villages in counties with a population greater than 500,000 are not so similarly situated.
¶ 61. The majority also assumes that the legislature cannot make a distinction as to remedies based on classifications. Yet, this is exactly what the legislature has done with workers' compensation. The Worker's Compensation Act, Wis. Stat. Ch. 102, distinguishes remedies for injuries, based on the classification of employment, in order to ensure that covered employees who become injured or ill receive prompt and comprehensive medical care. UFE Inc. v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm'n, 201 Wis. 2d 274, 288, 548 N.W.2d 57 (1996).
*123¶ 62. The majority struck down Wis. Stat. § 74.37(6) because the statute distinguished remedial procedures on the basis of population. However, this is the same legislative classification this court upheld in State ex rel. Johnson v. Cady, 50 Wis. 2d 540, 185 N.W.2d 306 (1971). In Cady, this court upheld, against an equal protection challenge, a statute which provided different remedies on the basis of population. 50 Wis. 2d at 553. The statute at issue in Cady distinguished between probation revocation procedures. Probationers in counties with a population of less than 500,000 received an administrative hearing upon revocation. Id. at 551. Probationers in a county having a population of more than 500,000-Milwaukee County — received a judicial hearing upon revocation. Id. at 550. The court upheld the statute, stating: "We are not convinced that a classification established by the legislature, which provides for different procedures in counties having a population of more than 500,000, is irrational or arbitrary. Thus, the difference in procedure does not offend the constitutional provisions requiring equal protection of the law." Id. at 553.
¶ 63. Even though the similarities between this case and Cady are striking, the majority nonetheless attempts to distinguish Cady. Majority op. at ¶ 45. The legislative classification is exactly the same, as both distinguish counties with a population of less than 500,000 from counties with a population of 500,000 or more. See Cady, 50 Wis. 2d at 552. Furthermore, just like here, where the population classification determines the remedial procedure for review of tax assessments, the population classification in Cady determined the remedial procedures for probationers. And just like here, the population classification determines the difference between an administrative *124hearing and a judicial hearing.1 This court found in Cady that an identical statutory classification-based on population - was not "irrational and arbitrary," Cady, Wis. 2d at 553, and the majority's attempts to distinguish it are not convincing.
¶ 64. Moreover, the majority hangs its hat on the differences between certiorari review and de novo review. Majority op. at ¶ 25. Cady implicitly rejected this distinction, however, by concluding that, for the purposes of equal protection, there is no substantial difference between certiorari review of the administrative hearing of probation revocation and a judicial hearing (de novo) for a probationer in Milwaukee County. Here, the difference is even less significant because residents of all counties have access to certio-rari review in the circuit courts. The legislature has simply chosen to provide an additional remedy of de novo review to residents in less populous counties.
¶ 65. Without meaningful distinction, the majority refuses to rely on the similarities in Cady. The majority also fails to recognize that if there was ever a situation to require absolute equal treatment of individuals, it would be in the situation such as Cady, *125where probationers are being returned to prison. This court held in Cady, that even in a situation where a person's conditional liberty is at stake, it is not a violation of equal protection for the legislature to designate on the basis of population, procedures available to provide a remedy. Reviewing tax assessments has less severe consequences than the loss of liberty.2
¶ 66. In addition to the statute in Cady, the legislature has distinguished procedures on the basis of population in numerous other statutes as well. For example, under Wis. Stat. § 938.06, a populous county is required to operate a children's court center and in a less populous county the county department provides intake services. Under § 59.20, residents of a less populous county elect a county coroner and county surveyor, but residents of a county with a population greater than 500,000 do not. Section 74.37(6) should be upheld, because it does not deprive any individual of a review of a property tax assessment; the legislature simply chose to provide an additional remedial procedure to property owners in less populous counties.
