Concurring Opinion by
Hoffman, J.:I concur in the result reached by the Majority. I feel that an additional word is necessary to make clear that the Court’s opinion does not erode the strict requirement of specificity necessary to validate a search warrant.
Article I, §8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides “. . . no warrant . . . shall issue without describing [any place or person to be seized] as nearly as may be. ... .” A frequent problem under §8 arises whenever the premises to be searched are located within a multiple-unit dwelling. Our Court has held a general description of the premises insufficient to establish probable cause in several instances. For example, in Commonwealth v. Copertino, 209 Pa. Superior Ct. 63, 224 A.2d 228 (1966), the warrant described an entire two-family dwelling as the location of the search, despite the fact that the police knew that the building contained two separate residences and *107that only one of the two was used by the named parties for illegal gambling activity — “ [t] herefore, no probable cause was shown to support a warrant commanding the search of the entire building, and the warrant which commanded that search was invalid.” 209 Pa. Superior Ct. at 69, 224 A.2d at 230. Accord, Commonwealth v. Johnson, 229 Pa. Superior Ct. 182, 323 A.2d 26 (1974) : the warrant described the entire house, whereas police knew that the illegal gambling activity occurred only in a first floor apartment. Another example of an insufficient warrant is found in Commonwealth v. Smyser, 205 Pa. Superior Ct. 599, 211 A.2d 59 (1965). The affidavit supporting the warrant mentioned no occupant’s name and specified only “the apartments located at 82 South Main Street, New Hope, Pennsylvania” as the place to be searched. Our Court concluded that “[u]nder the language of the Pennsylvania Constitution the complaint falls short of ‘describing ... as nearly as may be’ the place to be searched or the things or persons to be seized.” 205 Pa. Superior Ct. at 605, 211 A.2d at 63. See also, Commonwealth v. Muscheck, 222 Pa. Superior Ct. 348, 294 A.2d 809 (1972). (Hoffman, J., dissenting opinion), reversed 460 Pa. 590, 334 A.2d 248 (1975).
The question in the instant case is whether the warrant permitted the search of only one clearly specified apartment. The warrant left no room for interpretation concerning the area to be searched: only the apartment listed in Eric Kaplan’s name could have been searched. The police were under a duty to locate appellant’s apartment; had they attempted to execute the warrant by searching the third floor front apartment, that search would have been illegal. Probable cause was based on an informant’s knowledge that Kaplan alone was engaged in drug trafficking and that he was using his Pine Street residence for that purpose. The warrant, therefore, conformed to the specificity required by Commonwealth v. Fiorini, 202 Pa. Superior Ct. 88, 93, 195 A.2d 119, 122
*108(1963) : “ ‘It is enough to describe a definite ascertainable place excluding all others.’ It is generally held under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution that a search warrant directing a search of an apartment house or other building occupied by a number of different tenants, which states the name of the persons occupying the apartment to be searched, is valid.” (Emphasis added).
Thus, there is no question that the warrant in the instant case met constitutional requirements. The fact that the appellant led the police to his apartment is thus irrelevant to the disposition of the case. Had the warrant been insufficient, the appellant’s acquiescence in the police’s request to take them to his apartment could not have validated the otherwise illegal search. See Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968) ; United States ex rel. Gockley v. Myers, 378 F.2d 398 (3d Cir. 1967).