(dissenting) — Sergio J. Turner was twice violent, disorderly, and disruptive in open court, first, during morning proceedings before trial and second, after warnings, during afternoon jury selection. Both times he was so loud, verbally abusive, threatening to the court and counsel, assaultive to his attorney, and generally disruptive, he was twice forcibly restrained and removed from the courtroom. The assaults necessitated a new defense attorney, a trial continuance, and an unjust delay of the case. The judge likely knew beforehand the charges and alleged facts indicating Mr. Turner lacked sufficient self-control to keep from choking and threatening to kill one victim while in the presence of a police officer, another assault victim. When the State rested, the court certainly knew these additional facts.
Importantly, the trial court did not exercise its discretion until confronted with actual, not potential courtroom disruptions.
Therefore, the outcome is controlled by State v. DeWeese, 117 Wn.2d 369, 380-81, 816 P.2d 1 (1991) (actual disruption), not State v. Hartzog, 96 Wn.2d 383, 635 P.2d 694 (1981) (potential disruption). Even the Hartzog court recognized the need to exercise discretion to “maintain order and prevent injury” when supported by the facts. Id. at 400. Recently our Supreme Court recognized the critical distinction between actual and potential court disruptions. State v. Finch, 137 Wn.2d 792, 846-53, 975 P.2d 967 (attempting to escape from a preliminary hearing, violent behavior before coming to court or in court, disorderly conduct in the courtroom, and disruptive behavior in court justify trial restraints), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 922, 120 S. Ct. 285, 145 L. Ed. 2d 239 (1999). A court must limit its focus to relevant factors indicating “compelling circumstances” (here: violent, disorderly, and disruptive behavior) when deciding responsive measures for maintaining courtroom security. Id. at 850.
*493Certainly, we must be forever vigilant to guard against the risk of denigrating the presumption of innocence by courtroom shackling. State v. Hutchinson, 135 Wn.2d 863, 887-88, 959 P.2d 1061 (1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1157 (1999). Nevertheless, we must be equally aware of a trial judge’s duty to maintain order, dignity, and elementary standards within the courtroom for the proper administration of criminal justice. DeWeese, 117 Wn.2d at 380. The manner of maintaining order in the courtroom is within the trial judge’s discretion. Id. The preference when exercising discretion is to seek the least disruptive remedy. Id. Here, rather than excluding Mr. Turner from the trial for “good cause shown” under CrR 3.4(a), the court chose a lesser alternative.
Significantly, the trial court twice exercised its decision-making discretion; first, when deciding how to manage the actual disruptions, and second, when granting partial relief on the motion to reconsider. Mr. Turner does not argue the first decision was an abuse of discretion. However, Mr. Turner convinced the majority that the trial court abused its discretion by not giving a sufficient Hartzog hearing regarding his potential for future disruptive behavior when he asked for reconsideration. This argument ignores the actual disruptions and the Finch court’s admonition that solely the relevant factors are to be considered. Finch, 137 Wn.2d at 850. Although Mr. Turner suggested other factors during his argument, the court decided the original disruptive factors were relevant.
Since the trial court did not initially err, the real issue is whether it abused its discretion when declining to fully reverse its earlier decision at reconsideration without reciting all Hartzog factors. “The trial court must base its decision to physically restrain a defendant on evidence which indicates that the defendant poses an imminent risk of escape, that the defendant intends to injure someone in the courtroom, or that the defendant cannot behave in an orderly manner while in the courtroom.” Finch, 137 Wn.2d at 850. The court proceeded on evidence Mr. Turner was *494actually disruptive. Our appellate standard for abuse of discretion claims is generally whether the trial court’s decision is manifestly unreasonable or exercised on untenable grounds or for untenable reasons; at times a no reasonable person/judge formulation has also been used. See State v. Scott, 72 Wn. App. 207, 230, 866 P.2d 1258 (1993), review granted, 124 Wn.2d 1001, 877 P.2d 1287 (1994), aff’d by State v. Ritchie, 126 Wn.2d 388, 894 P.2d 1308 (1995) (Forrest, J., dissenting).
Because the court gave tenable reasons and grounds (the disruptions) supporting its initial decisions, it follows that those reasons and grounds remain valid when given upon reconsideration. Moreover, courtroom security is uniquely an area that should be left to the individual judge’s discretion. Each judge should decide how best to control a disruptive or, as here, a violent litigant to best protect those present and him- or herself. Appellate courts should be reluctant to second-guess those decisions. I cannot say the trial court’s decisions were manifestly unreasonable in the sense no reasonable judge would have so ruled or proceeded. Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., 112 Wn.2d 636, 667, 771 P.2d 711, 780 P.2d 260 (1989). Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
Review granted at 141 Wn.2d 1011 (2000).