Opinion by
Judge Colins,In this appeal, we are again confronted with a procedural issue raised by the use of the telephone to conduct administrative hearings of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review. The precise question before us is whether the instant claimants right to present evidence was effectively foreclosed by the in*416herent nature of the telephonic hearing. We conclude that it was, and accordingly, remand.
Albert R. Hoover (claimant) was denied benefits by the Office of Employment Security, which determined that he had been dismissed from his job for having committed acts of willful misconduct as contemplated by Section 402(e) of the Unemployment Compensation Law.1 He appealed this determination and a hearing was telephonically conducted, whereby the referee, who was present in the hearing room, telephoned the claimant, who was at another location, in order to take claimants testimony.2
Preliminarily we note that we recently held that the Board can no longer conduct telephonic hearings, over the objections of one of the litigants, “without first having promulgated regulations which will safeguard the minimum due process rights of the parties and also insure that the hearings are conducted uniformly by the referees.” Knisley v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 93 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 519, 523, 501 A.2d 1180, 1182 (1985). The instant claimant did not object to the nature of the hearing at the administrative level. Issues not raised below cannot be raised for the first time on appeal; therefore, the propriety of the telephone hearing itself may not be challenged. Wing v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 496 Pa. 113, 436 A.2d 179 (1981).
However, the use of the telephone infringed upon the right of the claimant to present evidence in his behalf. The Boards regulations provide: “The tribunal shall determine the order in which the evidence shall be presented in all hearings. Within the discretion of *417the tribunal, the parties shall be permitted to present all evidence and testimony which they believe is necessary to establish their rights.” 34 Pa. Code §101.21(b). The claimant in this case was discharged for tardiness and excessive absenteeism. He wished to refute this charge by showing that he did not miss the number of days the employer asserted he had, and to so do, he desired to admit into evidence pay stubs showing the days he had worked. A review of the record reveals the following exchange:
QR: Did they tell you why you were being discharged?
AC: Yes.
QR: What was the reason they gave you?
AC: They said I missed twenty-two days, and their [sic] lying. I have proof right here, pay stubs.
Because it was telephonically impossible to examine or admit the claimants evidence, the referee simply ignored the claimants proffer. Claimant asserted he had such “proof” once more during the hearing, which assertion was likewise ignored. Accordingly, we reverse the order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review and remand for a new hearing to be conducted consistent herewith.
Order
And Now, May 22, 1986, the order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, Decision No. B-228341, dated March 9, 1984, is reversed and remanded for a new hearing to be conducted consistent with this opinion.
Jurisdiction relinquished.
Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex. Sess., P.L. (1937) 2897, as amended, 43 P.S. §802(e).
The employer did not testify.