dissenting.
I respectfully dissent to the majority’s holdings as to appellant’s points of error two, three, and four.
In my opinion, the majority incorrectly concludes that INP’s increased proximity injury is an injury suffered in common with other properties, and is not compen-sable. The majority does not point out the other properties that suffered in common with INP. There are none. We are considering increased proximity damages, not whether there were damages from diversion of traffic, inconvenience of access, impaired visibility of ground level buildings, and disruption caused by construction activities as was the issue in State v. Schmidt, 867 S.W.2d 769 (Tex.1993). The Schmidt ease cited by the majority for its definition of community injuries is not in point, as increased proximity damages were not at issue in that case.
The increased proximity damages to INP in this case were special to INP because of the unique way the freeway was widened. The properties to the north of INP taken by the State could not have the increased proximity problem because that land was vacant. The wide curve of the new service road cut through the land to the north, which converged with the new service road at INP’s property, caused more of INP’s frontage to be taken than any of the properties to the south of INP. Except for the Northborough Tower, which is immediately adjacent to INP on the south, the other properties to the south were not buildings like INP’s. While these properties gave up a few feet of land, they suffered minor changes compared to INP in regard to proximity. INP’s property ended up closer to the freeway than even its closest neighbor to the south, the Northborough Tower. No proximity damages similar to INP’s occurred on the opposite (east) side of the freeway.
Damages may be awarded where the new proximity of the highway to the property after a taking is a factor. State v. Sungrowth VI California, Ltd., 713 S.W.2d 175 (Tex.App.-Austin 1986, writ ref'd. n.r.e.); State v. Holland, 453 S.W.2d 871 (Tex.Civ.App.-Tyler 1970, no writ); State v. Carswell, 384 S.W.2d 407 (Tex.Civ.App.-Eastland 1964, no writ); State v. Scarborough, 383 S.W.2d 839 (Tex.Civ.App.-Texar-kana 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.). As claimed by appellee, this is especially true when the new right-of-way puts the property in violation of the City of Houston’s building setback ordinance as well as the deed restrictions applicable to appellee’s property.
The State’s running objection to appel-lee's evidence of proximity damage on the grounds it was community in nature, and not special to this property, is misplaced because the testimony proved the injury not to be community in nature.
*15INP did not offer evidence of increased noise or as to damages attributable to highway construction. Therefore, Felts v. Harris County, 915 S.W.2d 482 (Tex.1996) has no application to this case.
Appellant’s points of error two, three, and four should be overruled.