(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I wholeheartedly concur with part I of the majority opinion; however, I dissent from part n. Thus, I would reverse the lower court’s order denying summary disposition for defendant in its entirety.
The essence of the majority position is that the parties’ contract is valid except for the agreement to *171arbitrate a civil rights claim. Thus, the agreement to arbitrate, as it pertains to civil rights, has been found to violate public policy, and the court has rewritten the parties’ agreement by striking that provision. Accordingly, the current state of the law is that the freedom to contract prospectively with regard to arbitration of civil rights claims is not available to our citizens on the asserted ground that such freedom offends public policy. I respectfully disagree.
In our jurisprudence, contractual freedom is the axiomatic norm, and to deviate from that norm requires justification.1 The majority asserts that there is such justification and that it is found in a constitutional provision, a statute, and a nonmajority opinion of the Supreme Court. Yet, as I explain below, the authority cited by the majority does not compel, or even allow, the conclusions that it has drawn from them. As a result, the majority has, without authority, but undoubtedly with good intentions, rewritten the parties’ contract.
In our original opinion in this case, we held that defendant was entitled to summary disposition of plaintiff’s gender discrimination claim because she failed to exhaust the remedies available to her pursuant to defendant’s alternative dispute resolution (ADR) *172procedure.2 We held that plaintiff’s sole remedy for her gender discrimination claim was the ADR procedure. Rushton v Meijer, Inc, unpublished memorandum opinion, issued March 1, 1995 (Docket No. 164272). The Supreme Court, 453 Mich 943 (1996), remanded this case to us for reconsideration in light of Heurtebise v Reliable Business Computers, Inc, 452 Mich 405; 550 NW2d 243 (1996). First, there is nothing in the majority holding of Heurtebise that suggests our prior reversal of the trial court’s holding was not the correct resolution of this issue. Indeed, a majority of the justices of the Supreme Court specifically declined to reach this issue. Id. at 438-439. Nevertheless, a minority opinion signed by two current and one former members of the Supreme Court stated in dicta that it is contrary to Michigan public policy to require an employee to waive resolution of a civil rights claim in a judicial forum as a condition of employment. That dicta has now been adopted, embellished, and made the law of this state as a result of part n of the majority opinion herein.
The conclusion of the minority opinion in Heurtebise is premised primarily upon Const 1963, art 5, § 29, which provides: “Nothing contained in this section [establishing the civil rights commission] shall be construed to diminish the right of any party to direct and immediate legal or equitable remedies in the courts of this state,” and its statutory counterpart, MCL 37.2803; MSA 3.548(803), which provides: “This [civil rights] act shall not be construed to diminish *173the right of a person to direct or immediate legal or equitable remedies in the courts of this state.” As explained below, the conclusion of the minority opinion in Heurtebise and the majority here is not established by the cited constitutional provision or the cited statute.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has definitively construed these provisions in a controlling opinion in a way that is not harmonious with the minority dicta opinion in Heurtebise or the majority opinion herein. In Nummer v Dep’t of Treasury, 448 Mich 534, 550; 533 NW2d 250 (1995), the Supreme Court said that the above-cited constitutional provision and statute mean that “the Civil Rights Commission does not have exclusive jurisdiction over discrimination claims, but instead has concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit courts.”3 Thus, the cited constitutional language simply means that a person is not required to exhaust whatever remedies he may have with the Civil Rights Commission before filing a circuit court lawsuit.4 In no event can it be said, as the minority opinion in Heurtebise claims and the majority herein adopts, that this constitutional provision provides a nonwaivable right to a judicial forum or precludes the enforcement of prospective arbitration agreements in *174employment contracts. 452 Mich 436, 438. The cited constitutional provision simply does not address the propriety of prospective agreements to arbitrate civil rights disputes in employment contracts.
