concurring.
I agree with the result of the majority but arrive at my conclusion for somewhat different reasons. Appellant argues that intoxication should have reduced murder of the third degree to voluntary manslaughter. Under the 1972 Code, as amended in 1974, the crime of murder has been divided into three degrees.* By equating murder of the third degree with the prior offense of murder of the second degree, it follows that the framers intended to perpetuate the requirement of only a malicious killing and not to require a specific intent to kill. Commonwealth v. O’Searo, 466 Pa. 224, 352 A.2d 30 (1976); Commonwealth v. Taylor, 461 Pa. 557, 337 A.2d 545 (1975); Commonwealth v. Bowden, *459456 Pa. 278, 309 A.2d 714 (1973). Voluntary manslaughter, on the other hand, requires a specific intent to cause death. Commonwealth v. Robson, 461 Pa. 615, 337 A.2d 573 (1975), certiorari denied, 423 U.S. 934, 96 S.Ct. 290, 46 L.Ed.2d 265; Commonwealth v. Long, 460 Pa. 461, 333 A.2d 865 (1975); Commonwealth v. Campbell, 451 Pa. 465, 304 A.2d 121 (1973). The only relevance of evidence of voluntary intoxication is to aid in establishing that the mental faculties were so impaired that a person was rendered incapable of forming the requisite specific intent. Commonwealth v. Graves, 461 Pa. 118, 334 A.2d 661 (1975).
Since the intent required for murder of the third degree is a general one, the doctrine of intoxication would not be applicable to that offense. Furthermore, it would be completely incompatible with our theory of intoxication to reach the result that the impairment created by the consumption of alcohol reduced the crime from an offense which required only a general intent to a crime that required a specific intent.
To justify the use of the voluntary consumption of alcohol and the effect it produces as a basis for reducing an offense from the higher grade requiring a general intent to a lesser grade requiring a specific intent would prompt the acceptance of the principle that voluntary intoxication should serve as a mitigating factor. Our case law has repeatedly rejected that contention. Commonwealth v. Ingram, 440 Pa. 239, 270 A.2d 190 (1970); Commonwealth v. Brabham, 433 Pa. 491, 252 A.2d 378 (1969); Commonwealth v. Reid, 432 Pa. 319, 247 A.2d 783 (1968); Commonwealth v. Simmons, 361 Pa. 391, 65 A.2d 353 (1949), certiorari denied, 338 U.S. 888, 70 S.Ct. 181, 94 L.Ed. 546.
The framers retained in the 1972 Crimes Code the original distinction between murder of the first and second degrees appearing in the 1939 Crimes Code. Act of Dec. 6, 1972, P.L. 1482, No. 334, § 1, eff. June 6, 1973; 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502 (1973). The 1974 amendment removed felony murder from the category of murder of the first degree and characterized it as murder of the second degree. “All other kinds of murder”, graded as murder of the second degree under the 1972 Crimes Code, became murder of the third degree. Act of March 26, 1974, P.L. 213, No. 46, § 4, imd. effective; 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502 (Supp.1977-78). Because the present statutory description of murder of the third degree is identical to the previous description of murder of the second degree, it is apparent that the framers intended that this new category of murder take the place of murder of the second degree.