with whom NEWMAN, Chief Judge and MACK, Associate Judge join, dissenting:
The events of the morning of February 27, 1980, define the limits of our disagreement in this case. I mention them briefly for clarity.1
The body of a homicide victim was found that morning about 12:35 a.m. Policemen who had been summoned to the area shortly before had chased and lost a suspect wearing clothes matching those described to them by the witness Phillips. Detectives Bryant and Brooks arrived about an hour later and within minutes were told that a wallet had been found not far from the body. The wallet was not opened for some appreciable time, however. When it was, the detectives learned that it contained ap-pellee Minick’s driver’s license, listing a nearby address. Notwithstanding, a continuing search of the area for evidence and for the suspect was unproductive.
The detectives returned to their office about 4:00 a.m., where the wallet and its contents were reexamined at length. Arrest records were checked as well, and more information was discovered which targeted appellee as a likely suspect. The detectives then decided to arrest Minick without obtaining a warrant, an inconvenient formality which, in their considered judgment, might have allowed for destruction of crucial evidence. As the majority puts it: “They discussed the possibility of obtaining a warrant but rejected the idea .... ” Ante at 876 (emphasis added). Presumably one is to applaud this fleeting nod to constitutional concerns.
At the motions hearing Detective Bryant said that the decision to effect a warrant-less arrest was based on a fear that vital evidence “would go down the drain with a shower or a bath.” He testified that the quickest he had ever gotten a warrant was between two and three hours, but he did not state how many times he had sought to obtain a warrant during the night, nor that two to three hours was generally known to be the average time required for such a task. On cross-examination, Detective Bryant admitted that neither he nor his partner made any attempt to ascertain which judge was available to sign warrants on an emergency basis that night.
At 5:00 a.m., a number of police officers entered appellee’s home, at gunpoint, only to find him unchanged, unwashed and *883asleep. Appellee was awakened, arrested, searched, and, finally, advised of his Miranda rights.2 A signed exculpatory statement given to the police later was not suppressed. Evidence seized at the home and an oral statement made there were suppressed, but the government appeals only the suppression of physical evidence.3
I
We agree, I think, that Dorman v. United States, 140 U.S.App.D.C. 313, 435 F.2d 385 (1970) (en banc), is our legal guide since the government cites exigent circumstances to justify the warrantless entry and arrest. The motions judge, upon findings now said to be inconclusive, indiscernible and inflexible, was unpersuaded of the right of the government’s position. A majority of this court is, however, and because it disputes the court’s findings, holds them clearly erroneous, as it must to reverse. Brooks v. United States, D.C.App., 367 A.2d 1297, 1302 (1976).
The majority poses, and addresses (analytically, it says) four questions. Its analysis is concerned, in the main, with the decisions made by the officers at each stage of the investigation and the deference the court must give to each one. We now have a warrant clock which ticks away imperceptibly yet inexorably on an incipient violation of constitutional rights, but only, the majority holds “as of the time the police reasonably conclude they should move against a suspect, even though by that time they may have more than minimum probable cause for the entry.” Ante at 877. It is this notion, which recurs throughout the opinion, that is so disturbing.
II
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980), is but one decision which holds that the Fourth Amendment prohibits the police from making a warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a home to make a routine felony arrest. The government concedes as much, but argues that the warrantless entry here was justified by exigent circumstances, as those circumstances are to be assessed under the seven-factor test enunciated in Dorman v. United States, supra.4
The factual setting of Dorman was an armed robbery of a men’s store, discovery of a probation report (Dorman’s) which had been dropped in the store, and positive identifications (from a photograph) by eyewitnesses. The court explained:
The remand findings set forth the circumstances which in the opinion of the District Judge justified Dorman’s arrest without a warrant as follows: The police had positive identification of three eyewitnesses, and positive evidence of Dor-man’s current address. They had reason to believe Dorman might flee when he became aware of the loss of his probation papers identifying him. They knew Dor-man and his associates were dangerous— they were armed and had physically abused their victims. The most likely place to find him after 10 p.m. was his home. The District Judge credited their testimony that the only purpose of the visit to his home was to arrest him. They needed no additional physical evidence. [Id. 140 U.S.App.D.C. at 316, 435 F.2d at 388.]