The cited statutory language is similarly straightforward. Section 803 states that the Michigan Civil Rights Act itself is not to be construed to diminish the right of a person to direct or immediate legal or equitable remedies in Michigan courts. That is, the Legislature wished to make it clear that the remedies in the Civil Rights Act are cumulative to preexisting common-law and statutory rights. This was necessary because, before passage of the Civil Rights Act, certain civil rights were already guaranteed by the common-law and by statute, and the Legislature wanted to make clear that its broad entry into the field had not abrogated the previously existing common-law and statutory rights. See Marsh v Dep’t of Civil Service, 142 Mich App 557, 563, n 2, 567, n 6; 370 NW2d 613 (1985). See also Heurtebise, supra at 423. Thus, as with the constitutional provision, § 803 simply does not address the issue of the propriety of prospective agreements to arbitrate civil rights claims. Accord Prudential Ins Co v Shammas, 865 F Supp 429, 433 (WD Mich, 1993) (the court rejected the argument that MCL 37.2803; MSA 3.548[803] precluded arbitration under the federal arbitration act of a Michigan civil rights claim).
A statute that does address the issue is Michigan’s statutory arbitration act.5 This act allows predispute *175contracts to arbitrate6 and only excepts collective bargaining and certain real estate disputes from its purview. MCL 600.5001(3); MSA 27A.5001(3); MCL 600.5005; MSA 27A.5005. Because the act allows predispute agreements to arbitrate civil rights claims, it establishes Michigan’s public policy concerning this issue. Obviously, if the Legislature wanted to preclude predispute agreements to arbitrate civil rights claims, it would have excluded such claims by name, just as it excluded collective bargaining agreements and certain real estate claims. The express exclusion of some claims implies inclusion of those not mentioned. People v Jahner, 433 Mich 490, 500, n 3; 446 NW2d 151 (1989). Therefore, for this reason also, there is no jus*176tification for this Court to substitute its judgment for that of the contracting parties in declaring the parties’ predispute agreement to arbitrate invalid.
Moreover, reading § 803 to produce the result that the majority reaches here requires one to ignore how explicitly our Legislature speaks when it wants to bar prospective contractual waivers of important rights. For example, in the Employment Security Act, the Legislature provided that no agreement by an individual to waive his right to benefits or any other rights under the act is valid. MCL 421.31; MSA 17.533. Similarly, when enacting the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act, the Legislature provided that no agreement by an employee to waive his rights to compensation under the worker’s compensation act before an injury shall be valid. MCL 418.815; MSA 17.237(815). In contrast, there is no waiver-bar language in either the constitution or § 803 vis-á-vis predispute agreements to arbitrate civil rights claims. This lack of language barring a waiver is inappropriately given no weight by the majority.
In addition, the majority misunderstands, and thus mischaracterizes, the import of the proper construction of the constitution and § 803. Defendant is not asserting that, because of the existence of the Civil Rights Commission section of the constitution or of the Civil Rights Act, plaintiff is precluded from going to the circuit court. Rather, defendant argues that these provisions do not mean one must go to the circuit court, and in no way preclude contracting parties from agreeing to a different forum than a court, to adjudicate their civil rights disputes. I agree with defendant’s argument because this construction leaves the constitution and § 803 with the meaning *177their language clearly implies and also because it does not obliterate freedom of contract with regard to the matter here under consideration.7
Finally, the whole notion of prospective waivers of important rights is not, as the majority seems to believe, inherently repugnant to our constitutional order. Indeed, it is well established that rights of a higher standing than that of forum selection, i.e., constitutional rights themselves, may be prospectively waived.8 See, e.g., Snepp v United States, 444 US 507; 100 S Ct 763; 62 L Ed 2d 704 (1980) (First Amendment right to speak or right about information gained in course of employment with government may be waived by contract); Whispering Pines AFC, Home, Inc v Dep’t of Treasury, 212 Mich App 545, 550; 538 NW2d 452 (1995) (due process right to an evidentiary hearing to resolve a dispute may be waived by signing *178a contract with the government).9 Given that these highly valued constitutional rights may be prospectively waived without offending public policy, how can it be seriously suggested that, without a statute or provision of the constitution prohibiting it, and, in fact, our state arbitration act allowing it, the right to have a circuit court to resolve a civil rights dispute may not be prospectively waived in favor of having such a claim adjudicated in an arbitral forum?
