The appellant entered a negotiated plea of guilty to theft of property, a Class C felony. He was sentenced to three years’ probation, fined $100, and ordered to pay court costs and restitution. The parties agreed to a separate restitution hearing in which the trial court ordered restitution in the amount of $19,500.00. On appeal, the appellant argues that the trial court erred in determining the amount of restitution. We affirm.1
The victim, Kelly Jones, testified that four of her horses were stolen in July 1993. She testified that two of the horses were registered Arabians and the other two were registered quarter horses. She stated that all the horses had been professionally trained and were show horses. Ms. Jones testified that one of the Arabians was a black bay mare worth $5,000. The other Arabian was a white stallion also valued at $5,000. Ms. Jones testified that her parents had given her one of the quarter horses which was a high point show mare. She testified that her parents paid $2,950 for the horse and she estimated its value at $3,500. Ms. Jones further testified that the fourth horse was a three-year-old palomino filly out of the highest point palomino in the American Quarter Horse Association. She stated that she borrowed $7,000 from her father to purchase the horse and had been offered $10,000 for it. The victim’s father confirmed that he loaned her $7,000 for the purchase of the palomino quarter horse. Ms. Jones further testified that she also lost $1,750 in stud fees.
Ms. Jones’s ex-husband testified that the horses were worth less than the amounts testified to by Ms. Jones. The appellant testified that he had sold the stolen horses for $1,600. He further testified that he made approximately $1,500 to $1,700 a month which was used to support himself, his wife, and three children.
In determining the amount of restitution, the trial court allowed $3,000 for each Arabian horse, $3,500 for one quarter horse and $10,000 for the second quarter horse. The appellant argues that it was error to consider the victim’s testimony to the amount of restitution. However, this argument was not made to the trial court. Our law is well established that arguments not raised at trial will not be addressed for the first time on appeal, and that parties cannot change the grounds for an objection on appeal, but are bound on appeal by the scope and nature of the objections and arguments presented at trial. Campbell v. State, 319 Ark. 332, 891 S.W.2d 55 (1995).
Theft of property is a Class C felony if the value of the property is less than $2500 but more than $200. Ark. Code Ann § 5-36-103 (b)(2)(A) (Repl. 1993). The appellant contends that the amount of restitution could not exceed $2500 because he entered a plea of guilty to a Class C felony theft of property. However, the appellant has not cited any authority to support this argument. Assignments of error unsupported by convincing argument or authority are not considered on appeal. Scroggins v. State, 312 Ark. 106, 848 S.W.2d 400 (1993). Moreover, restitution is meant, as far as is practicable, to make the victim whole with respect to the financial injury suffered. See Ark. Code Ann. §§ 16-90-301 to -306 (1987). Here, there was evidence that the victim sustained damages in excess of $2500 as a result of the theft; consequendy, we hold that the evidence is sufficient to support the trial court’s order of restitution.
The appellant also asserts that the trial court failed to consider the amount he could afford to pay in determining the amount of restitution. We disagree. The trial court heard testimony about the appellant’s income and financial responsibilities. The trial court’s order noted that the appellant would have to make only reasonable monthly payments. We note that a trial court retains jurisdiction beyond the term of a suspended or probated sentence until any fine, costs, or restitution is paid. See Basura v. City of Springdale, 47 Ark. App. 66, 884 S.W.2d 629 (1994). Thus, the term of the appellant’s restitution payments may be longer than his thirty-six months’ probation. Accordingly, we find no error and affirm.
Affirmed.
Stroud, Griffen, Rogers, and Robbins, JJ., agree. Mayfield, J., dissents.The State questions whether the appellant may bring this appeal from his guilty plea. However, because the appeal does not constitute a review of the guilty plea itself, we conclude that the appellant is not precluded from bringing an appeal challenging the restitution. See Hill v. State, 318 Ark. 408, 887 S.W.2d 275 (1994); State v. Sherman, 303 Ark. 284, 796 S.W.2d 339 (1990).