concuring. I agree to affirm this case because the record does not reflect that appellee actually entered a guilty plea. The only evidence to support the entry of a guilty plea is the district court docket sheet with a “Plea: GL” notation on it; a “settlement sheet” indicating an arraignment/trial date ofjune 21, 2004, on the offense of “Careless/Prohibited”; and a citation tracking report from the police department noting “GL/SIS 6 months” and a disposition date of May 20, 2004. None of these documents contains the signature of appellee, and none states that appellee entered a guilty plea on the charge. However, I concur because I do not agree that, in order for a guilty plea to be admissible as a declaration against interest, it must be made in “open court.”
The language “open court” first appeared in this context in 1987 in Dedman v. Porch, 293 Ark. 571, 739 S.W.2d 685 (1987). In Dedman, appellant contended that the trial court erred in refusing to allow into evidence as an admission against interest appellee’s payment of a traffic ticket. In support of his position, Dedman cited Miller v. Blanton, 213 Ark. 246, 210 S.W.2d 293 (1948); Harbor v. Campbell, 235 Ark. 492, 360 S.W.2d 758 (1962); and Midwest Bus Lines, Inc. v. Williams, 243 Ark. 854, 422 S.W.2d 869 (1968). 293 Ark. at 574, 739 S.W.2d at 687. The supreme court rejected Dedman’s argument, affirmed the trial court’s ruling, and stated: “We reaffirm our position that the only proper evidence relating to a traffic violation conviction is a party’s plea of guilty in open court.” 293 Ark. at 575, 739 S.W.2d at 687 (emphasis added). The court reasoned that it was unable to find a case holding that the payment of a traffic ticket entitled the opposing side to introduce evidence of the payment as an admission against interest. 293 Ark. at 574, 739 S.W.2d at 687. Although the supreme court stated in Dedman that Harbor and Miller “stand for the proposition that a plea of guilty in open court is admissible as a declaration against interest,” neither Harbor nor Miller ever mentioned the words “open court.” Id. (emphasis added).
In Harbor, appellee paid a fine for failure to yield the right-of-way. 235 Ark. at 492, 360 S.W.2d at 758. The trial court refused either to allow appellant to introduce into evidence a certified copy of the record of the municipal court reflecting appellee’s payment of the fine or to allow appellant to interrogate him at trial to show that he had entered a plea of guilty in municipal court to the charge. 235 Ark. at 492-93, 360 S.W.2d at 758. The supreme court held that the trial court was correct regarding its first ruling, holding that no record of the conviction of any person for a traffic violation was admissible, but the court reversed the trial court’s second ruling, holding that appellee’s plea of guilty in municipal court should have been allowed as a declaration against interest. 235 Ark. at 493, 360 S.W.2d at 758. The court relied upon its earlier ruling in Miller that testimony of a plea of guilty is admissible to show a deliberate declaration against interest, but the court did not indicate that the guilty plea was made in “open court.” Id. Indeed, it appears just as likely from the court’s brief factual recitation that appellee did not enter the plea in open court but merely paid a fine. In any event, making the plea in “open court” was not part of the court’s holding.
In Miller, deciding an issue of whether punitive damages were warranted in a car-accident case, the supreme court noted that appellant testified at trial that a charge of reckless driving had been filed against him as a result of the collision and that he had pleaded guilty to the charge. The court stated: “This testimony as to appellant’s plea of guilty was competent as showing a deliberate declaration against interest by said appellant.” 213 Ark. at 251, 210 S.W.2d at 295. There was no mention of the plea being made in “open court” in Miller.
The only mention — other than in Dedman — by the supreme court of a guilty plea to a traffic violation being made in “open court” are cases citing Dedman. In Ice v. Bramlett, 311 Ark. 157, 842 S.W.2d 29 (1992), the court affirmed the trial court’s exclusion of evidence relating to a traffic citation issued to appellee for his action in the accident in question. Appellant contended that appellee received a citation for running a red light, pleaded guilty to the citation, and was placed on probation. Appellant argued that the trial court erred in refusing to admit this evidence of a guilty plea as an admission against appellee’s interest. The supreme court noted the absence of any evidence in the record indicating that appellee actually received a traffic citation; that it was his signature on the probation contract; or that appellee ever “appeared before the municipal judge, or that he appeared in any hearing or formal activity in which the municipal court conducts business.” 311 Ark. at 162, 842 S.W.2d at 31-32. Accordingly, the court held that “due to the lack of evidence connecting appellee with the citation and probation, we hold consistently with Dedman, 293 Ark. 571, 739 S.W.2d 685, and [Ark. Code Ann.] section 27-50-804, that any evidence of his alleged probation in municipal court was not a guilty plea made in open court nor an admission against interest and was therefore properly excluded by the trial court.” Id. See also Patterson v. Odell, 322 Ark. 394, 909 S.W.2d 648 (1995) (concerning a plea of nolo contendere and merely citing Dedman’s statement that “a plea of guilty in open court is admissible as a declaration against interest” but not applying it in that case).
Dedman concerned the payment of a traffic ticket, not a guilty plea, and stands for nothing more than the proposition that evidence of the mere payment of a traffic ticket is not admissible as a declaration against interest in a civil action allegedly arising out of the same traffic offense. However, in dicta, the court in Dedman misstated the holdings of Harbor and Miller by suggesting that those cases required, as a prerequisite to the admissibility of evidence of a guilty plea to a traffic offense as an admission against interest, that the plea be entered in “open court.” I cannot interpret Dedman to require that a guilty plea must literally be made in “open court” in order to be admissible into evidence as a declaration against interest.
In my view, a traffic offender who knowingly and intelligently admits his guilt to the offense and who acknowledges such guilt by his signature on a plea agreement that is filed in and accepted by a court of proper jurisdiction should be held to the same level of accountability for his admission as a traffic offender who appears before the court in person and orally enters a guilty plea. The effect of the plea should not be determined by the local rule of a district court as to whether guilty pleas may be entered in absentia.
Unfortunately for the appellant, in this case, no guilty plea agreement was signed and filed by appellee. It is only for this reason that I must agree with the majority to affirm this case.