¶ 67. The law provides us with a presumption when deciding whether a legislative classification violates equal protection guarantees. The presumption is exactly opposite of the majority's assumption that the legislature cannot make a distinction based on population. The court must presume that the legislative classification is constitutional. Milwaukee Brewers Baseball Club v. DHSS, 130 Wis. 2d 79, 387 N.W.2d 254 (1986). The court must also "indulge every pre*126sumption to sustain the law if at all possible" and resolve all doubts "in favor of the reasonableness of the classification." Majority op. at ¶¶ 10, 11. Such presumption must be overcome, if it is to be overcome, beyond a reasonable doubt. Milwaukee Brewers, 130 Wis. 2d at 99. In reaching its conclusion, the majority fails to apply the proper presumption in favor of constitutionality.
¶ 68. Contrary to the majority's conclusion, this is not the situation we had before us in Milwaukee Brewers. The challengers in Milwaukee Brewers were residents of a six-block area that were singled out by legislation, and given only the meaningless option of an informational hearing as the process to challenge an Environmental Impact Study (EIS) for building a prison. Milwaukee Brewers, 130 Wis. 2d at 96-97. This case is different because all taxpayers, including residents in Milwaukee County, are entitled to a meaningful review of their assessment by a board of review. Even without the additional claim procedure, Milwaukee County residents, unlike the challengers in Milwaukee Brewers, have such a meaningful right.
¶ 69. The situation in Milwaukee Brewers was also different because it involved new legislation, so far limiting the process to challenge an EIS review, that it essentially prevented residents from contesting the prison location. Id. at 105-106. The instant case involves a statute that has been on the books for 45 years, and the majority now, in effect, removes it, without hesitation, by holding that it is unconstitutional.
¶ 70. This legislative classification based on population is constitutional, because it meets all five of the criteria discussed by the majority as necessary to meet the rational basis standard.
*127(1) All classifications must be based upon substantial distinctions which made one class really different from another.
(2) The classification adopted must be germane to the purpose of the law.
(3) The classification must not be based upon existing circumstances only and must not be so constituted as to preclude addition to the numbers included within a class.
(4) To whatever class a law may apply, it must apply equally to each member thereof.
(5) The characteristics of each class could be so far different from those of other classes as to reasonably suggest at least the propriety, having regard to the public good, of substantially different legislation.
Milwaukee Brewers, 130 Wis. 2d at 97.
¶ 71. Under the first criteria, the majority justifies its decision by denying that population makes one class "really different from another." Majority op. at ¶ 41. The majority refuses to recognize that population distinguishes classes with different needs, conditions, or requirements with respect to the burden on the courts. See majority op. at ¶ 40. Through its denial, the majority fails to recognize that certain benefits inure to residents in populous counties. Residents of Shore-wood, as well as all other residents of Milwaukee County, are benefiting explicitly from living in a county which contains the city of Milwaukee. As a first class city, Milwaukee gets benefits and aid to which other cities are not entitled, and, often, all of the county's residents, therefore, also receive a benefit. Unlike rural Forest County, Milwaukee County is eligible for relief block grants, Wis. Stat. § 49.025, and community program grants, § 46.48. As a result of the benefits exclusive to Milwaukee County, municipalities in Mil*128waukee County, including Shorewood, benefit from the population distinction.
¶ 72. The majority also contradicts itself by first denying that population is a distinguishable factor, and later specifically recognizing legislative classifications based on population. Majority op. at ¶ 17. In footnote seven, the majority acknowledges that how tax assessment contests are heard depends on population, which directly contradicts its position that population is not a distinguishable factor. Indeed, this is direct evidence that population is a distinguishable factor, and demonstrates how the legislature regulates activity as a result of population.
¶ 73. The population classification satisfies the second criteria, because the classification adopted is germane to the purpose of the law. Milwaukee Brewers, 130 Wis. 2d at 97. The majority simply relies on its denial that population is a substantial distinction in finding that the classification does not meet this factor, in regard to a rational basis determination. As recognized in the list of statutes above, the legislature uses population as a distinguishing factor, because population has a direct effect on the burdens placed on counties. It is entirely reasonable for the legislature to choose, due to population, not to further burden the courts in populous counties. This is a rational basis to uphold § 74.37(6), and to find it constitutional.
