dissenting.
The Commonwealth sought imposition of a five year minimum sentence in this case, pursuant to the Mandatory Sentencing Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9712(a) (sentencing for crimes committed with firearms), but the trial court declined to impose such a sentence. In denying the five year minimum sentence, the court stated,
[T]he Mandatory Sentencing Act appears to us to be directed to those persons who choose to use a firearm for *56the express purpose of committing one of the enumerated felonies. We do not believe that the evils intended to be remedied include conduct of persons in defendant’s situation who grab a firearm suddenly brought to the crime scene by the victim and who use that weapon under the circumstances shown here.
The trial court’s analysis of the legislative intent underlying the Mandatory Sentencing Act appears reasonable and correct.
In interpreting the scope of the Mandatory Sentencing Act, it is necessary to consider the occasion and necessity for the statute, the mischief to be remedied, the object to be attained, and the consequences of a particular interpretation. Statutory Construction Act of 1972, 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921. The legislative intent underlying the Mandatory Sentencing Act was, ostensibly, to impose substantial minimum terms of imprisonment upon individuals who are responsible for having committed certain serious crimes, provided the individuals are at the same time responsible for having caused firearms to become a factor in the commission of such crimes.
As noted in Commonwealth v. Bell, 512 Pa. 334, 341 n. 5, 516 A.2d 1172, 1176 n. 5 (1986), “Each of the crimes enumerated in section 9712 of the Act represents unacceptable assaultive behavior. The use of a firearm during the commission of any of the enumerated acts immeasurably enhances the threat to life or creates the likelihood of other severe bodily harm.” In recognition of the danger associated with the use of firearms in the commission of crimes, not only for intended victims of crimes but also for bystanders, and for law enforcement officers called upon to pursue fleeing criminals, the legislature enacted the Mandatory Sentencing Act. The Act was designed to serve the public interest in keeping firearms out of the hands of persons who are susceptible to committing the enumerated offenses. Commonwealth v. Bell, 512 Pa. at 341, 516 A.2d at 1176. See also Commonwealth v. Wright, 508 Pa. 25, *5741, 494 A.2d 354, 362 (1985) (Mandatory Sentencing Act serves to “protect the public from armed criminals and to deter violent crime and the illegal use of firearms____”), aff’d sub nom. McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986).
In the usual case, it would be the defendant who was responsible for causing a firearm to enter the field of action at a crime scene. In the present case, however, appellant was not responsible for there being a firearm at the scene, or for introducing the firearm into the potential realm of action, for it was Jones, the victim, who approached appellant with the pistol that, in a sudden and spontaneous affray, was used to fire the fatal shots.
The effect of imposing a mandatory minimum sentence upon appellant will be to enhance punishment for an individual who merely reacted in a spontaneous manner to a sudden confrontation with another who brought a pistol to the scene, and who allowed the pistol to fall to the ground where, by reason of its proximity and availability to either party, it became a factor in the affray. Surely the legislature did not intend to impose enhanced punishments for persons who bear no responsibility for having caused firearms to come into play as factors present at a crime scene, for the goals of deterring the presence of firearms in criminal activity, and of discouraging the carrying of firearms by persons susceptible to committing crimes, would not thereby be furthered. Under the circumstances presented, it cannot be said that appellant was responsible for frustrating the legislative objective, under the Mandatory Sentencing Act, of deterring the presence of firearms in such situations. It follows that the legislature did not intend that the Mandatory Sentencing Act would be applicable in such a factual context. Accordingly, the Court of Common Pleas properly declined in this case to impose an enhanced sentence under the Act. The order of the Superior Court vacating the judgment of sentence and remanding for resentencing should be reversed.