concurring.
I concur in the result reached by the majority opinion. But I disagree with the majority insofar as it holds that the Employment Security Commission may reconsider a prior decision only if such authority is expressly granted by statute in the Wyoming Employment Security Act. I agree with Justice Urbigkit’s special concurrence and would also hold that an agency may reconsider its prior decision if it has promulgated rules governing such reconsideration.
URBIGKIT, Justice,concurring, with whom THOMAS, Chief Justice, joins.
I concur in the result of the majority opinion, except to determine only that an agency does not possess the right to reconsider a decision in the absence of adopted rules of procedure. I do not agree that “the ESC may create and employ a reconsideration procedure only if that authority can be found somewhere in the Wyoming Employment Security Law.” I would hold *228that an agency, with the general powers to adopt rules of procedure when granted by the legislature, may reconsider a decision if the agency has adopted rules pursuant to the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act regarding such reconsideration procedures, at a time when the post-decision appeal time has not expired. See § 27-3-506(d), W.S.1977, 1985 Cum.Supp., and appellate Rule 12.04, W.R.A.P.
The authority of the Employment Security Commission is statutorily stated in the same general form as for many state agencies:
“(a) The commission shall:
* * * .* ⅜ *
“(ii) Determine its organization and methods of procedure in accordance with this act;
¡fc ⅜ ⅜: ⅜: * ⅜
“(b) The commission may adopt, amend or rescind rules and regulations after notice and public hearing in accordance with the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act.” Section 27-3-602, W.S.1977, 1985 Cum.Supp.
The principle to be addressed is whether that rule-making authority includes the power to provide for the adoption of rules for a rehearing process under the time constraints otherwise provided by Wyoming law for the ultimate right to appeal to the courts. In order to accommodate the modern theories of administrative procedure, I would hold that the Wyoming law is sufficient to permit the adoption of these procedural rules and to permit agency case rehearings in the same general fashion as is now available to the trial courts of this state as the other fact finders in the Wyoming adjudicatory system. Koch, Administrative Law and Practice § 1.21, p. 38.1
To authenticate this approach, the Wyoming legislature enacted the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act as § 16-3-101, et seq., W.S.1977 (1982 Replacement):
“General rulemaking requirements; assistance of attorney general.
“(a) In addition to other rulemaking requirements imposed by law, each agency shall:
“(i) Adopt rules of practice setting forth the nature and requirements of all formal and informal procedures available in connection with contested cases;
Sfc Sfc * * * *
“(c) In formulating rules of practice as required by this section, each agency may request the assistance of the attorney general and upon request the attorney general shall assist the agency or agencies in the preparation of rules of practice.” Section 16-3-102.
A rule for this purpose is defined by § 16-3-101(b)(ix), W.S.1977:
“(ix) ‘Rule’ means each agency statement of general applicability that implements, interprets and prescribes * * * procedures, or practice requirements of any agency.”
The Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure recognize the potential rehearing process:
“In a contested case, or in a noncontest-ed case where a statute places a time limit on appeal, the petition for review shall be filed within thirty (30) days after written, certified notice to all parties of the final decision of the agency or denial of the petition for a rehearing, or, if a rehearing is held, within thirty (30) days after written, certified notice to all par*229ties of the decision thereon * * *.” (Emphasis added.) Rule 12.04, W.R.A.P.
See Big Horn County Commissioners v. Hinckley, Wyo., 593 P.2d 573 (1979).
The majority opinion in this case is correct in assessing the status of the law as less than unanimous. Three basic rules exist, with a number of deviations for specific circumstances.