*884In addition, it was crucial that in Dor-man, rather than disdaining established procedures, the police called an Assistant United States Attorney for preliminary approval before referring the matter to a magistrate, and at the same time began typing an affidavit to accompany an application for an arrest warrant. Id. at 315-16, 435 F.2d at 387-88. They were then advised that no magistrate could be found but that they could nevertheless arrest Dorman because “a felony was involved.” Id. at 316, 435 F.2d at 388.
The trial court undertook to measure and balance the Dorman factors and found that one supported the reasonableness of the warrantless entry by noting that “undoubtedly, there was a grave offense involved.” Another factor which could have supported the entry is a reasonable belief that the suspect was on the premises. The court’s finding with respect to this factor, the fourth in the Dorman list, is not entirely clear.5 Nevertheless, while at the time the officers decided to make the warrantless arrest, they had no special grounds to believe appellee would be at home, they plainly saw him there before entering his residence when his sister opened the door.
The peaceable though nonconsensual entry by the police is another factor not specifically addressed by the trial court which arguably could support the reasonableness of the entry. The trial court also made no definite finding with respect to which way the “time of entry” factor6 would cut in this case,7 so this court cannot resolve whether the added delay in obtaining a nighttime warrant provides the additional modicum of urgency required to justify this warrantless entry, absent evidence of record to approximate either the average time required to obtain a nighttime warrant in this jurisdiction, or the time it would have required in this particular ease.
The trial judge found that the remaining Dorman factors did not support the reasonableness of the warrantless entry, concluding (1) that it was doubtful that the police “had reasonably trustworthy information to believe that the suspect committed the crime, over and beyond the minimum requirements of probable cause,” (2) that they “had no reason to believe that the suspect was armed,”8 and (3) that there were no facts to support any suspicion the officer may have had that the suspect might escape if not swiftly apprehended. None of these findings is clearly erroneous based on the suppression hearing testimony of Detective Bryant.
The government vigorously contests the first of these findings and argues that it was clear error for the court to consider “doubtful” whether the police had strong probable cause to arrest appellee. However, the conclusion that the police lacked *885reasonably trustworthy information to believe that the suspect committed the crime, over and beyond the minimum requirements of probable cause” is not clearly erroneous. The court noted that the wallet was not found in a truly incriminating place and in light of the proximity of the residence indicated on the enclosed driver’s license, it could as easily be inferred that the owner had dropped the wallet on an innocent expedition. The wallet was found twenty-five feet away from the body of the deceased, along the tennis court fence, far enough from the victim and close enough to the court to suggest that it need not have been dropped by the fleeing suspect. Without questioning police investigative procedures, we note that the wallet was not opened for thirty-five to forty minutes after its discovery, a fact which indicates the relative lack of interest it engendered among the detectives on the scene.
Another factor which casts doubt on the association between the wallet and the man chased by the police, is that the suspect fled in a direction opposite to that of the residence indicated on the driver’s license. The fact that there was a prior rape record on the man whose identifications were found in the wallet does not of itself constitute reasonably trustworthy information to believe that he committed this particular crime. Notwithstanding the court’s view that it was proper for “the police to focus in on a suspect who has an identical [modus operandi],” it apparently did not find such past criminal record, even together with the location of the wallet, to constitute a clear showing of probable cause, beyond that required to obtain a warrant. I see no clear error in that conclusion.
