concurring. The majority opinion is correct if for no other reason than that Arkansas Highway and Transp. Dep’t v. Hope Brick Works, 294 Ark. 490, 744 S.W.2d 711 (1998), compels reversing and remanding this case. There the court, citing Arkansas Gazette Co. v. Pickens, 258 Ark. 69, 522 S.W.2d 350 (1975), stated that the FOIA clearly provides that “anyone who requests information under the Act is entided to it.” Hope Brick Works, 294 Ark. at 495. (Emphasis added.) Certainly, Attorney General Winston Bryant is no less a citizen than was the corporation in Hope Brick Works, which we held was entitled to information under the FOIA. The Attorney General is a qualified elector, which requires him to be a citizen. See Ark. Const. Art. 3, § 1, and Art. 19, § 3. To say the Attorney General is not a citizen merely because he acts in his official capacity simply ignores both constitutional and statutory (FOIA) law.
In sum, the Attorney General clearly comes within this broad interpretation of the term “citizen” given the FOIA by this court. Professor Watkins appropriately recognized this broad interpretation, stating that Hope Brick Works may even have expanded the definition of the term “citizen” in the Act to include a foreign corporation. See J. Watkins, The Arkansas Freedom of Information Act 284 (2d ed. 1994). The decisions of Pickens and Hope Brick Works are controlling here, and we have not been asked to overrule them. Therefore, I would reverse.