The rule adopted in the majority opinion is the statutory requirement standard, as particularly reflected in a Hawaiian case, Yamada v. Natural Disaster Claims Commission, 54 Hawaii 621, 513 P.2d 1001 (1973). But see Kahalekai v. Doi, 60 Hawaii 324, 590 P.2d 543 (1979), where apparently the discretionary rehearing process existed. Most but not all California cases are in accord. Cf. Koehn v. State Board of Equalization, Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 166 Cal.App.2d 109, 333 P.2d 125, 128 (1958), and Heaps v. City of Los Angeles, 6 Cal.2d 405, 57 P.2d 1323 (1936), with In re Fain, 135 Cal.Rptr. 543, 65 Cal.App.3d 376 (1976). A differential may be determined by which an agency is subject to the California Administrative Procedure Act, id. at 537, Chas. L. Harney, Inc. v. State, 217 Cal.App.2d 77, 31 Cal. Rptr. 524 (1963). In general accord with this rule, at least in earlier times, see Arizona Magma Copper Co. v. Arizona State Tax Commission, 67 Ariz. 77, 191 P.2d 169 (1948). See also Pearce Hospital Foundation v. Illinois Public Aid Commission, 15 Ill.2d 301, 154 N.E.2d 691 (1958); Slosburg v. City of Omaha, 183 Neb. 839, 165 N.W.2d 90 (1969). But see American Smelting & Defining Co. v. Arizona Air Pollution Control Hearing Board, 113 Ariz. 243, 550 P.2d 621, 622 (1976):
“A board, commission or tribunal can use its appropriate modification power to reconsider decisions until the time when an appeal is perfected.”
The second rule, designated as the inherent-authority rule, is derived from a theory of jurisprudence that the nature of the task appointed to the administrative agency and its responsibility in performance affords an inherent authority for a rehearing opportunity to reconsider a previous result. Most federal cases fall into this category, and the rule is likewise found in a substantial number of states. Lane v. United States ex rel. Mickadiet, 241 U.S. 201, 36 S.Ct. 599, 60 L.Ed. 956 (1916); Trujillo v. General Electric Co., 621 F.2d 1084 (10th Cir. 1980); Lyons v. Delaware Liquor Commission, 44 Del. 304, 58 A.2d 889 (1948); Air-Way Branches v. Board of Review, Division of Employment Security, 10 N.J. 609, 92 A.2d 771 (1952); Henry v. Department of Labor, Del.Super., 293 A.2d 578 (1972); United States v. Sioux Tribe, 616 F.2d 845, 222 Ct.Cl. 421, cert. denied in Yankton Sioux Tribe v. United States, 446 U.S. 953, 100 S.Ct. 2920, 64 L.Ed.2d 810 (1980); State ex rel. Republic Steel Corp. v. Environmental Board of Review, 54 Ohio St.2d 75, 374 N.E.2d 1355 (1978); 73A CJS Public Administration Procedure § 161, p. 151.
Some detail of the various mutations can be elicited from Annot., 73 A.L.R.2d 932, 933, with supplements, and 73A C.J.S., Public Administration Procedure § 161, supra.
A close look at a significant number of cases in individual states causes questions of consistency, as, for example, California and Arizona, and the differences may be derived from statutory factors not clearly disclosed by the opinions.
The third rule, which applies logic and will best accommodate Wyoming law and legislative procedure, is to acknowledge that the general power provisions of the normal agency statute, including the ability and obligation to adopt rules of procedure, afford the right through those provisions and the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act to adopt the additional rules as part of the hearing process which provide agency procedural flexibility by rehearing. Some states have an express provision in their administrative procedures act, as, for example, Pennsylvania. See Commonwealth, Department of Environmental Resources v. Wolford, 16 Pa.Commw. 254, 329 A.2d 304 (1974).
*230Without requiring specific additional statutory provision, this recommended approach of statutory adoption permits an agency through its rule-making process to provide any rehearing arrangements as are deemed necessary or useful within appeal-right time constraints. Conversely, this approach affords the legislature an opportunity to deny rights of rehearing for the individual agency by specific language in the general powers provisions for that particular agency. The agency has more time and more expertise to deal with the governmental mission than can be afforded by the legislature as otherwise would be required for individual agency statutory approval for each rule adoption. Koch, supra at pp. 127-128. It should not necessarily be assumed that a particular agency will want a rehearing process, since it might afford an automatic additional pleading stage and de-cisional requirement which the agency would prefer to avoid. Other agencies, such as the Public Service Commission, which incidentally does have the statutory authority, might find that the complexity of the issues to be decided justifies and accommodates a second-look opportunity of the nature that would be afforded by a rehearing rule as a matter of discretion of the agency, and for exercise of the discretion of the agency in the utilization of the adopted rule, if any. United States v. Pierce Auto Freight Lines, 327 U.S. 515, 535, 66 S.Ct. 687, 697-98, 90 L.Ed. 821 (1946); Duvin v. State Department of Treasury, Public Emp. Retirement System, 76 N.J. 203, 386 A.2d 842 (1978); Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 18.09, pp. 605, 610.
