(concurring in the result) — I agree entirely with the view expressed in the majority opinion, that a suspension invoked under § 2 of the statute does not preclude the chief from thereafter proceeding with disciplinary action under § 3 and subsequent sections.
On this I would only add that petitioner’s reference to the common-law principles of election of remedies and res judicata seem to me inappropriate. The question is one of statutory construction, and, as indicated by the majority, there is nothing in the statutes which warrants the conclusion that the two disciplinary procedures are mutually exclusive. Cases from other jurisdictions, cited by petitioner, involve statutes which are differently worded and so call for a different construction.
*835But I do not agree with the majority that the chief invoked the suspension procedure of § 2. The notice of June 10, 1953, as quoted in the majority opinion, makes reference to ROW 43.43.070 (§ 3 of the statute). This is the section which relates to discharge, demotion, or suspension for more than thirty days. The next section, RCW 43.43.080 (§ 4 of the statute), provides for suspension “pending the hearing” referred to in § 3. It is this suspension procedure which was sought to be invoked, and not that of § 2. This is demonstrated not only by the statutory citations in the notice of June 10, 1953, but in the body of that notice, which refers to the filing of formal charges, the right to submit a written resignation or waiver of hearing, and the convening of a trial board.
A further indication that the chief sought to invoke the suspension procedure of § 4, rather than that of § 2, is found in the fact that the second notice, which was concededly for the purpose of following § 4 procedure, is identical with the first notice, except as to the date the suspension was to commence. Respondent’s counsel confirms the view here expressed, for he states in his brief:
“There is nothing in or out of the record indicating the chief ‘prosecuted to finality’ a mode of punishment, or ‘selected’ a different mode than that provided in section 3, and sections following, chapter 205, Laws of 1943, providing for written charges.”
The attempt to invoke the suspension procedure of § 4 was a nullity, because when this notice was served no written complaint was served and no hearing thereon could be said to be pending. Suspensions under § 4 are authorized only “pending such hearing.” Powers conferred upon a public officer can be exercised only in the manner and under the circumstances prescribed by law, and when this is not done, the attempted exercise of such powers is a nullity. In re Elvigen’s Estate, 191 Wash. 614, 71 P. (2d) 672; In re Jullin, 23 Wn. (2d) 1, 158 P. (2d) 319, 160 P. (2d) 1023.
Since the original notice of suspension was a nullity, it does not stand in the way of a legally effectual notice. While *836the result is unfortunate from petitioner’s standpoint, in that he acquiesced in a void notice of suspension, this does not prevent the chief from starting over again in a legal manner. The principle of estoppel has no application, and petitioner makes no such contention. In legal contemplation, petitioner .Is chargeable with knowing that the original suspensión procedure was invalid. • This is in keeping with the principle that everyone is required to take notice of the extent of authority conferred by law on a person acting, in) an official capacity. See the cases cited in 43 Am. Jur. 73;- “Public -Officers,” § 256, notes 16 and 17..