dissenting.
The only question to be decided in this case is the following: Was defendant Lance Harmon acting within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident?
The facts are not disputed and show that on 22 July 1972, Harmon, an enlisted man on active duty with the Air Force, had just finished a duty shift and, while still on the base, was driving to his off-base residence in his personal automobile. Driscoll, a civilian employed by General Electric Corporation on the base, was a pedestrian crossing the street from the parking lot to the facility when he was struck by Harmon’s automobile.
We have held, in accord with the Restatement of Agency, Second, §§ 220, 228, and 229, that various matters of fact may be considered in determining whether an employee is acting within the scope of his employment, so as to make the principle of respondeat superior fairly applicable. State v. Superior Court, In and For County of Maricopa, 111 Ariz. 130, 524 P.2d 951 (1974); Throop v. F. E. Young and Company, 94 Ariz. 146, 382 P.2d 560 (1963). We have stated “the ultimate fact, which these evidentiary facts are merely intended to assist * * * in determining, is whether the alleged servant is subject to the other’s control or right to control * * Consolidated Motors, Inc. v. Ketcham, 49 Ariz. 295, 306, 66 P.2d 246, 250 (1937); accord, Williams v. Wise, 106 Ariz. 335, 476 P.2d 145 (1970).
One of the means of ascertaining if a right to control exists is to determine whether the employer has the power to supervise the employee’s “method of reaching a desired result,” Hughes v. Industrial Commission, 113 Ariz. 517, 518, 558 P.2d 11, 12 (1976), or whether, “if instructions were given, they would have to be obeyed.” First Nat. Ben. Soc. v. Sisk, 65 Ariz. 1, 8, 173 P.2d 101, 105 (1946). It is not whether the employer actually exercised such power that must be considered, but whether the power exists. Hughes, supra.
Although I agree that workmen’s compensation decisions are not necessarily controlling in cases concerning common law tort liability, Throop v. F. E. Young and Company, supra, it would appear that questions concerning whether a person was acting in the scope and course of his employment are particularly appropriate for answer by the law of workmen’s compensation *18where spatial and temporal boundaries are part of the question of the right to control.
In compensation cases Arizona follows the so-called “going and coming” rule which provides that hazards encountered by employees going to and from work are not necessarily covered by industrial insurance. City of Phoenix v. Industrial Commission, 104 Ariz. 120, 449 P.2d 291 (1969); McKay v. Industrial Commission, 103 Ariz. 191, 438 P.2d 757 (1968); Malinski v. Industrial Commission, 103 Ariz. 213, 439 P.2d 485 (1968); Burns v. Wheeler, 103 Ariz. 525, 446 P.2d 925 (1968).
An exception to the going and coming rule is the “on premises” rule. Larson has stated it as follows:
“The course of employment is not confined to the actual manipulation of the tools of the work, nor to the exact hours of work. On the other hand, while admittedly the employment is the cause of the workman’s journey between his home and the factory, it is generally taken for granted that workmen’s compensation was not intended to protect him against all the perils of that journey. Between these two extremes, a compromise on the subject of going to and from work has been arrived at, largely by case law, with a surprising degree of unanimity: for an employee having fixed hours and a place of work, going to and from work is covered on the employer’s premises.”
1 A. Larson, The Law of Workmen’s Compensation § 15.11, p. 4-3 (1972). (emphasis in original)
The “on premises” exception to the “going and coming” rule, the majority view in the United States, was not followed in Arizona until recently. In McCamphell v. Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks, 71 Ariz. 244, 226 P.2d 147 (1950), we rejected the on premises rule; and our Court of Appeals in Sendejaz v. Industrial Commission, 4 Ariz.App. 309, 420 P.2d 32 (1966) held that an employee who worked at the Arizona Biltmore Hotel and was injured while riding home on a motor scooter while still on a road on his employer’s premises was not acting in the scope and course of ’ employment.
This court, however, in Pauley v. Industrial Commission, 109 Ariz. 298, 508 P.2d 1160 (1973), reversed McCampbell v. Benevolent & Protective Order of Elks, supra, as well as cases following it, stating:
“ * * * We hold that when an employee is going to or coming from his place of work and is on the employer’s premises he is within the protective ambit of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, at least when using the customary means of ingress and egress or route of employee’s travel or is otherwise injured in a place he may reasonably be expected to be.” 109 Ariz. at 302, 508 P.2d at 1164.
In the instant case, the defendant was still on his employer’s premises and he was under the control of the United States government. As was pointed out in the brief, the military controls the traffic on the base and everything within the physical boundaries. The fact that Luke Air Force Base is a self-contained community including houses, stores and recreational areas does not make any difference. The defendant was still on his employer’s premises, and he was subject to their control.
I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.