The trial judge also considered whether the possible destruction of evidence created a sufficient urgency to justify a warrantless entry. In Brooks v. United States, supra at 1303, this court, while “mindful of the danger [of] a preservation of the evidence rationale,” recognized that “[u]nder limited circumstances, the ‘likelihood of escape’ inquiry properly includes consideration of the probability that evidence as well as the suspect may be lost.” (Citations omitted.) See also Thomas v. United States, D.C.App., 352 A.2d 390 (1976) (possibility that evidence may be lost or destroyed constitutes exigent circumstances justifying warrant-less search). In this case, where the only “official” explanation for why the police had not sought a warrant was that they felt they “would lose a quantity of evidence,” Judge Pratt correctly addressed that contention. However, Detective Bryant’s testimony failed to persuade him that the police had a genuine, particularized concern over the destruction of evidence:
Taking — using their time frame, had they immediately applied for a warrant, they had reasonable expectations that they would have it by five o’clock. They made no effort whatsoever to obtain a warrant, but, instead, at five o’clock, they decided that the circumstances required their going without a warrant. There was no reason to believe that if the Defendant, or the suspect was going to bathe, that he had not bathed by five o’clock in the morning. It’s no more persuasive than if they had decided they were going in January rather than April because there was a greater possibility that the sooner you go, the better; but, beyond some rather generalized reasoning, there was no reason to believe that.
So, the Court does not have to address itself as to whether or not the police would have a right to make a warrantless entry for the purpose of seizing evidence, when there was no realistic exigent circumstance for preserving or believing it had been preserved by the time they went in. The right of entry of a private dwelling is a sacred trust that should not be invaded except upon exceptions to the warrant requirement.
The government charges that by suggesting that the police should have applied for a warrant at 2:00 a.m., the trial court “in effect ruled that the further investigations in which the police engaged here undercut their claim of exigency at the time when they did proceed to arrest appellee” and *886that this puts police in the quandary of having to risk failure of the Dorman test either for lack of clear probable cause or for dissipation of the exigency. But the court cannot be faulted for the inverse relationship of these two factors. It is true, as time passes and investigation proceeds, probable cause to arrest may tend to increase, while exigency, after a certain time, tends to diminish. The passage of time reduces the exigency after the point when an immediate escape and/or destruction of evidence might be effected. The preservation of “mere evidence” and the seizure of a suspect not known to be armed, are urgencies that attenuate over time, either because the evidence or suspect has likely disappeared already, or because their existence and location have probably attained a status quo position.9
Both flight and destruction of evidence could have been readily accomplished in this case before the police even discovered the contents of the wallet. The police must have been aware of such possibilities since they had given chase to a man whom they believed was both the owner of the wallet and the assailant. The suspect was thus on alert that the police were on his tracks and most likely realized that the body had been discovered and possibly also that his wallet had been found. If he was intent on fleeing or destroying evidence, he had all the reason in the world to do so immediately, if ever. The likelihood that he would decide on one or the other course diminished with every passing hour, and thereby reduced the exigency that would be present in a situation of hot pursuit, or if the suspect was known to be armed.
The trial judge concluded that “there were no realistic exigent circumstances for preserving or believing [the evidence] had been preserved by the time [the police] went in.”10 In so holding, he did not improperly substitute his “own view of what was probable and prudent” for the judgments of the experienced police officers on the scene, as alleged by the government.11 In evaluating the validity of the warrant-less entry, the court did no more than objectively review the facts known to the officers, “including the time factors,” to determine whether “a prudent and cautious police officer could reasonably have concluded that immediate entry ... was imperative.” Chappell v. United States, 119 U.S.App.D.C. 356, 359, 342 F.2d 935, 938 (1965). Its findings reveal no clear error;12 on the contrary, they fully support the grant of appel-lee’s motion to suppress. In my judgment, the government failed in this case to meet its heavy burden of showing “that there was a need that could not brook the delay incident to obtaining a warrant.” Dorman v. United States, supra, 140 U.S.App.D.C. at 320, 435 F.2d at 392.
I agree completely that, in the words of Judge Leventhal:
*887The courts have respect for the intelligent law enforcement activities of the police, situated as they are in the front line of the campaign for law and order, and this case plainly depicts police officers engaged steadily and systematically in the identification and pursuit of the criminal suspects.... [Id. at 322, 435 F.2d at 394.]
I strongly endorse his further statement that
Responsible police are aware that a responsible procedure which accords to the police the latitude for intelligent law enforcement but withholds absolute discretion is the sound approach for securing the overall combination of law and justice that is the inspiration of a democratic society. [Id.]
