dissenting:
I respectfully dissent.
The majority’s interpretation of what constitutes a “proprietary interest” within the context of the arson statute violates a fundamental tenet of statutory construction. In recognition of the necessity to give all persons fair notice of what constitutes a criminal act, penal statutes which proscribe certain conduct must be strictly construed in favor of the accused. People v. Home Insurance Co., - Colo. -, 591 P.2d 1036 (1979); People v. Cornelison, 192 Colo. 337, 559 P.2d 1102 (1977). It is basic to this tenet that courts should not “depart from the plain meaning of words in search of a legislative intention the words themselves do not express.” People v. Mooney, 87 Colo. 567, 571, 290 P. 271, 272 (1930). In my view, the majority has done just that.
*499In its normal use, the term “proprietary interest” connotes an ownership interest in the subject property. See Black’s Law Dictionary 1358 (4th ed., rev. 1968); Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1819 (1961). A lien created as security for an obligation is not an ownership interest and therefore is not included within the plain meaning of “proprietary interest.” It may be that sound public policy would dictate that “property of another” should have been defined to include security interests. See section 18-4-101(3), C.R.S. 1973. However, any such policy is not expressed by the language of the statute. We may not extend the reach of the arson statute either by implication or construction. People v. Home Insurance Co., supra.