¶ 74. The majority further believes that distinguishing population at the county line is not justified because property assessments are reviewed at the municipal level. Majority op. at ¶ 42. What the majority overlooks, however, is that Wis. Stat. § 74.37 provides for review in the circuit courts, which are organized by county. Because the legislature wanted to prevent further burdening the circuit courts in popu*129lous counties, it was entirely reasonable to distinguish population at the county line.
¶ 75. The majority fails to give the judicial burden rationale the weight it deserves, and simply dismisses it by stating, "judicial workload and timely resolution of property assessments are concerns of all counties." Majority op. at ¶ 38. However, this was the legislature's choice, and the legislature appears to have concluded that, for populous counties, the judicial workload was already too much. "Any reasonable basis for the classification will validate the statute." Milwaukee Brewers, 130 Wis. 2d at 99.
¶ 76. Although completely ignored by the majority, the third and fourth criteria for a rational basis determination are also satisfied by the population classification in § 74.37(6). Under the third factor, the classification does not rest only on existing circumstances, as others could be added to the class. Currently, only Milwaukee County is a member of the class, but as other counties grow, they will join the class as they reach the 500,000 mark. See Scanlan, 146 Wis. at 370 (recognizing that other counties "may grow into the class.")
¶ 77. The population classification also satisfies the fourth criteria since Wis. Stat. § 74.37(6) applies equally throughout the class. None of the property owners in counties with more than 500,000 people have access to the additional claim procedure.
¶ 78. Finally, the population classification also meets the fifth prong of the test, because the characteristics of each class could be so far different from the other class reasonably to suggest the propriety, in light of the public good, of substantially different legislation. Similar to the first factor, the majority finds itself "unable to identify any difference" based on population *130"that would necessitate different legislation for the classes in challenging their property assessment." Majority op. at ¶ 43. The population difference suggests that allowing more populous counties access to the additional excessive assessment claim procedure in Wis. Stat. § 74.37 might actually run afoul of the public good. Apart from the burden of the claim procedure on Milwaukee County and the tax districts in the county, having the circuit courts hold de novo trials on allegedly excessive assessments would be burdensome. Also, there may be other justifications for the additional procedure only in less populated counties. Many counties with smaller populations may have assessors, and those on the boards of review, that a majority of the property owners know. Circuit court review of excessive assessments de novo provides an additional assurance that there is no favoritism in the assessment.
¶ 79. Since the majority concluded that Wis. Stat. § 74.37(6) was unconstitutional on equal protection grounds, it did not need to address Nankin's two additional constitutional challenges: One, that § 74.37(6) violates Article IV, Section 31 of the Wisconsin Constitution as a private or special law that assesses or collects taxes.3 Two, that § 74.37(6) violates Article IV, Section 18 because it is a private or local law *131which addresses more than one subject.4 Section 74.37 violates neither constitutional provision, just as it does not violate equal protection.
¶ 80. Wisconsin Stat. § 74.37 indisputably pertains only to claims made on excessive assessments, and, as such, it has nothing at all to do with the assessment or collection of taxes. On that basis, § 74.37 does not violate Article IV, Section 31. Moreover, even if § 74.37 pertained to the assessment or collection of taxes, § 74.37 complies with the requirements for a "general" and "uniform" law under Article IV, Section 32. "This court has consistently applied certain rules for determining the legislature's competence under Wis. Const, art. IV, § 32 to pass laws affecting only certain entities, such as cities or counties of a certain class or size, notwithstanding the prohibitions of Wis. Const, article IV, section 31." Libertarian Party of Wisconsin v. State, 199 Wis. 2d 790, 803, 546 N.W.2d 424 (1996) (per curiam). These rules are the same five criteria or factors that comprise the standard for determining whether there is a rational basis for the legislative classification. Id.; see also ¶ 66 herein, above. Because the classification in § 74.37 is reasonable under the five prongs of that test, it is reasonable here, where §§ 31 and 32 of Article IV are at issue. "[I]f the legislation being challenged contains classifications which are open, germane, and relate to true differences between the entities being classified, then the legislation is considered general and of uniform application." City of Brookfield v. Milwaukee Metro. *132Sewerage Dist., 144 Wis. 2d 896, 911, 426 N.W.2d 591 (1988). In other words, even if § 74.37 addressed a tax assessment or collection, which it does not, it is a "general law" and "uniform" within the meaning of Article IV, Section 32, and therefore proper.