The majority also adopts Justice Cavanagh’s statement that § 803 expressly prohibits an exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement. I agree with this proposition of law, but note that it has no relevance to the question whether parties may enter into predispute agreements to arbitrate civil rights claims.10 This *179proposition of law is irrelevant to the question before us because a contractual remedy is not an administrative remedy. It is important to remember what an administrative remedy is and what it is not. An administrative remedy is a remedy that is available from an administrative agency, such as the Civil Rights Commission. It is not, as the majority seems to suggest, any remedy other than a court remedy. To put a finer point on it, an administrative remedy is not one from an arbitration forum established through a privately established method of alternative dispute resolution. Thus, because we are dealing with an arbitration available through a valid contract, the doctrine that holds that a civil rights claimant need not exhaust administrative remedies is simply inapplicable. It is disingenuous for the majority to ignore the difference between an administrative remedy and a private contractual remedy, and there is no principled basis for treating a private contractual remedy as if it *180were identical to a remedy available from an administrative agency.
At this point, then, at least to my satisfaction, the flaws in the majority’s position have been demonstrated. This draws me to the conclusion that the real objection the majority has can be found at the end of the minority opinion in Heurtebise. Id. at 438. There, Justice Cavanagh states that he believes that the right to be free of unlawful discrimination is just “too important” to be left to any dispute resolution process, prospectively agreed upon, other than that available in a court. Id. at 438 (emphasis supplied). While a jurist can, of course, hold this view as a personal matter, I do not know how this gets converted into a rule of law given that any legal basis for this view has been demonstrated to be lacking. In a situation like the case at bar, it is for the Legislature (which as we have seen has spoken concerning this and allowed that which Justice Cavanagh and the majority opinion herein disallows), or for the people directly, through referendum or constitutional amendment, to establish as the public policy. Because the Legislature has acted to establish this public policy in this area, it is inappropriate for the majority to disregard that action.
Further, I respectfully point out that, in my view, Justice Cavanagh’s position also is ill-advised because it can only be reached if one, notwithstanding protests to the contrary, id. at 438, holds the notion that arbitration is a second-rate type of fact-finding and remedy-producing vehicle that is to be discouraged in favor of traditional litigation. That, however, is inconsistent with how the courts view arbitration. Both the Michigan and the federal courts have enunciated *181strong public-policy positions that favor the utilization of arbitration to resolve disputes. Such statements are premised, in part, upon Congress’ enactment of the federal arbitration act, 9 USC 1 to 15, and Michigan’s enactment of the previously discussed statutory arbitration act, MCL 600.5001 et seq.; MSA 27A.5001, and clearly show that arbitration is favored as a means of resolving disputes.
The United States Supreme Court in Gilmer v Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp, 500 US 20, 34, n 5; 111 S Ct 1647; 114 L Ed 2d 26 (1991), stated:
The Court in Alexander v Gardner-Denver Co [415 US 36; 94 S Ct 1011; 39 L Ed 2d 147 (1974)] also expressed the view that arbitration was inferior to the judicial process for resolving statutory claims. 415 US, at 57-58. That “mistrust of the arbitral process,” however, has been undermined by our recent arbitration decisions. [Shearson American Express, Inc v McMahon, 482 US 220, 231-232; 107 S Ct 2332; 96 L Ed 2d 185 (1987)]. “[W]e are well past the time when judicial suspicion of the desirability of arbitration and of the competence of arbitral tribunals inhibited the development of arbitration as an alternative means of dispute resolution.” Mitsubishi Motors Corp v Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc, 473 US 614, 626-627 [87 L Ed 2d 444; 105 S Ct 3346] (1985).
Our Michigan courts have said no less. In Huntington Woods v Ajax Paving Industries, Inc, 177 Mich App 351, 356; 441 NW2d 99 (1989), rev’d in part on other grounds on rehearing 179 Mich App 600 (1989), Judge (now Justice) Marilyn Kelly said: “Our courts have long been supportive of arbitration agreements and have discouraged efforts to circumvent their objectives.” Also, in Whispering Pines, supra at 550, the Court stated: “[T]he law favors contractual terms providing for alternate dispute resolution mechanisms.” *182Most recently, in Brucker v McKinlay Transport, Inc, 454 Mich 8, 17; 557 NW2d 536 (1997), the Michigan Supreme Court stated: “[P]arties who can locate an alternative method of dispute resolution are encouraged to bypass the courts and use other appropriate means.” Indeed, Justice Cavanagh himself acknowledges this virtually uniform view by conceding that there is a public policy favoring alternative dispute resolution, while puzzlingly asserting that the import of this view does not adversely affect his position. Heurtebise, supra at 438.
