State v. Jordan

Reed, C.J.

(dissenting)—I must respectfully dissent. In my view, this case is controlled by State v. Brown, 9 Wn. App. 937, 515 P.2d 1008 (1973), a well reasoned opinion by Division One of this. court. The distinction which the majority attempts to draw between this case and Brown is illusory. Brown was not decided on the basis of a lesser expectation of privacy in a motel room as opposed to a private residence. In fact, except for certain expected intrusions by management such as for housekeeping and the like and the exception for common areas, one has the same expectations of privacy in one's hotel room as in one's own home. See the quote from Marullo v. United States, 328 F.2d 361, 363 (5th Cir. 1964), on pages 928-29 of the majority opinion.

I confess to at first having entertained some doubts about the police activities in this case. Perhaps this was because of the impression I gained from the briefs and during oral argument that the officers had to strain and contort so that they might see through a tiny opening into the living room. After reviewing the record, however, this appears not to have been the case. The act of leaning over and peering through the opening provided by the carelessly drawn drapes was reasonable and judicious in the circumstances. Here was no purposeful "search" for suspected contraband. Cf. Lorenzana v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. 3d 626, 511 P.2d 33, 108 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1973). Rather, the officers had a genuine and, I think, a legitimate interest in ascertaining if *930possible whom and how many persons they were soon to encounter. Participants of loud parties have been known to react violently to police efforts to calm or quell the festivities. Policemen have been shot with less provocation.

Simply stated:

As a general proposition, it is fair to say that when a law enforcement officer is able to detect something by utilization of one or more of his senses while lawfully present at the vantage point where those senses are used, that detection does not constitute a "search" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

1 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 2.2 (1978); see also LaFave, supra § 2.3 and United States v. Hersh, 464 F.2d 228 (9th Cir. 1972); State v. Gott, 456 S.W.2d 38 (Mo. 1970); State v. White, 18 Or. App. 352, 525 P.2d 188 (1974).

As to the other issues, the reaction of the occupants to the knock and announcement provided the exigent circumstances for forced entry. The drugs found in "plain view" during the search for occupants were properly seized.

I would affirm.