In this appeal, the appellant, Michele Fryer, challenges the dismissal of her complaint against appellee Harleysville Insurance Company. Fryer was involved in an automobile accident on October 21, 1981. At the time of the accident, her own automobile was being serviced by Verrena BuickOlds (“Verrena”). When the accident occurred, Fryer was operating an automobile which had been loaned to her by Verrena Buick-Olds. Harleysville Insurance Company insured vehicles owned by Verrena, but the following clause was included in the insurance policy:
D. WHO IS AN INSURED.
1. For Covered Autos.
a. You are an insured for any covered auto.
b. Anyone else is an insured while using with your permission a covered auto except:
*420(3) Your customers, if your business is shown in ITEM ONE of the declarations as an auto dealership. However, if a customer of yours:
(a) Has no other available insurance (whether primary, excess or contingent), he or she is an insured but only up to the compulsory or financial responsibility law limits where the covered auto.is principally garaged.
(b) Has other available insurance (whether primary, excess or contingent) less than the compulsory or financial responsibility law limits where the covered auto is principally garaged, he or she is an insured only for the amount by which the compulsory or financial responsibility law limits exceed the limits of his or her other insurance.
At the time of the accident, Fryer was an insured under her father’s policy with Allstate Insurance Company. Fryer filed a complaint for declaratory judgment, contending that Harleysville is the primary insurer under the circumstances of this case. The trial court sustained Harleysville’s preliminary objections, finding that Fryer is not an insured under the terms of the Harleysville insurance policy. Following a careful review of the record before us, in light of relevant case law, we find that the trial court erred in holding that the disputed clause in the Harleysville policy is not an unenforceable “escape” clause. Accordingly, we reverse and remand this matter for further proceedings in the trial court.
An “escape” clause has been generally defined as a clause which purports to relieve the insurer of any obligation to an insured if the insured has other available insurance coverage. In Connecticut Indemnity Company v. Cordasco, 369 Pa.Super. 439, 535 A.2d 631 (1987), Juan Fuentes was operating a motor vehicle loaned to him by Gillner Motors while his own auto was being repaired at Gillner Motors. Fuentes became involved in an accident with Cordasco, and Cordasco suffered personal injuries as a result. The auto owned by Gillner Motors was insured by *421Connecticut Indemnity Company, and the terms of the policy covered the situation where the auto was loaned to a customer while his or her own auto was left at Gillner Motors for repair. The Connecticut Indemnity Company argued that Fuentes’ own insurer, State Farm, was the primary insurer under the circumstances. State Farm relied upon the following provision in its policy with Fuentes in contending that it was not obligated to provide any liability coverage:
3. Temporary Substitute Car, Non-Owned Car, Trailer. If a temporary substitute car, a non-owned car or a trailer designed for use with a private passenger car or utility vehicle has other vehicle liability coverage on it, then this coverage is excess. THIS COVERAGE SHALL NOT APPLY:
a. IF THE VEHICLE IS OWNED BY ANY PERSON OR ORGANIZATION IN A CAR BUSINESS; and
b. IF THE INSURED OR THE OWNER HAS OTHER LIABILITY COVERAGE WHICH APPLIES IN WHOLE OR IN PART AS PRIMARY, EXCESS OR CONTINGENT COVERAGE.
Id. at 442, 535 A.2d at 633.
This Court, in Cordasco, recognized that escape clauses are generally disfavored in the law. In concluding that the clause in the State Farm policy was an unenforceable escape clause, we noted that “[b]y its very terms, coverage would be available to Fuentes under the State Farm policy if he was not covered under the Connecticut garage policy issued to Gillner Motors.” Id. We then held that State Farm was obligated to provide excess coverage to Fuentes, because the “weight of authority instructs us to strike the escape clause or provision and enforce the polic[y] as if the escape provision did not exist.” Id.
The Cordasco decision was relied upon by Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Automobile Underwriters, Inc. v. Fireman’s Fund Insurance Companies, 874 F.2d 188 (3rd Cir.1989), in analyzing a case factually analogous to the case at bar. There, William Loving had leased a car from *422Ramsey-Sturman Ford, Inc. [“Ramsey”], while he left his own car at Ramsey for repairs. While operating the leased auto, Loving struck and killed a pedestrian, Eric Nelson. The Court of Appeals had to decide whether the following provision in a policy issued to Ramsey by Fireman’s Fund was an unenforceable “escape” clause:
Anyone else is an insured while using with your permission a covered auto except:
$ * ‡ * * ♦
(3) Your garage operations customers. However, if a garage customer of yours ...
(a) Has no other available insurance (whether primary, excess or contingent), he or she is an insured only up to the compulsory or financial responsibility law limits where the covered auto is principally garaged.
(b) Has other available insurance (whether primary, excess, or contingent), less than the compulsory or financial law limits where the covered auto is principally garaged, he or she is an insured only for the amount by which the compulsory or financial responsibility law limits exceeds the limits of his or her other insurance.
Id. at 189-190. The district court had determined that the provision was not an “escape” clause, but an “excess” clause and, consequently, the court had granted summary judgment in favor of Fireman’s Fund. The district court had reasoned that “(b)ecause Loving has other insurance which exceeds the statutory minimum required by Pennsylvania, Loving is not an insured under the Fireman’s Fund primary policy.” Id. at 190. The Court of Appeals reversed, striking the provision as an unenforceable escape clause which worked to relieve the insurer from any obligation to its insured if other coverage is available. In rejecting the position that the Fireman’s Fund provision could not properly be labelled as an “escape” clause, because the provision would have provided coverage where the garage customer was without minimum coverage required under the law, the Court of Appeals opined:
*423... No escape clause exonerates the company from liability in all situations; all such clauses by definition contemplate the possibility that no other insurance policy will provide coverage, but it is only in the event of that contingency that the insurer will be responsible.
The policy reason for nullifying escape clauses was discussed in ... where we noted that such a rule protects the interests of the insured; that companies who write insurance in the state are aware of the rule; and that applying it would promote certainty in a field of law where predictability was particularly desirable.
Id. at 193 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
Instantly, the Harleysville policy purports to insure customers of Verrena Buick-Olds, but only under specific circumstances. Thus, customers such as Fryer will qualify as insureds under the Harleysville policy except where they have other available insurance coverage. Fryer would be an insured under the Harleysville policy except for the fact that she was insured at the time of the accident under a policy issued to her father by Allstate Insurance Company. Under the terms of the Harleysville policy, this fact relieved it of liability to Fryer. We find that the provision at issue in the present case falls within the classic definition of an unenforceable escape clause. Whether an insurance company chooses to place such a clause in its policy’s definition provisions or in another section of the policy is a distinction without a difference. Our reading of the law convinces us that the Harleysville policy provisions must be enforced as if the escape clause did not exist.
For all of the foregoing reasons, we reverse and remand for further proceedings. Jurisdiction is relinquished.
TAMILIA, J., files a dissenting opinion.