(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I dissent as to the majority’s conclusion that hearsay evidence is not admissible at a juvenile transfer hearing.
Juvenile dispositional proceedings are fundamentally different from juvenile adjudicatory proceedings and criminal actions. A transfer hearing does not result in a determination of delinquency, it does not result in a determination-of guilt, and it does not result in confinement or other punishment. The purpose of the transfer hearing is not to *319adjudicate but to determine whether retention of the child in the juvenile system is in the best interests of the child and the public. I agree with Justice Blaekmun who said in McKeiver:
Concern about the inapplicability of exclusionary and other rules of evidence ... chooses to ignore, it seems to us, every aspect of fairness, concern, of sympathy, and of paternal affection that the juvenile court system contemplates.
If the formalities of the criminal adjudicatory process are to be superimposed upon the juvenile court system, there is little need for its separate existence. Perhaps that ultimate disillusionment will come one day, but for the moment we are disinclined to give impetus to it.
McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 550-51, 91 S.Ct. 1976, 1989, 29 L.Ed.2d 647, 664 (1971).
In Kent, the Supreme Court considered the procedural requirements for transfer of a juvenile to an adult criminal court.
We conclude that an opportunity for a hearing, which may be informal, must be given the child.... We do not mean by this to indicate that the hearing to be held must conform with all of the requirements of a criminal trial or even of the usual administrative hearing; but we dp hold that the hearing must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment.
Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 561-62, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 1057, 16 L.Ed.2d 84, 97-8 (1966) (citing Pee v. United States, 274 F.2d 556, 559 (D.C.Cir.1959)). Thus, the Court left it to the states to determine the eviden-tiary standard to be applied at juvenile transfer proceedings.
In my opinion, the rules of evidence are not applicable in juvenile transfer hearings in South Dakota. The purpose of a transfer hearing is to determine whether retention in the juvenile system is in the best interest of the child or the public. State v. Harris, 494 N.W.2d 619, 624 (S.D.1993); State v. Flying Horse, 455 N.W.2d 605, 608 (S.D.1990). To that end the transfer court may consider the factors listed in SDCL 26 — 11^4, although it is not required to consider each one nor is it limited to considering only the listed factors. Harris, 494 N.W.2d at 624; In re D.M.L., 254 N.W.2d 457, 459 (S.D.1977). There was no “intention to create a rigid or cumbersome procedure to be followed by the trial court in all cases.” D.M.L., 254 N.W.2d at 459.
In Flying Horse, we held that a juvenile transfer hearing is “not adjudicatory in nature.” 455 N.W.2d at 608. In that decision, we cited the Supreme Court of Washington which found that transfer hearings were “ ‘not governed by the strict rules of procedure and evidence applicable at either a criminal trial or at a juvenile court delinquency hearing.’ ” Id. at 608 (quoting State v. Piche, 74 Wash.2d 9, 442 P.2d 632, 636 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1041, 89 S.Ct. 666, 21 L.Ed.2d 588 (1969), overruled on other grounds, McRae v. State, 88 Wash.2d 307, 559 P.2d 563 (1977)); see also, In re M.W., 374 N.W.2d 889, 896 (S.D.1985) (Henderson, J., concurring in result) (in dependency and neglect dispositional hearings “ ‘the rules of evidence contained in SDCL chs. 19-9 to 19-18, inclusive do not apply in dispositional hearings in juvenile court.’ [applying former SDCL 26-8-30] A law-trained mind, with experience, should be able to understand why the Legislature has adopted two standards for the application of the rules of evidence. A higher degree of proof and greater accuracy and reliability should be required in the proof during an adjudicatory hearing. It is understandable that strict rules of evidence should apply. When dispo-sitional hearings are at hand, the rules may be relaxed to the extent of determining the best interests of the child and the various opinions that arise as to the alternatives available to a trial judge.”); In re C.J.H., 371 N.W.2d 345 (S.D.1985).
