concurring.
I agree with a majority of the court that Intervenor’s Motion for Leave to File Motion for Rehearing should be denied. Why we should have to reiterate what we said in our judgment of December 17, 1991 is beyond me.1 Did we mean it then? “Yes.” Do we mean it now? The answer is still “Yes.” The dissenters were in the minority then; they are in the minority now. Although it is not particularly unusual for any member of the court to be in the minority in any given case, what is unique about this case is the malevolence of Justices Mauzy’s and Doggett’s dissent. I can only conclude that their zeal has overcome *757their better judgment. I can conceive of no other reason why they would irresponsibly charge members of this court with participating in a conspiracy to pervert justice. Such alleged conspiracy apparently also includes the United States Department of Justice, a federal three-judge panel sitting in Austin, and presumably, the United States Supreme Court before whom related proceedings are pending.
Relators and Respondents, apparently in reliance on the belief that we did mean what we said, have not filed written responses to Intervenors’ multiple filings. In the meantime, the dissenters have taken Intervenors’ ex parte2 arguments as true. No charitable reason occurs to me why Justices Mauzy and Doggett accept as un-impeachably true the ex parte representations of Intervenors and rely on them, as they do, in engaging in a blistering attack on other members of the court.
Furthermore, they would have us revisit, and overrule — apparently without further briefing and arguments — our decision of December 17,1991 based on alleged factual developments that have occurred since our judgment was rendered. Make no mistake, they do not merely argue that we should reverse field and allow Intervenors leave to file a Motion for Rehearing, they’ve already made up their minds how these alleged subsequent developments should be addressed. They argue that the court should
reconsider the case, withdraw the prior opinions, commend Judge Ramirez for appropriately handling this matter, and apologize to the people of this state for the millions of dollars of taxpayer monies wasted by the wholly-unwarranted prior decision.
The dissent reminds me of the old saw: “We’ll give ’em a fair trial — then we’ll hang ’em.”
But our prior judgment was rendered following full participation in the proceedings by all interested parties and included such procedural and substantive niceties as notice to the parties and an opportunity to be heard. Moreover, our decision was based on the facts as presented at that time, not as they might allegedly subsequently develop. Logically and legally, subsequent developments cannot be considered on the question of the propriety of the court’s judgment when it was rendered on December 17, 1991. In their eagerness to condemn all five justices who agreed to the court’s judgment, the dissenters somehow overlook the fact that my concurrence is in no way based on Relators’ alleged failure to intervene in the Quiroz and Mena litigation. My concurrence was based solely on my conviction that the Attorney General was constitutionally prohibited from agreeing to a substitute reapportionment for the Texas Senate. Because the Attorney General was without such authority, the trial court’s judgment based on such purported agreement was void. None of the Intervenors’ ex parte arguments are relevant to the concerns expressed in my concurring opinion. Unfortunately, however, the truth is only one of the victims of Justices Mauzy’s and Dog-gett’s diatribe.3
. Contrary to the dissenters’ assertions, I joined in the judgment of the court, including that portion that holds that motions for rehearing would not be entertained. I did so because of the need for a semblance of finality to our judgment due to approaching filing deadlines.
. The dissent quarrels with the use of the term ex parte in characterizing Intervenors’ original Motion For Leave to File Motion For Rehearing and its four supplements. But that is precisely what Intervenors’ one-sided written communications with the court are. See BRYAN A. GARNER, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL USAGE 231-32 (1987). No other party or interested person has filed a motion for leave to file a motion for rehearing or an opposition to Inter-venors' filings.
. One need only compare the temperate tone of the dissenting opinion of Justices Gammage and Hightower to comprehend the truly venomous nature of the Mauzy/Doggett dissent.