(dissenting).
I.- The majority concedes the district court lacked authority to order the plaintiffs to obtain counsel. It further concedes the court lacked authority to dismiss the plaintiffs’ action if they failed ■ to do so. The majority must so concede because a litigant has a right to prosecute the case pro se.
The majority, however, brushes aside these obvious flaws to the district court’s dismissal order in the name of error preservation. It then concludes by way of circular reasoning that the dismissal order was authorized under Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure 216 and 230.
Rule 216, an involuntary dismissal rule, has doubtful application because it provides that “[a] party may move for dismissal of any action or claim against the party or for any appropriate order of court, if the party asserting [the action or claim] fails to comply with these rules or any other order of court.” (Emphasis added.) No party moved for dismissal; the court dismissed the action on its own. This court has raised but not answered the question whether a trial court has inherent power under this rule to dismiss an action on its own:
We need not say at this time whether Iowa trial courts possess inherent power to dismiss, or if so, the extent of the power, for we are clear this is not a case for the exercise of such power. Motz’ case is a novel one, to be sure, and may ultimately appear to be without merit. But the case is only in the preliminary stages....
We think the trial court should have at least let the case progress in the regular way. If trial courts do possess inherent power to dismiss cases, they should exercise the power with restraint and caution *601and not in situations like this one. We hold that under the present circumstances the trial court erred in dismissing the case.
Motz v. Motz, 207 N.W.2d 580, 581 (Iowa 1973).
Rule 230 provides that a party is in default whenever that party “fails to comply with any order of court.”
I submit error preservation, which is a court-imposed rule, should not apply here even if trial courts have inherent authority to dismiss cases on their own. The purpose of the error preservation rule is to afford trial courts an opportunity to correct a valid complaint before action is taken. Hoekstm v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 382 N.W.2d 100, 107 (Iowa 1986). This court recognized the right to proceed pro se over seventy years ago. See Arthaud v. Griffin, 202 Iowa 462, 464, 210 N.W. 540, 541 (1926). The right is so ingrained in our law that all judges are aware of the right without the need of litigants to remind them of it. There was, therefore, no need to remind the district court it was without authority to saddle the plaintiffs with the duty to obtain counsel as a condition for proceeding with their case.
Rules 216 and 230 are necessarily premised on the existence of proper authority to dismiss the action. Because there was no such authority here, the district court erred in dismissing the action.
II. Fundamental fairness also dictates that we should not apply the court-imposed rule of error preservation. There was good reason why the plaintiffs did not alert the district court to the fact it was without authority to condition their right to proceed pro se on obtaining counsel. Specifically, the order provided that “[pjlaintiffs shall have 60 days from this date in order to secure the services of other attorneys to continue prosecution of their case.” To lay persons such an order would naturally imply they had no right to proceed pro se.
In fact, the district court made it very clear the plaintiffs would not be allowed to proceed pro se. In its default order, the court wrote: “A discussion was held at the meeting (April 2 hearing) which clearly explained the plaintiffs could not effectively proceed without an attorney, due to the nature of the case.” I believe even the majority would concede that a trial court has no authority to prohibit a pro se litigant from proceeding simply because of the nature of the case.
The district court misled plaintiffs into believing they did not have the right to proceed pro se. To penalize plaintiffs for not asserting this right perverts our error preservation rule and commits a travesty of justice. Fundamental fairness transcends all rules, even court-imposed error preservation rules. Such is the ease here. We have inherent power to correct an obvious injustice. We should do so here.
III. Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 236 governs motions to set aside defaults. The rule allows the district court to set aside a default for mistake, inadvertence, surprise, excusable neglect or unavoidable casualty. The purpose of the rule is to allow determinations of controversies on their merits, rather than on the basis of nonprejudicial inadvertence or mistake. Paige v. City of Chariton, 252 N.W.2d 433, 437 (1977).
The plaintiffs alleged all of the rule 236 grounds in their motion to set aside the default. The motion then concluded the court should set aside the default because the “plaintiffs have obtained counsel who have agreed to prosecute their case without delays and can be ready for trial.”
For reasons that follow, I think the district court should have set aside the default on the ground of “excusable neglect.” We now apply a liberal approach in interpreting excusable neglect. Central Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 513 N.W.2d 750, 756 (Iowa 1994). District courts must focus on four factors in determining what constitutes excusable neglect:
First, did the defaulting party actually intend to defend [or prosecute]? Whether the party moved promptly to set aside the default is significant on this point. Second, does the defaulting party assert a claim or defense in good faith? Third, did the defaulting party willfully ignore or defy the rules of procedure or was the default simply the result of a mistake? *602Last, whether relief is warranted should not depend on who made the mistake.
Id.
Unquestionably, the plaintiffs intended to proceed. They did obtain counsel, quickly moved to set aside the default, and prosecuted this appeal. Ironically they obtained counsel on the very day the district court dismissed their action.
Unquestionably, the plaintiffs are asserting a claim in good faith. There is no evidence to the contrary.
Unquestionably, the plaintiffs did not willfully disobey the court’s order — an order that was entered without authority. As I mentioned, they obtained counsel on the very day the district court dismissed their action. The plaintiffs were therefore arguably not even in default.
We will reverse a district court’s default ruling for abuse of discretion. Id. at 753. We find an abuse of discretion when there is a lack of substantial evidence to support the district court’s ruling. Id. Evidence is substantial if reasonable minds would accept it as adequate to reach the same findings. Henning v. Security Bank, 564 N.W.2d 398, 399 (Iowa 1997). “We are more reluctant to interfere with the grant of a motion to set aside a default than with its denial.” Central Nat’l Ins. Co., 513 N.W.2d at 754.
Here when considering all of the evidence on the four factors for determining excusable neglect, I conclude there is no substantial evidence to support denial of the plaintiffs’ motion to set aside the default. Reasonable minds would not find this record sufficient to deny the plaintiffs’ motion to set aside the default. I therefore conclude the district court abused its discretion in denying the plaintiffs’ motion to set aside the default.
The dismissal of this action tragically resulted from a comedy of errors resulting from the district court’s lack of authority to forbid the plaintiffs from proceeding pro se. We should therefore not hesitate to intervene. If we do so, the defendants would be no worse off on the merits of the case. Our failure to do so results in a windfall for the defendants.
I would reverse and remand for further proceedings.
CARTER, J., joins this dissent.