Additionally, it should be recognized that the statutory requirement standard is logically not necessarily constrained to “state” agencies and could rationally envelop all public instrumentalities created by legislative authorization, as might include hospital boards, weed and pest control districts, the community development authority, and even city councils. There are many governmental agencies in Wyoming which function by virtue of statutory provisions, permitting adoption of rules and regulations for operational procedure.
In the absence of the repeal of the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act, which repeal is highly unlikely, this court is mandated to require agency rule adoption in accord with its terms as a predicate for power or procedure exercise.2 Monahan v. Board of Trustees of Elementary School District No. 9, Fremont County, Wyo., 486 P.2d 235 (1971); Yeik v. Department of Revenue and Taxation, Wyo., 595 P.2d 965 (1979).
The process which I recommend is consistent by discussion of either a statute or a rule, with an Illinois decision, Klaren v. Board of Fire and Police Commissions of Village of Westmont, 99 Ill.App.2d 356, 240 N.E.2d 535 (1968), and Olson v. Borough of Homestead, 66 Pa.Commw. 120, 443 A.2d 875 (1982). A case specifically in point is Atlantic Greyhound Corporation v. Public Service Commission of West Virginia, 132 W.Va. 650, 54 S.E.2d 169 (1949). See State ex rel. Klotter v. Police Board of City of New Orleans, 51 La. Ann. 747, 25 So. 637 (1899); Helvering v. Continental Oil Co., 63 App.D.C. 5, 68 F.2d 750 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied 292 U.S. 627, 54 S.Ct. 629, 78 L.Ed. 1481 (1933); Annot., 73 A.L.R.2d 939, 955.
Atlantic Greyhound affords a thoughtful discussion of the view which I recommend that this court should rationally adopt.
Based upon the statutory premise that “the commission may prescribe rules of practice and procedure, and the method and manner of holding hearings,” the West Virginia agency adopted a rule which “authorizes rehearing as a proceeding upon petition, duly verified, filed within ten days after final decision in the case.” The court, in reference to the adopted rule, said:
*231“Denial of the authority of the commission to rehear a matter of which it has jurisdiction, in view of its power to prescribe rules of practice and procedure * * * would disrupt the orderly discharge of the duties and the functions which the Legislature, by the enactment of statutes, has required it to perform, produce confusion and uncertainty, and add to the number and the frequency of unnecessary appeals. Unless legally necessary, a conclusion which produces those results should not be adopted. In the absence of any limitation or precept of law which requires disavowal of that right, and it seems that there is none, the power of the commission to rehear a proceeding of which it has and retains jurisdiction will be recognized and its effective operation sustained and upheld.” 54 S.E.2d at 175-176.
I also find support in another Wyoming case involving the Employment Security Commission, Sage Club, Inc., v. Employment Security Commission of Wyoming, Wyo., 601 P.2d 1306 (1979), as a significant step in looking to the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act rather than to specific legislation for guidance in agency procedural matters.3 This court in Sage Club acknowledged that the Unemployment Compensation statute “sets out an elaborate scheme providing for judicial review.” Id. at 1308. The court then determined that judicial review of final decisions of the Employment Security Commission is governed by the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act and by court rule,4 and that inconsistent statutes in the Employment Security Law were superseded. The court wrote that:
“ * * * While the statutes which govern the activities of the E.S.C. are extraordinarily detailed in setting out the rules which govern that agency’s operations and also set out in detail the procedures for conducting hearings in contested cases, as well as providing a specific procedure for judicial review of final agency determinations, the E.S.C. is not immune from the terms of the W.A.P.A.” •601 P.2d at 1308.
Just as this court in Sage Club ruled that the provisions of the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act superseded the specific Employment Security Law statutes on judi- ■ cial review, it could have with equal justification ruled that the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act superseded the Employment Security Law statutes regarding agency operations and contested-case procedures. This court may have in fact done just that in the quoted sentence.
The Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act has been in effect in Wyoming since 1965, Ch. 108, S.L. of Wyoming 1965. Agencies, lawyers, contestants, and regulated parties have become accustomed to its requirements. Quoting again from Sage Club, supra:
“ * * * The readily apparent purpose of the W.A.P.A. was to provide uniform procedures to be followed in the adoption, of rules and in conducting contested hearings.” 601 P.2d at 1308.
Some agencies may have specific statutory authority to reconsider decisions while others do not. An example of an agency with rehearing authority is the Public Service Commission. See § 37-2-214, W.S. 1977. A similar statute for other agencies was not found. These inconsistencies are not based on conscious decisions by the legislature to distinguish agencies which should have authority to reconsider from agencies which should not have that authority. The Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act, as a conscious legislative act, did provide a mechanism for agencies to adopt procedural ground rules which guide agency decisionmaking in a predictable manner.5 First National Bank of Ther*232mopolis v. Bonham, Wyo., 559 P.2d 42 (1977). Had the Employment Security Commission previously adopted a rule allowing for reconsideration, Mr. Hupp would not have been taken by surprise in this case when the agency decided to reconsider its decision.
Correction of a patent error at the administrative level will save the judiciary time and may save the parties the expense of an appeal. Both are desirable objectives. They should not be foreclosed by requiring specific statutory authority to reconsider a decision when the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act’s rulemaking statutes serve as a mechanism to create needed procedural rules for an agency to reconsider its own erroneous decisions. The legislature, in any event, retains the right to ultimate decision through the text of the Administrative Procedure Act or by specific provisions in the individual agency statutes. The additional control afforded through the rules review process, § 28-9-101 et seq., W.S.1977 (1984 Replacement), in conjunction with the Administrative Procedure Act, § 16-3-101 et seq., is a very significant legislative restraint. See XIV Land & Water L.Rev., supra, for a discussion of the rather unusual process as retained administrative and legislative control or supervision as providing for participation by the attorney general, § 16 — 3—102(c); approval by the governor, § 16 — 3—103(d); and also review by the legislature, § 28-9-101 et seq., and § 16-3-103(a)(i).
I concur in the reversal, but would not deny agency authority to adopt reasonable rules of procedure to afford a discretionary rehearing process.
. The basic goal and responsibilities for an administrative law system as accommodated by the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act is expressively discussed by Koch, supra, § 1.11, p. 25, to facilitate the optimum delivery of government services to the public with fairness, responsiveness and efficiency. See also Bloomen-thal, Administrative Law in Wyoming — An Introduction and Preliminary Report, 16 Wyo. LJ. 191 (1962), and Comment, The Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act, I Land & Water L.Rev. 497 (1966). Of interest generally on the adaptation of the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act see Administrative Law, Wyoming Style, XVIII Land & Water L.Rev. 223 (1983); Singer, Administrative Regulation Review — Act II, XV Land & Water L.Rev. 205 (1980); and Comment, Wyoming’s Administrative Regulation Review Act, XIV Land & Water L.Rev. 189 (1979).
. This court was advised at oral argument that the Employment Security Commission has, since this case developed, adopted a rule of procedure for rehearing. The majority would void that rule, which I would not choose to do.
.The definition of agency in the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act includes commissions. Section 16-3-101(a)(i), W.S.1977.
. Specifically governed by Rule 12, W.R.A.P., which, at the time the Sage Club dispute arose, was Rule 72.1, W.R.C.P.
. An administrative agency should have the authority to reconsider and correct its own deci*232sions, especially when a decision is determined upon reflection to be obviously erroneous. District courts need not be burdened with correcting errors which become obvious to an agency before the agency loses jurisdiction when the judicial appeals process is invoked. Anchor Casualty Co. v. Bongards Co-Op Creamery Ass’n, 253 Minn. 101, 91 N.W.2d 122, 73 A.L.R.2d 933 (1958); American Smelting & Refining Co. v. Arizona Air Pollution Control Hearing Board, 113 Ariz. 243, 550 P.2d 621 (1976); State ex rel. Republic Steel Corp. v. Environmental Board of Review, 54 Ohio St.2d 75, 8 Ohio.Ops.3d 79, 374 N.E.2d 1355 (1978).