(dissenting).
In holding untenable the contention of the claimants herein (plaintiff, Mitchell and Maryland), and in sustaining the defense of Employers’, the Court of Appeal made specific reference to the definition-contained in the omnibus' clause under which Mitchell became an additional insured and it concluded that, in view of the-definition, he (Mitchell) was subject to the-same conditions and limitations respecting the policy’s coverage as was the named in*885•sured, Southern. Thus, to quote from the ■opinion of that tribunal, 72 So.2d 353, 355, it observed: “An examination of the policy leads to the conclusion that it is not ■open to such a construction as appellants contend for. The contract states specifically and unambiguously that 'the unqualified word "insured” includes the named insured.’ ‘To hold for appellants would necessitate striking out of the policy such quoted language of the insuring agreements. (Italics •ours.)
“Such definition of the ‘insured’ in the ■omnibus clause has the effect of placing the persons covered by the omnibus clause in •exactly the same position as the named insured, and subject to all of the conditions of •the policy as they would apply to the named ■insured, and subject to all the limitations ■upon coverage set forth in the policy. Hence, since Pullen was an employee of .'Southern Equipment & Tractor Co., the named insured, the latter was liable to his widow under the compensation statutes, :and so Pullen’s death was excluded from coverage whether the person causing the death be the named insured or a person ■to whom the omnibus clause applies, even though the latter is not liable for the providing of the compensation benefits. If a ■contrary view were to be taken, it would 'be equivalent to saying that the insurer’s liability is greater as to Mitchell, an omnibus insured, than it would have been to .Southern Equipment & Tractor Co., if said named insured' through negligence on its part had been responsible for Pullen’s death.”
With such conclusion and observation I fully agree. It may be added that to give the exclusions the meaning that claimants contend for, and thus to overcome the plain definition contained in the omnibus clause that the unqualified word “insured” includes the named insured as well as an additional insured, there would have to be written into such exclusions a restrictive phrase such as the “employee of the insured against whom liability is sought to be imposed” or “employee of the insured tort feasor”.
Furthermore, an interpretation of the exclusions in the manner suggested by claimants might well lead to results obviously not contemplated by the parties to the’ insurance contract. For example, under that interpretation, if Southern had not carried workmen’s compensation insurance it would have a right and a cause of action against the tort-feasor Mitchell and also against its own public liability insurer (Employers’) to recover all workmen’s compensation which it is obligated to pay to Pullen’s widow. See Board of Commissioners of Port of New Orleans v. City of New Orleans, 223 La. 199, 65 So.2d 313. The liability policy in question under those circumstánces would furnish to Southern' both workmen’s ' compensation and public liability insurance.
*887On behalf of claimants it is argued that the provisions of the exclusions are ambiguous and, hence, that the adoption of the suggested interpretation is required by the well established and widely recognized rule that where policy provisions are attended with ambiguity they are to be construed strongly against the insurer and in favor of the insured. My view is that such provisions are not ambiguous, and it accords with the views of numerous courts of other jurisdictions that have construed similar insurance verbiage as I do herein. Lumber Mutual Casualty Insurance Co. of New York v. Stukes, 4 Cir., 164 F.2d 571; Webb v. American Fire & Casualty Co., 148 Fla. 714, 5 So.2d 252; Standard Surety & Casualty Company of New York v. Maryland Casualty Co., 281 App.Div. 446, 119 N.Y.S.2d 795; Pearson v. Johnson, 215 Minn. 480, 10 N.W.2d 357; Continental Casualty Company v. Pierce, 170 Miss. 67, 154 So. 279; Gibbs v. Employers’ Mutual Liability Insurance Co. of Wisconsin, 224 N.C. 462, 31 S.E.2d 377; Birrenkott v. Mc-Manamay, 65 S.D. 581, 276 N.W. 725; Vaughn v. Standard Surety & Casualty Co., 27 Tenn.App. 671, 184 S.W.2d 556, certiorari denied by Sup.Ct.; Associated Indemnity Corporation v. Wachsmith, 2 Wash.2d 679, 99 P.2d 420, 127 A.L.R. 531; Shawcroft v. Standard Accident Insurance Co. of Detroit, 177 Wash. 106, 30 P.2d 987. Even the few tribunals of other jurisdictions adopting a contrary construction have-not found ambiguity. Kaifer v. Georgia Casualty Co., 9 Cir., 67 F.2d 309; Sandstrom v. Clausen’s Estate, 258 Wis. 534, 46 N.W.2d 831; Shanahan v. Midland Coach Lines, 268 Wis. 233, 67 N.W.2d 297.
I respectfully dissent.