concurring.
I concur in the results reached, but I would go further and point out the legislative history of Senate Joint Resolution No. 18 (Acts 1977, 65th Leg., p. 3359), which proposed an amendment to Article V, § 5 of the State Constitution, and which was. adopted on November 8,1977 by the voters of Texas and became effective January 1, 1978. That legislative history shows that Senate Joint Resolution No. 18 was drafted, among other things,1 to expressly give the Court of Criminal Appeals the authority to issue writs of mandamus to compel speedy trials in criminal cases in this State. This writer and other members of this court appeared before legislative committees of both the Senate and the House to explain its provisions, and to point out that under the then existing constitutional provisions the Court of Criminal Appeals, the court of last resort for criminal matters in this State, did not have the authority to issue writs of mandamus to compel speedy trials in criminal cases.
Article V, § 5 of the State Constitution, as amended 1966, provided in part:
“The Court of Criminal Appeals shall have appellate jurisdiction co-extensive with the limits of the State in all criminal cases of whatever grade, with such exceptions and under such regulations as may be prescribed by law.
The Court of Criminal Appeals and the Judges thereof shall have the power to *848issue the writ of habeas corpus, and render such regulations as may be prescribed by law, issue such writs as may be necessary to enforce its own jurisdiction. . ” 2 (Emphasis supplied.)
Under such constitutional provision and decisional law, this court could only issue the writ of mandamus to protect its appellate jurisdiction or its original jurisdiction to issue the writ of habeas corpus. Thus when a defendant in a criminal case sought a writ of mandamus to compel a speedy trial, he could not obtain one from the court of last resort in criminal cases because neither this court’s appellate jurisdiction nor its original jurisdiction to issue the writ of habeas corpus was in need of protection. Such defendant was required to apply to the Supreme Court of Texas, a court of generally civil jurisdiction, for the needed mandamus since such court, as noted by the majority, had the general authority to issue the writ of mandamus.3 This was true despite the fact that the Court of Criminal Appeals would be the court to determine later on appeal whether the defendant had been in fact deprived of a speedy trial.
It was in part to correct this anomaly that Senate Joint Resolution No. 18 was drafted to give this court original jurisdiction not only to issue writs of habeas corpus but writs of mandamus, procedendo, prohibition and certiorari. That portion of Senate Joint Resolution No. 18 here involved provides:
“Subject to such regulations as may prescribed by law, regarding criminal law matters, the Court of Criminal Appeals and the Judges thereof shall have the power to issue the writs of habeas corpus, mandamus, procedendo, prohibition, cer-tiorari, and such other writs as may be necessary to protect its jurisdiction or enforce its judgments. . . . ” (Emphasis supplied.)
In the drafting it was decided to additionally include a catch all clause “and other such writs as may be necessary to protect its jurisdiction or enforce its judgments.” Care should be taken to understand that the phrase “as may be necessary to protect its jurisdiction or enforce its judgments” has reference only to “and other such writs” and is not a limitation upon the authority of the court to issue writs of habeas corpus, mandamus, procedendo, prohibition or certiorari. One important limitation, however, is that the court’s authority to issue such above described writs is limited to “criminal matters.” This limitation was the subject of a committee substitute to said Senate Joint Resolution by Senator Bill Meier of Euless, sponsor of the joint resolution, early in the legislative process, to counter claims that without such limitation the Court of Criminal Appeals might use its newly granted writ powers in civil law matters. This limitation may have, wittingly or unwittingly, restricted this court’s authority to issue writs of habe-as corpus. Formerly under the prior constitutional provision the power of the court to issue the writ of habeas corpus was not limited to “criminal matters.”4
With these observations, I concur with the result reached.
. Senate Joint Resolution No. 18 also proposed increasing the number of judges on the Court of Criminal Appeals from five to nine judges with the authority to sit in panels of three in all cases with the exception of death penalty cases.
. This same language is found in the 1891 amendment to Article V, § 5 of the State Constitution creating the Court of Criminal Appeals.
. This same situation existed where the defendant sought a writ of mandamus to compel a speedy trial in a probation revocation hearing. See Fariss v. Tipps, 463 S.W.2d 176 (Tex.Sup.Ct.1971).
.The original jurisdiction of the Court of Criminal Appeals to issue writs of habeas corpus under the prior constitutional provision was unlimited. State ex rel. Wilson v. Briggs, 171 Tex.Cr.App. 479, 351 S.W.2d 892 (1961); Ex parte Cvengros, 384 S.W.2d 881 (Tex.Cr.App.1965); Ex parte Degener, 30 Tex.App. 566, 17 S.W. 1111 (1891); Ex parte Kearby, 35 Tex.Cr.R. 531, 34 S.W. 635 (1896); Ex parte Kearby, 35 Tex.Cr.R. 634, 34 S.W. 962 (1896). See and cf. Ex parte Hofmayer, 420 S.W.2d 137 (Tex.Sup.Ct.1967).