(dissenting).
It is a long-standing rule of law that the trier of fact, in its capacity as sole judge of the credibility of witnesses, may accept or reject all or part of an expert’s testimony. Lewton v. McCauley, 460 N.W.2d 728 (S.D.1990); Cargill Inc. v. Elliott Farms, Inc., 363 N.W.2d 212 (S.D.1985); State v. Romero, 269 N.W.2d 791 (S.D.1978). Expert Deming Smith testified that the assets were capable of being valued at the time of Ethlyn Davis’ death. He fixed the amount at $62,255.00. Another expert David Gerdes testified the lawsuit was not capable of evaluation at the date of death; but expressed that were he obliged to do so, his valuation would be at such a wide range that his valuation would be meaningless from an acceptable appraisal viewpoint. The trial court accepted Smith’s analysis and rejected the other.* We can reverse the trial court only if the ruling was a clear abuse of discretion. Stormo v. Strong, 469 N.W.2d 816 (S.D.1991).
In my opinion, settled law sides with the trial court. The lawsuit in question (1) was an asset of the estate and (2) was properly evaluated for tax purposes as of the date of decedent’s death. In South Dakota, inheritance taxes are imposed upon succession and not upon property. In re John’s Estate, 65 S.D. 124, 271 N.W. 903 (S.D.1937). Per John’s Estate, 271 N.W. at 904, the interest which is transferred, is to be valued “... as of the date of the death of the decedent, without regard to any subsequent increase or decrease in value.” The meaning of this holding has no area of doubt and darkness. The approach to valuation is not limited to South Dakota. Indiana Dept. of State Rev. v. Estate of Cohen, 436 N.E.2d 832 (Ind.App.1982); Matter of Estate of Van Duzer, 369 N.W.2d 407 (Iowa 1985); Gearhart’s Ex’r and Ex’x v. Howard, 302 Ky. 709, 196 S.W.2d 113 (Ky.App.1946); Matter of Estate of Phillips, 92 Wash.2d 362, 597 P.2d 1358 (1979); Matter of Estate of Irish, 89 Wis.2d 148, 277 N.W.2d 872 (1979); 42 Am.Jur.2d Inheritance, Estate, & Gift Taxes § 250 (1969).
Accordingly, the valuation is to be fixed at the time of the devolution of the property, which is the death of the transferor. See In re Guider’s Estate, 63 S.D. 495, 260 N.W. 828 (1935). We should base our decision on Law, not on a private notion of policy. The lawsuit in question was property. SDCL 43-42-1. Valuation is a concept, and that concept is embraced in SDCL 30-16-4 and SDCL 30-16-9. Policy is expressed by our State Legislature for the people. A totality of these statutory enactments should govern. Unless otherwise provided by statute, this lawsuit had to be valued for tax purposes at the date of death. John’s Estate, 271 N.W. at 904.
An abuse of discretion occurs only if no “judicial mind, in view of the law and circumstances of the particular case, could reason*131ably have reached such a conclusion.” Jensen v. Weyrens, 474 N.W.2d 261, 263 (S.D.1991); Matter of Estate of Pejsa, 469 N.W.2d 243, 245 (S.D.1990). As the trial court applied settled law relevant to these issues, there can be no abuse of discretion. Cody v. Edward D. Janes & Co., 502 N.W.2d 558, 561 (S.D.1993). Hence, I would affirm the Honorable EUGENE L. MARTIN, Circuit Judge.
It becomes obvious why the circuit judge fastened upon a tangible opinion and avoided a vacuous locution.