(concurring).
The judgment of the trial court is subject to reversal upon either of two grounds.
The trial court, after making findings of fact pertaining to reasonable attorney’s fees for counsel representing Musebeck Shoe Company, concluded that as a matter of law Hilton’s answer did “not conform to the requirements of Rule 185,” that Hilton was liable to Musebeck for attorney’s fees, and that judgment should be entered for Musebeck on the open account and for attorney’s fees.
It is immaterial that Hilton’s answer did not conform to Rule 185. Under the facts of this case Hilton was a stranger to the transactions between Musebeck Shoe Company and the Hilton Foot-So-Port Shoes, Inc. Musebeck sued Hilton alone and did not join the corporation. Hilton was permitted by the trial court, over objection of Musebeck, to prove that no merchandise was sold to Hilton individually, but that shipping invoices sent by Musebeck, as well as correspondence from Musebeck, were addressed to the corporation and not to Hilton as an individual, and that payments to Musebeck were made by the corporation, not by Hilton. The trial court properly permitted Hilton to make such proof, since Hilton, in his verified answer, pleaded that the goods set forth in Musebeck’s petition were not sold to Hilton but were in fact sold to the corporation, and denied that he was liable in any capacity for the corporation’s debt.
Musebeck’s account, though verified, was hearsay as to Hilton, and as a stranger to the transactions between Musebeck and the corporation, Hilton had the right to controvert and disprove the account without filing a written denial under oath in conformity with Rule 185. McCamant v. Batsell, 59 Tex. 363 (1883); Duree v. Aetna Insurance Co., 66 S.W.2d 764 (Tex.Civ.App. Amarillo 1933, no writ); Eng v. Wheeler, 302 S.W.2d 263 (Tex.Civ.App. San Antonio 1957, writ dsmd.); Robertson v. Rexall Drug and Chemical Company, 410 S.W.2d 200 (Tex.Civ.App. Fort Worth 1966, no writ); Nichols v. Acers Company, 415 S.W.2d 683 (Tex.Civ.App. Austin 1967, writ ref. n. r. e.) ; Copeland v. Hunt, 434 S.W.2d 156 (Tex.Civ.App. Corpus Christi 1968, writ ref. n. r. e.); Sampson v. Apco Oil Corporation, 476 S.W.2d 430 (Tex.Civ.App. Amarillo 1972, no writ) ; Compression; Inc. v. James and Dilda, 481 S. W.2d 458 (Tex.Civ.App. Houston 1st 1972, no writ).
It was error for the trial court to enter judgment against Hilton individually on the account and to hold him for attorney’s fees incurred by Musebeck. Hilton’s proof under his pleadings was uncontradicted that the transactions sued upon were be*344tween Musebeck and the corporation and not between Musebeck and Hilton.
On appeal Hilton also urges that there was no evidence introduced to support the judgment. The record does not disclose that Musebeck offered the account in evidence. Attaching a purported verified account to plaintiff’s petition did not constitute proof. The account must be offered in evidence. Chisos Mining Co. v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Company, 142 S.W.2d 549 (Tex.Civ.App. El Paso 1940, writ dsmd. jdgmt. cor.); Johnson v. Walker, 330 S.W.2d 508 (Tex.Civ.App. San Antonio 1959, no writ).
No evdience was offered to support Musebeck’s claim against Hilton. The only evidence on accountability for the claim was Hilton’s testimony and documentary evidence that the transactions were between Musebeck and the corporation and not with Hilton personally. In either instance it was error for the trial court to enter judgment against Hilton.
The judgment is properly reversed and judgment here rendered that appellee Muse-beck take nothing.
Reversed and Rendered.