concurring specially.
I concur fully in the judgment reached by the majority but write to point out the following.
*409Decided July 9, 1996 Reconsideration dismissed August 5, 1996. Gale & Henley, Teddy L. Henley, for appellant. James R. Osborne, District Attorney, for appellee.The majority’s reliance on Davis v. State, 135 Ga. App. 203, 205 (217 SE2d 343) (1975) with regard to the State’s burden of introducing the illegal drug itself into evidence is appropriate here, because the defendant herein did not invoke the discovery provisions of OCGA § 17-16-1 et seq.
OCGA § 17-16-4 (a) (3), effective January 1, 1995, provides in pertinent part: “The prosecuting attorney shall, no later than ten days prior to trial, or as otherwise ordered by the court, permit the defendant at a time agreed to by the parties or ordered by the court to inspect. . . tangible objects . . . which are within the possession, custody, or control of the state or prosecution and . . . were obtained from or belong to the defendant.”
The defendant must elect by written notice to the prosecuting attorney to have this article apply to his case. OCGA § 17-16-2. No discovery invocation was made by the defendant herein, and therefore the majority appropriately does not address any affirmative duty which the State might have in regard to the preservation of evidence where the provisions of OCGA § 17-16-1 et seq. have been invoked by the defendant.