¶ 81. Wisconsin Stat. § 74.37 is also proper under Article IV, Section 18. Since the Article IV, Section 18 challenge arises in a classification context, the analytical framework is nearly the same as the five-part test used to evaluate equal protection and Article IV, Section 31 and Section 32 challenges. See City of Brookfield, 144 Wis. 2d at 911-12. The only difference is that the classification is not presumed to be constitutional. Id. at 912 n.5. However, even without this presumption, there is no indication that § 74.37 is "local" legislation in violation of Article IV, Section 18, even though "general in form." See Village of Whitefish Bay v. Milwaukee County, 224 Wis. 373, 378—79, 271 N.W. 416 (1937). At issue in Whitefish Bay was legislation that modified the allocation of collected delinquent taxes for municipalities in counties with a population of greater than 500,000. This court found that the classification did not make the law "local" (even though the only county with a population of greater than 500,000 was Milwaukee County) because the classification was an open one. That is, other counties could grow into it. The problem with the classification in Whitefish Bay was that it was not germane to any purpose of the law. "Counsel do not suggest, and we are unable to discover, any basis for classification resting upon population applicable to Milwaukee county that does not apply' equally to every other county in the state so far as the distribution of tax moneys is concerned." Id. at 378. Here, in contrast, the classification is germane to the purpose of Wis. Stat. § 74.37(6), namely to relieve the *133courts in the more populous counties from the additional burden of de novo review of allegedly excessive tax assessments.
¶ 82. Based upon review of the five factors necessary to determine whether there is a rational basis which justifies the legislature's population classification, and especially given that the legislature's classifications are presumed to be constitutional, I cannot join the majority's opinion. Nothing Nankin or the majority has presented convinces me that the judicial burden rationale fails to provide a rational basis for the population classification, and that § 74.37(6) is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.
¶ 83. For all of these reasons, I respectfully dissent.
¶ 84. I am authorized to state that Justice JON P. WILCOX joins this opinion.
While the classification distinctions are the same, the difference between this case and State ex rel. Johnson v. Cady, 50 Wis. 2d 540, 185 N.W.2d 306 (1971), is the review granted to each population class. In Cady, probationers in the populous county received a judicial hearing and all other probationers received an administrative hearing followed, if desired, by certi-orari review. 50 Wis. 2d 540, 549-51, 185 N.W.2d 306 (1971). The opposite is true in this case. Residents of the populous county receive administrative review and certiorari review in the circuit court, of their tax assessments. All other residents have administrative review, certiorari review, and the additional remedy of de novo review in the circuit court.
Also, arguably, in Cady, it would be more of a burden on the populous county courts to provide a judicial hearing for probation revocation. See ¶ 57 herein. Yet, this court determined that distinguishing according to population was neither irrational nor arbitrary. Cady, 50 Wis. 2d at 553.
Article IV, Section 31 provides in pertinent part that "[t]he legislature is prohibited from enacting any special or private laws in the following cases:. . .[f]or assessment or collection of taxes or for extending the time for the collection thereof."
However, the legislature may legislate on any subject prohibited in Article IV, Section 31, so long as the legislation complies with Article IV, Section 32: "The legislature may provide by general law for the treatment of any subject for which lawmaking is prohibited by section 31 of this article. Subject to *131reasonable classifications, such laws shall be uniform in their operation throughout the state."
Article IV, Section 18 provides that ”[n]o private or local bill which may be passed by the legislature shall embrace more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title."