One cannot help sensing that the members of the Supreme Court who joined in the Heurtebise minority opinion, as well as the majority here, feel that they have struck a blow for the working people of this state. After all, no arbitration of civil rights claims, and only full dress litigation with all of its protections, sounds at first blush to be protective of civil rights principles. Yet, the cost may well be that just-cause employers, such as Meijer, having had much of the value of their bargain (just-cause employment given in return for a promise to eliminate lengthy, costly civil rights litigation in court) stripped from them by this decision, will simply terminate the whole just-cause regime, as they have reserved the right to do, and return to at-will employment. Moreover, might it not be that, in practice, even just-cause disputes (that would still be subject to arbitration under part I of the majority opinion) will opportunistically be coupled with or pleaded as a civil rights claim,11 in order to avoid arbitration? Whether this maneuvering *183will actually take place is less important than that it will be anticipated by sophisticated employers, thus providing an additional disincentive for an employer to enter into any agreement offering just-cause employment in return for an agreement to utilize arbitration to resolve employment-related disputes and thereby leaving employees in the less desirable status of at-will employment.
In short, can it be said with certainty that the majority’s opinion has really advanced the cause of this state’s employees? It can be doubted. The reason is that every worker cares about freedom from arbitrary termination while fewer, fortunately, have any need to worry about, or avail themselves of, civil rights remedies. While this calculus may not be every person’s, it is for that reason it would be wise, especially given the legislative allowance of predispute agreements to arbitrate civil rights claims and no constitutional bar against it, not to impose our preferences on the parties and to allow them instead, as free men and women, to enter or not to enter into employment with these conditions. Were we to have ruled that just-cause employers may prospectively agree with their employees to arbitrate civil rights claims, one could reasonably assume that more at-will employers would seriously consider, and have incentive to become, just-cause employers. It is fortunate that ours may not be the final word on this question and that our Supreme Court, should it grant leave in this case (which I urge), will see this issue, as the Heurtebise majority’s refusal to join the minority opinion may suggest, more clearly than the majority in this Court does.
*184In my opinion, defendant was entitled to summary disposition of plaintiffs civil rights claim because the contract she had with Meijer required utilization of arbitration as the “exclusive, final and binding method to resolve all claims arising out of termination from employment.” Plaintiff’s civil rights have not been diminished one iota by the agreement to arbitrate, and the only waiver involved is the forum for deciding if her civil rights had been violated. McKinstry v Valley Obstetrics-Gynecology Clinic, PC, 428 Mich 167; 405 NW2d 88 (1987). There is no valid reason not to enforce this contractual provision. Thus, I would hold that a just-cause employer that agrees to pay the costs of arbitration and authorizes the arbitration panél to grant any relief a court of law could grant, as Meijer’s policy provides, may require a nonunion employee to arbitrate all employment-related disputes, including civil rights claims, as a condition of employment. Accord Cole v Burns Int’l Security Services, 323 US App DC 133; 105 F3d 1465 (1997) (employer may require arbitration of civil rights claims by employees if employer assumes responsibility for the payment of the arbitrator’s compensation and arbitrators are authorized to grant all of the types of relief that would otherwise be available in court).12
*185As a final matter, one of the reasons cited by the trial court for refusing to summarily dismiss plaintiffs gender discrimination claim was the fact that the Meijer’s termination appeal procedure requires a person whose employment has been terminated to invoke the procedure within fourteen days of discharge by filing a form. This issue was not ripe for the trial court’s handling because, whether it is permissible or not to allow only fourteen days to file a claim, this plaintiff managed to meet the standard and cannot claim prejudice. The propriety of this short period simply was not relevant to defendant’s motion because defendant was not claiming that plaintiff had failed to invoke the procedure within fourteen days.
Because I would find the prospective agreement to arbitrate civil rights claims enforceable under Michigan law, I find it unnecessary to address defendant’s claim that the federal arbitration act preempts a ruling to the contrary. See, e.g., Great Western Mortgage Corp v Peacock, 110 F3d 222 (CA 3, 1997) (in enacting the federal arbitration act, Congress withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims that the contracting parties agreed to resolve by arbitration), Patterson v Tenet Healthcare, Inc, 113 F3d 832 (CA 8, 1997) (federal arbitration act required the plaintiff to arbitrate a state [Missouri] civil rights claim), O’Neil v Hilton Head Hosp, 115 F3d 272 (CA 4, 1997), and Burns v Olde Discount Corp, 212 Mich App 576, 580; 538 *186NW2d 686 (1995) (state courts are bound under the Supremacy Clause, US Const, art VI, § 2, to enforce the substantive provisions of the federal arbitration act).
