dissenting.
I agree with appellants that appellee did not suffer a compensable injury. Therefore, I would reverse and remand this case.
On May 23, 2006, appellee was working as night manager at CV’s Family Foods. Appellee tripped and fell in the parking lot of CV as he was watching an employee to her car. As night manager, appellee was required to watch the employees in the store, remain in the store until all the employees were gone, set the alarm before leaving, and lock the store up for the night. On May 23, appellee waited for the last employee to finish counting |ñher money. After the employee finished, appellee locked up the store as usual.
Appellee stated that he noticed a truck in the parking lot next to the employee’s car and he decided to watch her to her car. Appellee continued to watch the employee as he proceeded to his car, parked near the front door. As appellee reached in his pocket for his car keys, he tripped over a concrete parking barrier. Appellee suffered a right hip fracture.
At the hearing, appellee stated that he thought it was his duty to ensure that all of the employees reached their vehicles safely. Appellee admitted that no one ever told him that it was his duty. John P. Wilkinson testified that appellee worked for him. Wilkinson stated that appellee’s watching of the employee to her car was a “personal issue” and a “gentlemanly gesture” that was not required by CV’s.
In an opinion dated December 28, 2007, the ALJ determined that appellee’s injury arose out of and in the course of his employment and was compensable. The Commission’s April 30, 2008 opinion affirmed ' and adopted the ALJ’s opinion. Appellee was granted benefits for medical services, temporary-total disability benefits from May 24, 2006, through July 5, 2006, and attorney’s fees. This appeal followed.
In reviewing a decision of the Commission, we view the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the findings of the Commission. Magnet Cove Sch. Dist. v. Barnett, 81 Ark.App. 11, 97 S.W.3d 909 (2003). The Commission’s findings will be affirmed if supported by substantial evidence. Id. Substantial evidence is such relevant |7evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Id. The issue on appeal is not whether we might have reached a different result or whether the evidence would have supported a contrary finding if reasonable minds could reach the Commission’s conclusion, we must affirm. Linton v. Ark. Dep’t of Connections, 87 Ark.App. 263, 190 S.W.3d 275 (2004).
Appellants argue that the evidence does not support the Commission’s decision that appellee was in the course of employment at the time of his injury. In order for an accidental injury to be compensable, it must arise out of and in the course of employment. Ark.Code Ann. § 11-9-102(4)(A)(i) (Supp.2007). A compensable injury does not include an injury which was inflicted upon the employee at a time when employment services were not being performed. Ark.Code Ann. § 11 — 9— 102(4)(B)(iii). An employee is performing employment services when he or she is doing something that is generally required by his or her employer. Dairy Farmers of America, Inc. v. Coker, 98 Ark.App. 400, 255 S.W.3d 905 (2007). We use the same test to determine whether an employee is performing employment services as we do when determining whether an employee is acting within the course and scope of employment. Pifer v. Single Source Transp., 347 Ark. 851, 69 S.W.3d 1 (2002). The test is whether the injury occurred within the time and space boundaries of the employment, when the employee was carrying out the employer’s purpose or advancing the employer’s interest, directly or indirectly. Id.
|sIn the instant case, appellee was injured while watching a female employee after he had locked the store for the night. Appellee testified that he had never been told that it was his duty to ensure the safety of employees. Wilkinson testified that appellee’s watching of the employee was a “gentlemanly gesture.” There was no evidence to prove that appellee was carrying out CV’S purpose or advancing its interest. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commission, I cannot say that persons with the same facts before them would have reached the same conclusion. Substantial evidence does not support the Commission’s decision that ap-pellee suffered a compensable injury.
The majority in its opinion today has expanded the definition of “employment services.” They impute that it is in the employer’s interest that all employees arrive at their cars safely. On its face that seems reasonable. However, their logic is flawed and overbroad. The employee being watched by appellee would not have received any benefits had she been the one who fell and broke her hip. This court has made it clear that simply walking to your car after work is not an “employment service.” The majority leaves employers wondering what this court will next consider to be an “employment service” because it is in the “employer’s interest.” Therefore, I respectfully dissent.