dissenting.
I find that I must dissent from the conclusion of the majority that this case should be remanded for further findings. Judge Gonzalez found that Burks was incapable of knowingly and intelligently waiving his right to counsel. This finding is supported by the record. Yet Judge Gonzalez allowed Burks to conduct his own defense. Because the trial judge found that Burks was incapable of representing himself, yet allowed him to do so, reversal is necessary in this case.
The question of when a defendant can represent himself seems to be occurring with increasing frequency in the trial courts. At the risk of oversimplifying, perhaps it would be helpful if I gave my impression of the essence of the cases in this area.
A defendant has the right to represent himself. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 821, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2534, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975); McCracken v. State, 518 P.2d 85, 91 (Alaska 1974). The decision by a defendant, however, to exercise this right is almost always a bad one. The cases, however, seem to recognize the right of a defendant to make a bad decision; they permit him to choose to commit judicial suicide by defending himself. The court has a duty to make sure that the defendant who wishes to represent himself is fully aware of the dangers of self-representation and of the benefits of having an attorney. Because a decision by a defendant to exercise this right is usually such a bad decision and is generally so disruptive to the proper function of the judicial process, the trial court must make sure that a defendant who chooses to represent himself knows what he is doing.1 The trial judge should *1183attempt to discourage a defendant from representing himself. If he insists, however, the defendant must be allowed to represent himself if he is able to knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel and has certain minimum competence to conduct a defense.
Whether a defendant can knowingly and intelligently waive a fundamental right such as the right to counsel is one which courts decide frequently. Judge Gonzalez found that Burks was not able to knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel. Although it is relatively unusual to find that a defendant is not able to knowingly waive his right to counsel, in this case the record fully supports Judge Gonzalez’s conclusion. Since Burks was unable to waive his right to counsel, Judge Gonzalez was required to find that Burks could not represent himself and to require counsel to represent Burks.
There is an additional element of the defendant’s competence to conduct a defense which is worthy of comment. If the defendant is capable of waiving counsel, what sort of competence is necessary to conduct a defense? Under Faretta, the defendant does not need to “have the skill and experience of a lawyer in order competently and intelligently to choose self-repre-sentation_” Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835, 95 S.Ct. at 2541. The Alaska Supreme Court states that the trial court must establish that the defendant can represent himself in a “rational and coherent manner.” McCracken, 518 P.2d at 91. It appears that the average criminal defendant must be permitted to represent himself regardless of how bad an idea that might be for him. The trial court first should explain to the defendant the disadvantages of self-representation. If the defendant insists on representing himself and is competent to do so, the trial court can consider the use of advisory counsel to aid him. It appears, however, that there is some sort of relatively low minimum standard which the defendant must meet to be able to conduct his own defense. Exactly what this minimum standard is, however, is not clear. It appears that the standard which the defendant has to meet is not high, and the court must find fairly unusual circumstances in order to deprive the defendant of his right to represent himself. In this case it appears that there was substantial evidence that Burks did not meet this minimum standard of competence. It is unnecessary to resolve this issue, however, because Burks had already been found to be incapable of waiving his right to counsel.
. I Standards for Criminal Justice, § 6-3.6 commentary at 6.39-40 (2d. ed. 1982) (footnotes omitted) states:
Except in the most unusual circumstances, a trial in which one side is unrepresented by counsel is a farcical effort to ascertain guilt. Thus, once a defendant has clearly and unequivocally declared his or her intention to appear pro se, the trial judge must conduct a thorough inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the assertion.... This inquiry should be incorporated into the trial record ... and should include: advising the defend*1183ant of the right to counsel and the importance of having coünsel; warning the defendant of the "dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that ‘he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open”’; and inquiring into the defendant’s educational background, previous experience with criminal trials, and general competence.... [T]he defendant must possess the mental competence to understand the dangers and ramifications of self-representation. ,