For these reasons I would reverse and remand for entry of a judgment in defendant’s favor.
See, e.g., Dep’t of Navy v Federal Labor Relations Authority, 295 US App DC 239, 248; 962 F 2d 48 (1992) (cited with approval in Port Huron Ed Ass’n v Port Huron Area School Dist, 452 Mich 309, 319; 550 NW2d 228 (1996):
Because of the fundamental policy of freedom of contract, the parties are generally free to agree to whatever specific rules they like, and in most circumstances it is beyond the competence of the Authority, the National Labor Relations Board or the courts to interfere with the parties’ choice.
Plaintiff failed to exhaust a contractual remedy available to her under the termination appeal procedure when she failed to demand arbitration (step two) after the termination of her employment was upheld under step one of the termination appeal procedure.
I note that the majority does not respond to this argument. Indeed, the majority states that only two of my arguments warrant a response. I am unsure what that means but incline to the view that it means that they have no credible response to the positions they have declined to answer.
This is in contrast to the federal system wherein a party must obtain a right to sue letter from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (eeoc) before asserting a federal civil rights claim in federal court. See Nummer v Dep’t of Treasury, supra at 548, n 13 (exhaustion rules apply in the federal system); Heurtebise, supra at 419 (title vn requires claimants to exhaust administrative remedies with the eeoc before pursuing judicial relief).
The majority claims that I believe the state arbitration act “overrides” § 803. I do not believe it, nor have I said it. As set forth in my dissent, § 803 and the state arbitration act are not incompatible in any way. Thus I do not contend that either statute overrides the other. The majority’s con*175clusion that § 803 must be viewed as an exception to the state arbitration act is in error for the simple reason that the two statutes do not conflict. Because § 803 does not expressly forbid predispute agreements to arbitrate civil rights claims, something the state arbitration act allows, it is the majority’s position that this authorization of the state arbitration act has been repealed by implication. The repeal by implication doctrine is inapplicable because the statutes can be read harmoniously. Our Supreme Court has addressed this situation and said: “ ‘ “Repeals by implication are not favored and will not be indulged in if there is any other reasonable construction.” ’ “ Wayne Co Prosecutor v Dep’t of Corrections, 451 Mich 569, 576; 548 NW2d 900 (1996), quoting House Speaker v State Administrative Bd, 441 Mich 547, 562; 495 NW2d 539 (1993), which in turn quoted Attorney General ex rel Owen v Joyce, 233 Mich 619, 621; 207 NW2d 863 (1926). The majority has chosen to ignore this admonition.
MCL 600.5001(2); MSA 27A.5001(2) states:
A provision in a written contract to settle arbitration under this chapter, a controversy thereafter arising between the parties to the contract, with relation thereto, and in which it is agreed that a judgment of any circuit court may be rendered upon the award made pursuant to such agreement, shall be valid, enforceable and irrevocable save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the rescission or revocation of any contract.
Mejjer’s adr procedure contains the necessary language that the decision of the arbitrator is intended to be enforceable in any court of competent jurisdiction.
The majority asserts that my construction of § 803 is inconsistent with my published admonitions encouraging all judges to exercise judicial restraint in deferring to the unambiguous word of the Legislature. It is pleasant, albeit a bit surprising, to see my two colleagues concerned about insufficient deference to the Legislature. But alas, as with most fresh converts, they are having trouble with the application of the doctrine. The problem here is that it is their position, not mine, that requires one to rewrite the statute. To reach the conclusion the majority reaches, one has to rewrite § 803 to state: “Neither this act, nor a private contract, nor the state arbitration act shall be construed to diminish the right of a person to direct or immediate legal or equitable remedies in the courts of this state.” (Added language italicized.) This is not what I counseled in my dissent in McDougall v Eliuk, 218 Mich App 501, 516 ff; 554 NW2d 56 (1996), lv pending. The proper thing to do in the case at bar is not to rewrite the statute as the majority has effectively done. Perhaps in future cases my brothers will better grasp the application of the principle, but for now I must take solace in the fact we at least agree with the principle of deferring to the Legislature absent constitutional concerns.
