concurring in part; dissenting in part.
I concur in the majority’s disposition of the wrongful death claim. However, the majority is wrong in reversing the dismissal of the child’s personal injury claim, because it fails to analyze Banda v. Danner, 87 Or App 69, 741 P2d 514 (1987), aff’d 307 Or 302 (1988), and says that our later decision in Lawson v. Coos Co. Sch. Dist. #13, 94 Or App 387, 765 P2d 829 (1988), is not relevant.
The 2-year limitation on actions against public bodies, which the majority only mentions, is in ORS 30.275(8):
“Except as provided in ORS 12.120 and 12.135, but notwithstanding any other provision of ORS chapter 12 or other statute providing a limitation on the commencement of an action, an action arising from any act or omission of a public body or an officer, employee or agent of a public body within the scope of ORS 30.260 to 30.300 shall be commenced within two years after the alleged loss or injury.”
In Lawson v. Coos Co. Sch. Dist. #13, supra, the plaintiffs minor ward was injured on the defendant’s property in 1982. More than 2 years later, she filed a negligence action, contending that the “notwithstanding” language of that statute applies only to provisions in chapter 12 and other statutes that limit the commencement of an action. Because ORS 12.160 extends the time for a minor to commence an action,1 *568she argued that it is not subject to the 2-year time limit provided in ORS 30.275(8). We disagreed:
“The statute states two exceptions to the two-year limitation: ORS 12.120 and ORS 12.135. Immediately following the exception language, the statute provides that the two-year limitation applies ‘notwithstanding any other provision of ORS chapter 12 or other statute providing a limitation on the commencement of an action.’ Further, the statute sets out the ‘notwithstanding’ provisions in the alternative: The time limit applies (1) notwithstanding any other provision of ORS chapter 12 and (2) notwithstanding any other statute providing a limitation on the commencement of an action.
“Our conclusion that the two-year limitation is not tolled by plaintiffs minority status is further supported by the fact that, in another subsection of ORS 30.275, minority status is specifically addressed. ORS 30.275(2) provides:
“ ‘(2) Notice of claim shall be given within the following applicable period of time, not including the period, not exceeding 90 days, during which the person injured is unable to give the notice because of the injury or because of minority[,] incompetency or other incapacity:
“ ‘(a) For wrongful death, within one year after the alleged loss or injury.
“ ‘(b) All other claims, within 180 days after the alleged loss or injury.’ ” 94 Or App at 390. (Emphasis in original; footnote omitted.)
Lawson is correct. ORS 12.160 does not extend the time to a maximum of 5 years for a minor to commence an action under OTCA and, even if it did, it does not say that the time to commence an action does not start to run until a guardian ad litem has been appointed for the minor. It is also clearly correct in pointing out that ORS 30.275(2) specifically addresses the minority status of the injured person. The legislature has provided that a minor has an additional 90 days after the loss or injury, not after the appointment of a guardian ad litem, to give notice of a claim. The majority would add a new and significantly different condition to all of *569those statutes: The time does not start to run until a guardian ad litem has been appointed. We do not have authority to do that, ORS 174.010,2 even if it were wise to do so, which is questionable.
A superficial reading of Banda v. Danner, supra, might lead one to believe, as does the majority, that we held that the time under ORS 30.275 does not begin to run until a guardian ad litem has been appointed for the minor and the guardian has knowledge of sufficient facts to assert a claim. Although we did use words to that effect, it was not necessary for our decision. The plaintiff alleged that her child was injured at birth in 1981 as a result of the defendants’ negligence. No tort claim notice was given until 1984. The key that unlocks the mystery of that case is contained in its note 4:
“Plaintiff argues that the version of ORS 30.275 in effect when Jose was born applies. It would allow an additional five years to bring the action because of Jose’s minority. The 1981 amendments to the statute, which became effective January 1,1982, abolished the five-year tolling of the Statute of Limitations under the Tort Claims Act. We have held that the amendments do not apply to a claim which accrued before their effective date. Bergstad v. Thoren, 86 Or App 70, 738 P2d 223 (1987). Because the notice and limitations periods begin to run at the same time, Adams v. Oregon State Police, 289 Or 233, 611 P2d 1153 (1980), we need not decide whether the amendments apply to this case. If the claim accrued in March or April, 1982, as defendant argues, the tort notice was untimely. If it did not, defendant’s action is not barred. When the claim accrued is a question of fact.” 87 Or App at 72 n 4. (Emphasis supplied.)
We went on to point out that the evidence was that, when the mother first looked into a possible claim in March or April, 1982, she was advised that her child did not have a claim against anyone. It was not until after she had been appointed guardian ad litem and filed the action in January, 1984, that she had reason to believe that the defendant’s *570negligence had contributed to her child’s injury. The guardian ad litem’s notice, therefore, was timely, and the action was commenced within 2 years, after plaintiffs discovery. Therefore, summary judgment for the defendant was error. The case does not hold that the time did not begin to run until a guardian ad litem had been appointed, although there is language in the opinion to that effect. Although Banda was correctly decided, I would disapprove that language and limit the case to its facts.
The purpose of OTCA is to give the public body timely notice of a tort claim and to allow its officers an opportunity to investigate the claim promptly to ascertain all of the facts. Leonard v. State Highway Dept., 52 Or App 923, 928, 630 P2d 885, rev den 291 Or 662 (1981). The majority’s misapplication of Banda v. Danner, supra, would effectively nullify the timely notice requirement, ORS 30.275(2), and the 2-year Statute of Limitations. ORS 30.275(8).
The majority cites Perez v. Bay Area Hospital, 112 Or App 288, 829 P2d 700 (1992), in which we relied solely on Banda v. Danner, supra, without discussion or analysis and ignored Lawson. That case is wrong for the same reason that the majority is wrong in this case.
Because I would affirm the dismissal of both claims, I dissent.
ORS 12.160 provides, in relevant part:
“If, at the time the cause of action accrues, any person entitled to bring an action mentioned in ORS 12.010 to 12.050 and 12.070 to 12.250 is:
“(1) Within the age of 18 years;
*568tint; * * * *
“the time of such disability shall not be a part of the time limited for the commencement of the action; but the period within which the action shall be brought shall not be extended more than five years by any such disability, nor shall it be extended in any case longer than one year after such disability ceases. ”
ORS 174.010 provides:
“In the construction of a statute, the office of the judge is simply to ascertain and declare what is, in terms or in substance, contained therein, not to insert what has been omitted, or to omit what has been inserted; and where there are several provisions or particulars such construction is, if possible, to be adopted as will give effect to all.”