Our sister states have determined the strict rules of evidence do not apply to juvenile transfer hearings. State v. Wright, 456 N.W.2d 661, 662 (Iowa 1990) (“hearsay evidence is admissible if it is relevant and material”); People v. Williams, 111 Mich.App. 818, 314 N.W.2d 769, 771 (1982) (“[t]he purpose of Phase 2 is to determine whether the interests of the child and the public would best be served by retaining or waiving juris*320diction. Therefore, this hearing can be characterized as dispositional ... The significance of this is that information which would not be admissible as evidence in an adjudication may be brought before the court to enable it to conduct a ‘full investigation’ on disposition of a child.”); In re Welfare of T.L.J., 495 N.W.2d 237 (Minn.App.1993); In re Welfare of T.D.S., 289 N.W.2d 137, 140 (Minn.1980) (“application of strict exclusionary rules of evidence to reference [transfer] hearings would impede both the state and the juvenile in fully advising the court of relevant considerations”); Welfare of S.R.J. v. State, 293 N.W.2d 32, 35-36 (Minn.1980) (“reference hearings are dispositional hearings not governed by the strict rules of evidence.”); In Interest of P.A.K., 119 Wis.2d 871, 350 N.W.2d 677 (1984); D.H. v. State, 76 Wis.2d 286, 251 N.W.2d 196, 205 (1977) (“Several states that have dealt expressly by statute or rule of court with the matter of evidence at waiver hearings have similarly concluded that the application of rigid rules, including the rules of evidence, would be more likely to impair the juvenile court’s ability to deal fairly with a particular problem than to lead to a just result.”).
Similarly, the conclusion that the rules of evidence are not applicable- in juvenile transfer proceedings is supported by case law in numerous other jurisdictions which have considered the question. Matter of Pima Co., 26 Ariz.App. 46, 546 P.2d 23 (1982); People v. Chi Ko Wong, 18 Cal.3d 698, 135 Cal.Rptr. 392, 557 P.2d 976 (1976), overruled on other grounds, People v. Green, 27 Cal.3d 1, 164 Cal.Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468 (1980); In re Dinson, 58 Haw. 522, 574 P.2d 119 (1978); State v. Christensen, 100 Idaho 631, 603 P.2d 586 (1979); In re Wolf, 99 Idaho 476, 583 P.2d 1011 (1978); People v. Taylor, 76 Ill.2d 289, 29 Ill.Dec. 103, 391 N.E.2d 366 (1979); Jonaitis v. State, 437 N.E.2d 140 (Ind.App.1982); Marvin v. State, 95 Nev. 836, 603 P.2d 1056 (1979); In re Eduardo, 136 N.H. 678, 621 A.2d 923 (1993); State v. Gibbs, 126 N.H. 347, 492 A.2d 1367 (1985); State v. Carmichael, 35 Ohio St.2d 1, 64 O.O.2d 1, 298 N.E.2d 568 (1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1161, 94 S.Ct. 922, 39 L.Ed.2d 113 (1974); In re Harbert, 85 Wash.2d 719, 538 P.2d 1212 (1975).
An examination of South Dakota statutes dealing with juvenile proceedings also supports the determination that the. rules of evidence do not apply in juvenile transfer proceedings. In interpreting statutes we apply the following rules of statutory construction:
Each statute must be construed according to its manifest intent as derived from the statute as a whole, as well as other enactments relating to the same subject. Words used by the legislature are presumed to convey their ordinary, popular meaning, unless the context or the legislature’s apparent intention justifies departure. Where conflicting statutes appear, it is the responsibility of the court to give reasonable construction to both, and to give effect, if possible, to all provisions under consideration, construing them together to make them harmonious and workable. However, terms of a statute relating to a particular subject will prevail over general terms of another statute. Finally, we must assume that the legislature, in enacting a provision, had in mind previously enacted statutes relating to the same subject.
Harris, 494 N.W.2d at 622 (citing Meyerink v. Northwestern Public Service Co., 391 N.W.2d 180, 183-84 (S.D.1986) (citations omitted)).
SDCL 19-9-14 exempts juvenile disposi-tional hearings from the strict rules of evidence applicable to other court procedures. SDCL 19-9-14 provides in part:
Except as otherwise provided in this section, chapters 19-9 to 19-18, inclusive, apply to all actions and proceedings in the courts of this state. Those chapters ... do not apply in the following situations:
[[Image here]]
(7) Disposition hearings in juvenile court.