The relative considerations in Dorman favored the warrantless entry because the police had three positive eyewitness, identifications, establishing clear probable cause; Dorman was reasonably believed to be armed; and, as it happened, a magistrate was unavailable that night.13 Here, probable cause was minimal. Minick was not identified, he was not believed to be armed, and no attempt was made to ascertain the availability of a judge to issue a warrant.14
I would affirm.
. There is a comprehensive statement of facts in the panel majority opinion, reported as United States v. Minick, D.C.App., 438 A.2d 205, 206-11 (1981), vacated and reh’g en banc granted (1982).
. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
. The court held that appellee’s oral statemeits made in his home following arrest must be excluded from the government’s evidence because not preceded by a valid Miranda warning. The government has expressly refrained from challenging this portion of the court’s ruling on appeal.
. These factors are:
(1) grave offense involved;
(2) suspect reasonably believed to be armed;
(3) clear probable cause to arrest;
(4) strong reason to believe that the suspect is on the premises;
(5) likelihood that the suspect will escape if not swiftly apprehended;
(6) whether entry is effected peaceably, without breaking;
(7) whether entry is made during day or night.
. The following statement appears in the transcript record of the court’s ruling: “They had strong reason to believe the suspect was on the premises.” It is ambiguous whether this was the trial judge’s conclusion, or merely his announcement of the next factor to be considered, for the sentence after the next notes the absence of evidence on the length of time that the suspect had resided at the particular address and on “any of the attendant facts.” In the intervening sentence, the trial judge refers to the fifth Dorman factor, the likelihood that the suspect will escape, a factor for which he finds insufficient factual support. It is thus unclear whether the last quoted sentence refers to inadequacy of factual support for the fourth or fifth Dorman factor.
. Judge Leventhal recognized that whether the entry is made during the day or the night is a factor that “works in more than one direction.” Dorman v. United States, supra at 321, 435 F.2d at 393. Nighttime entry generally involves a greater intrusion on Fourth Amendment rights, but the delay in obtaining a nighttime warrant might underscore the level of urgency in effectuating a warrantless arrest.
. The court’s only reference to this factor came when defense counsel argued that nighttime entry, such as in this case, results in a greater intrusion. The trial judge then noted that on the other hand, “at nighttime [appellant] would be more likely to be home.”
. “This consideration bears materially on the justification for a warrantless entry.” Id. at 320, 435 F.2d at 392 (footnote omitted). But the majority “easily” disposes of this factor by virtually ignoring it.
. Reasonable belief that the suspect is armed or that there is contraband evidence to be seized may toll the attenuation of exigent circumstances since the presence of weapons or other contraband presents dangers beyond the risk of flight and destruction of evidence inherent in every case where the police are not able to swiftly apprehend the wrongdoer(s).
. After reading the majority opinion the trial judge will no doubt be impressed by the dissection of his analysis of this factor, particularly as it relates to the fatal defect of clothing disposal. He will also, I suggest, be astonished to learn that rather than finding a fact, he has made a “universal pronouncement about human behavior,” known in legal circles as a conclusion of law.
. No one except the majority even suggests that there is a question of “stalling” by the police to avoid getting a warrant. Nor does anyone propose that the officers could be expected to get a warrant in the 20 minutes time it took to get to appellee’s home. Both are irrelevancies, injected in the opinion, I assume, because the majority has to answer the questions it asks itself.
. Any error the court may have committed with regard to the fourth Dorman factor, see supra note 5, does not alter the validity of the rest of the court’s findings, including its ultimate ruling, and does not leave me “with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S.Ct. 525, 542, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948).
. From its discussion of procedures then in place to obtain a nighttime warrant, I am certain the Circuit Court did not anticipate this problem would recur. In United States v. McEachin, 216 U.S.App.D.C. 320, 670 F.2d 1139 (1981), a warrantless search for a shotgun three weeks after a robbery was held to be justified by exigent circumstances. Logic and wisdom aside, McEachin differs factually, in material respects, from this case and is neither persuasive nor leading authority.
. I agree with my brother Ferren that the Superior Court might well consider warrants by telephone. Speaking as a participant in this process for some years, however, the emphasis on contacting a judge is misleading; it is the judge who normally waits, day or night, for the papers to be prepared for signature.