concurring.
I concur in Judge Moore’s opinion in all respects but one: I would hold that sufficient evidence supported the district court’s finding of probable cause.
Here, the district court considered five pieces of evidence that, when taken “in the light most likely to support [its denial of the motion to suppress],” United States v. Davis, 514 F.3d 596, 607 (6th Cir.2008), support that finding. First, the court knew the informant’s identity. Second, the police found 41 grams of cocaine in the informant’s car. Third, the informant said he picked up the cocaine earlier that day from a specific address, which the police verified to be Higgins’ residence. Fourth, two passengers — when separated and interviewed independently' — said the informant had driven them to Higgins’ residence that day. And fifth, the informant identified Higgins as the seller, and disclosed that he had purchased narcotics from Higgins at that residence on another occasion as well.
This evidence brings the case within the purview of United States v. Allen, 211 F.3d 970, 976 (6th Cir.2000). The informant was reliable; he was a “known person”; two independent sources corroborated his statements regarding his whereabouts that day; and the informant admitted to his own prior criminal conduct. There was also a factual foundation for the informant’s claim of witnessing a recent crime: Namely, he was caught red-handed with cocaine, which by his own account he had just purchased from Higgins. Consequently, “a neutral and detached magistrate [could] believe that evidence of a crime [would] be found” at Higgins’ residence, id., and the district court properly denied his motion to suppress.
My disagreement with Judge Moore ultimately does not matter much, since the issue does not affect our disposition of the case. She holds, and I join her in holding, that the Leon good-faith exception applies here.
For these reasons, I join all but section II.A.2.a of Judge Moore’s opinion.