dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
The record reflects that in January 1984 appellant referred a case to appellee and appellee agreed to pay expenses and to remit one-third of the legal fee earned in the case to appellant. The client agreed in writing to the referral of the case to appel-lee. On March 19, 1984, appellant was publicly reprimanded by the State Bar of Texas. On April 3, 1987, the State Bar of Texas suspended appellant from the practice of law for two years, effective April 10,1987. The court’s judgment suspending appellant provided:
It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that the Respondent, James R. Lee, during said suspension is hereby enjoined from practicing law in Texas, holding himself out as an attorney at law, performing any legal services for others, accepting any fee directly or indirectly for legal services_ (emphasis added)
While appellant was still suspended, he resigned his license to practice law in the State of Texas in lieu of additional disciplinary action by the State Bar of Texas. On February 2, 1988, the Supreme Court of Texas accepted appellant’s resignation and ordered that his law license be cancelled. In May 1989, appellee settled the case but refused to pay the referral fee to appellant who was then a non-lawyer.
Under the State Bar Rules, “[a] lawyer or law firm shall not share or promise to share legal fees with a non-lawyer_” SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS, STATE BAR RULES art. X, § 9 (Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct) Rule 5.04(a) (1990) [hereinafter Tex. DISCIPLINARY Rules of PROF. Conduct] (located in the pocket part of Volume 3 of the Texas Government Code in title 2, subtitle G app., following § 83.006 of the Government Code).
The Texas Supreme Court has addressed this issue in Royden v. Ardoin, 160 Tex. 338, 331 S.W.2d 206 (1960). In Royden, the supreme court held:
[w]here the attorney, prior to the completion of his contingent fee contract is disbarred or suspended, he is not entitled to collect either on the contract or quantum meruit for the services, if any, that have *365been rendered. His disbarment or suspension is considered tantamount to and to have the same effect as a voluntary abandonment, for the attorney by knowingly and willfully practicing such a course of conduct that would lead to the termination of his right to practice renders it impossible to complete the work that he engaged to perform.
331 S.W.2d at 209.
In appellant’s response to appellee’s request for admissions which was attached to appellee’s motion for summary judgment, appellant admitted that he resigned his license to practice law in the State of Texas “in lieu of disciplinary proceedings.” He also admitted that he was not subsequently licensed to practice law in Texas or in any other jurisdiction.
While the committee on professional ethics did not answer the exact question presented in this case in Ethics Opinion 432, I would apply their rationale and take the opinion a step further. I would find that payment of legal fees to appellant would be in violation of Rule 5.04 of the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct and hold that an unlicensed attorney may not accept legal fees, directly or indirectly, once he has been disbarred or resigned his license to practice law in lieu of disciplinary action. I find that there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding appellant’s right to collect fees under the agreement between appellant and appellee and, accordingly, I would overrule appellant’s first sub-point in his point of error.
In his second sub-point, appellant contends that the trial court erred in granting appellee’s motion for summary judgment because he did not waive his right to collect a fee under the agreement by resigning his license to practice law. He contends that he had fully performed his portion of the referral contract and no longer had a duty to perform any service for the client after the client acknowledged the referral in writing. The majority opinion finds no abandonment by appellant. However, I would find the resignation in lieu of disciplinary proceedings had the same effect as a voluntary abandonment, and would further find that appellant waived any right to receive fees for legal services whether they be direct legal fees or indirect referral fees. The fact that nothing remained for appellant to do under the terms of the contract is not material to the question of whether he is authorized to accept a portion of the legal fee. I would overrule the second sub-point of appellant’s point of error.
In his third sub-point, appellant claims that the trial court’s granting of summary judgment for appellee constituted a taking of property without due process of law in violation of the United States Constitution. However, appellant has not stated any argument or authority under this sub-point. The Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure require the argument in a brief to contain “such discussion of the facts and the authorities relied upon as may be requisite to maintain the point at issue.” Tex.R.App.P. 74(f). I would find that appellant waived this sub-point of error. See Lewis v. Deaf Smith Electric Cooperative, Inc., 768 S.W.2d 511, 512-13 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1989, no writ); Essex Crane Rental Corp. v. Striland Construction Company, Inc., 753 S.W.2d 751, 756 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1988, writ denied).
Finally, the district court order, effective April 10, 1987, suspended appellant from the practice of law and ordered that he receive no legal fees “directly or indirectly.” Prior to the expiration of the suspension, appellant voluntarily resigned his license to practice law and his license to practice in Texas was cancelled. Since the initial date of suspension, appellant has never regained any rights to receive legal fees, directly or indirectly. I would find that judgment final and binding on appellant.
Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the court below.