SDCL ch. 26-7A on juvenile court procedure clearly states that the rules of civil procedure apply in juvenile adjudicatory hearings. However, it then expressly provides a different standard for dispositional *321and all other juvenile court hearings. SDCL 26-7A-34 provides:
Hearings under this chapter and chapters 26-8A, 26-8B and 26-8C shall be conducted as follows:
(1) Adjudicatory hearings shall be conducted in accordance with rules of civil procedure under chapter 15-6, except as otherwise provided in this chapter; and (2) Dispositional hearings and all other hearings shall he tried to the court and shall be conducted and designed to inform the court fully of the exact status of the child and to ascertain the history, environment and past and present physical, mental and moral condition of the child and of the child’s parents, guardian or custodian. (Emphasis added.)
Further guidance concerning the applicability of the rules of evidence in juvenile proceedings is found at SDCL 26-7A-56 which declares that the rules of evidence apply in adjudicatory hearings but goes on to set forth a different standard for all other juvenile hearings. SDCL 26-7A-56 provides in part:
Except as otherwise provided in this chapter and related chapters 26-8A, 26-8B and 26-8C, the rules of civil procedure and the rules of evidence apply to adjudicatory hearings. All other hearings shall be conducted under rules prescribed by the court. The rules may be designed by the court to inform the court fully of the exact status of the child and to ascertain the history, environment and the past and present physical, mental and moral condition of the child and the child’s parents, guardian and custodian, as may be necessary or appropriate to enable the court to determine suitable disposition of the child according to the least restrictive alternative available in keeping with the child’s best interests and with due regard for the rights and interests of the parents, guardian, custodian, the public and the state. (Emphasis added.)
Additionally, the transfer hearing statute directs the court to consider a “laundry list” of factors as to whether transfer is appropriate. SDCL 26-11-4 provides in part:
At the transfer hearing, the court shall consider only whether it would be contrary to the best interest of the child or of the public to retain jurisdiction over the child.
The following factors may be considered by the court in determining whether a child should be transferred:
(1) The seriousness of the alleged offense to the community and whether protection of the community requires waiver;
(2) Whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent, premeditated or willful manner;
(3) Whether the alleged offense was against persons or property with greater weight being given to offenses against persons;
(4) The prosecutive merit of the complaint. The state shall not be required to establish probable cause to show pro-secutive merit;
(5) The desirability of trial and disposition of the entire offense in one proceeding when the child’s associates in the alleged offense are adults;
(6) The record and previous history of the juvenile;
(7) The prospect for adequate protection of the public and the likelihood of reasonable rehabilitation of the juvenile, if he is found to have committed the alleged offense, by the use of procedures, services and facilities currently available to the juvenile court.
Written reports and other materials relating to the child’s mental, physical, and social history may be considered by the court, provided that the person or persons who prepared the report and other material shall appear and be subject to both direct and cross-examination.
Further support is found by examining the last paragraph of SDCL 26-11-4. Because the rules of evidence are not applicable in a transfer hearing, and therefore statutes such as the business records exception of SDCL 19-16-10 do not apply, the transfer statute requires that, before reports and other materials are considered by the court, the person *322who prepared the material must be available for questioning and cross-examination. If the rules of evidence were applicable, there would be no need to provide another standard for admissibility of written materials in transfer hearings.
When viewed in harmony, the above statutes show a clear intent to apply different procedural rules in adjudicatory hearings as opposed to all other hearings conducted in juvenile court. In an adjudicatory hearing, the safeguards of the rules of evidence are necessary because a child may be determined delinquent, found guilty and deprived of his or her liberty. This differs considerably from a transfer hearing where the court is charged with making a decision in the child’s and the public’s best interest. Harris, 494 N.W.2d at 624; Flying Horse, 455 N.W.2d at 608.
I agree the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in deciding to transfer Milk to adult court, but dissent as to the majority’s conclusion that the rules of evidence are applicable in a juvenile transfer hearing.
I am authorized to state that Justice HENDERSON joins in this concurrence in part and dissent in part.