The adr procedure does not waive any of a plaintiff’s civil rights — it only affects the forum that will determine if those rights have been violated. McKinstry v Valley Obstetrics-Gynecology Clinic, PC, 428 Mich 167, 184; 405 NW2d 88 (1987); Campbell v St John Hosp, 434 Mich 608, 615; 455 NW2d 695 (1990).
Indeed, constitutional rights are also waived when a person fails to assert them. Also see People v Rodriguez, 192 Mich App 1, 5; 480 NW2d 287 (1991) (constitutional right to appeal a criminal conviction may be waived as a result of a guilty plea).
Cases such as Michigan Professional Employees Society v Dep’t of Natural Resources, 152 Mich App 595, 600; 394 NW2d 786 (1986) (MPES), are readily distinguishable. In MPES, a labor union filed a civil rights complaint in the circuit court on behalf of three of its members. The trial court granted accelerated judgment because the collective bargaining agreement required all contract disputes to be submitted to arbitration. This Court reversed, stating that a classified civil servant (union member) may directly, and in the first instance, file a discrimination lawsuit in the circuit court without the necessity of exhausting rights under a collective bargaining agreement. Little rationale for this holding was given, but we are fortunate to have a parallel case to MPES, Pryner v Tractor Supply Co, 109 F3d 354 (CA 7, 1997), authored by Judge Richard Posner. In Pryner, the court fully considered the virtually identical issue whether a collective bargaining agreement can compel the arbitration of a federal antidiscrimination claim. The Pryner court concluded it could not, and based its analysis on three main points: (1) the plaintiffs’ rights under the collective bargaining agreements were not as extensive as their statutory rights; (2) the arbitration procedure could only be invoked by the union and not the worker; and (3) collective bargaining agreements bind all members of a bargaining unit even if an individual employee opposed the agreement. Obviously, had these factors not been present, the agreement would have been enforceable. To understand this is important because in *179our case, unlike in Pryner or MPES, we have the situation where the invalidating factors eliminating employee freedom to trigger the arbitration are not present. First, plaintiffs rights herein are exactly coextensive with available statutory rights because the Meijer adr procedure states that arbitrators are specifically authorized to award any relief that a court of law could award. Second, plaintiff had the absolute right to force the matter to arbitration and was not required to convince a union to pursue the matter. Third, there is no concern that a union negotiated something plaintiff may not have agreed with because plaintiff, under the majority’s own analysis, agreed to just-cause employment subject to arbitration of all employment disputes when she accepted an offer of employment from defendant. Thus, MPES, even as Pryner, must be seen as not standing for blanket unenforceability of predispute arbitration agreements, but only the illegalizing of such agreements when the invalidating factors Pryner points out are present. The implicit holding of MPES, as seen through the lens of Pryner’s analysis, is that, absent the difficulties seen in Pryner, a predispute agreement to arbitrate a civil rights claim will be enforced. Because we are in such a situation, we should enforce the agreement.
As the saying goes, when all you have to work with is a hammer, everything starts to look like a nail.
Moreover, even if I were persuaded, wMch I am not, that it would violate public policy to require just-cause employees to arbitrate civil rights claims, I would still find that defendant was entitled to summary disposition because lawful conditions precedent to the initiating of a circuit court action were not met by plaintiff. Section n of the Meijer termination appeal procedure states that if a court of competent jurisdiction determines that the termination appeal procedure is not the sole and exclusive remedy and forum for some or all of an employee’s claims, exhaustion of the termination appeal procedure is a condition precedent to institution of a legal proceeding. Therefore, even assuming for the sake of the argument that plaintiff could not forever be deprived of litigating her gender discrimination claim in the circuit court through a contractual *185agreement with her employer, she still was required to utilize the termination appeal procedure before she could file a lawsuit in the circuit court. Plaintiff failed to do this, and as a consequence she should be barred from pursuing a gender discrimination claim in the circuit court. This is fatal to plaintiff’s desire to pursue a civil rights claim in the circuit court.