(dissenting in part and concurring in part).
I would affirm that part of the trial court judgment enjoining use of the property in question “as a facility or home for persons who are not related by blood or marriage.”
*441The Knapps acquired the property by deed which contained certain covenants restricting its use. The ones in question before us are:
“(1) The use of said premises shall be restricted to the construction of one single family dwelling, with a one or two car garage, and shall be used for residential purposes only.
“(2) No garage or outbuilding or part of the same shall be used as a residence at any time, either before or after construction of the residence.”
The Knapps bought the property for the purpose of running a boarding house for profit to house eight unrelated mentally retarded adults plus two adult custodians to run the operation. In the offer to purchase the property it was stated that the Knapps made the offer “subject to approval of Wisconsin Industrial Commission (for intended use as a multi-family-residen-tial).” The buyers were fully aware of the use restrictions placed on this property at the time of the offer and at the time of purchase.
The record shows the Knapps knew of the plaintiffs’ objection to the proposed use of the property prior to consummation of their purchase agreement.
The majority opinion correctly holds that the covenants in question were part of a general plan of development that the Crowleys and Wrights had the right to enforce.
The majority faults the terminology of the restriction for not defining “family” as being limited to those related by blood or marriage. I would hold that the term family must be given the commonly held meaning that people ordinarily give to the term, i.e., persons related by blood, adoption or marriage. All terms are not always defined in contracts or in deeds and in the absence of an included definition showing a modification of the ordinary meaning of a term as used in the particular con*442text, I would hold that the generally accepted definition of the word should apply.
When the legislature has used the term, “family” it has generally used it in terms of its commonly accepted meaning. Thus, sec. 245.001(2), Stats. 1975, says in part:
“. . . Marriage is the institution that is the foundation of the family and of society. . . .” (Emphasis added.)
The legislature has also designated November as Wisconsin family month, sec. 256.171, Stats. 1975, says it is “to focus attention on the principles of family responsibility to spouses, children and parents, as well as on the importance of the stability of marriage and the home for our future well-being. . . .” (Emphasis added.)
In sec. 102.07(5) (c), Stats. 1975, the legislature defines a “family farm corporation” as a corporation whose stockholders are related by blood or marriage.1
None of these statutory uses of the word “family” would encompass the concept of eight unrelated adults living with two custodians as falling within the definition of “single family.”
The case of Missionaries Of La Salette v. Whitefish Bay, 267 Wis. 609, 66 N.W.2d 627 (1954), relied on by the majority is distinguishable. In that , case a zoning ordinance restricted use of certain property to single family dwellings. However, the ordinance defined “family” as “one or more individuals living, sleeping, cooking or eating on the premises as a single housekeeping unit.” 267 Wis. at 611. The ordinance thus defined in *443specific terms what a “family” was for purposes of the zoning ordinance. Having defined the term, this Court concluded that eight members of a religious order living together as a unit met the definition of the ordinance. We have no such definition in the ease before us and should interpret the word “family” in the sense that Ahrens, the original grantor here and the Wrights and Crowleys undoubtedly interpreted it, that is in its ordinary meaning.
To import the definition of “family” in the Whitefish Bay ordinance to the case at bar is to confuse some things that families may do, i.e., “live, sleep, cook and eat upon the premises as a single housekeeping unit” with what a family is.2
1 disagree with the conclusion in the majority opinion that “the factual similarity between the nature of the occupancy of the priests and persons in the Knapp home is striking, and the term ‘family’ used in imposing the purported restriction is identical.”
On the contrary the factual dissimilarity is what is “striking.” The majority’s comparison of a commercial boarding house to a monastic order, living in community,3 such as the Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette ignores a millennium and a half of western culture.
The members of a religious order, bound by vows to live, work and carry on religious devotions together, addressing each other as “father” or “brother” has long *444been recognized as a special type of relationship dating back to the founder of western monasticism, St. Benedict (c. 480 to c. 547). It is hardly to be compared to a transient boarding house operated for profit.4
I also disagree that “the term family used in imposing the purported restriction is identical.” On the contrary, the term “family” in La Salette was defined by a zoning ordinance; the zoning ordinance provided “a family is one or more individuals living, sleeping, cooking or eating on premises as a single housekeeping unit.” La Salette, 267 Wis. at 611.
This Court held:
“It is not within the court’s province to add or detract from the clear meaning that the village board has expressed in the definition of the word ‘family.’ ” 267 Wis. at 616.
The only holding of La Salette is that the living arrangement of the members of the religious order came within the definition of “family” in the ordinance. In my opinion, the La Salette case involving the specific definition of “family” in a zoning ordinance has no relevance to the question before us.
Supporting the principle of liberal construction of private deed restrictions to promote the free use of land does not require, nor in my opinion sanction, interpreting “single family dwelling” to include the boarding house arrangement for profit in this case. To do so is to ignore the restriction, not to interpret it.
*445At the time of oral argument, counsel for the Knapps argued that sec. 46.03(22) (d), Stats., created by ch. 205, Laws of 1977, is dispositive of the principal issue in favor of the Knapps. I disagree. The pertinent parts of the statute are set forth in the majority opinion. In it, the legislature says that “a community living arrangement with a capacity for eight or fewer persons shall be a permissible use for purposes of any deed covenant which limits use of property to single family or 2-family residences
I would hold the statute inapplicable because in the case before us ten people are involved and thus not covered.
Counsel for the Crowleys and Wrights argued that his clients acquired their rights prior to the enactment of the statute and that retroactive application would be an unconstitutional impairment of contract. I would not reach that issue on the basis of this record. Even in this statute in the legislatively stated purpose, the act does not say community living is a family but that “the arrangements resemble families. . ,.” Thus, the legislature recognized that the word “family” as a restriction does not encompass unrelated persons living in groups.
I would affirm that part of the judgment that restrains and enjoins use of the premises as a facility or home for persons not related by blood or marriage and I would concur with the majority in reversing the remainder of the judgment.
I am authorized to state that Mr. Justice William Callow joins in this dissent.
“102.07. Employe defined ... (5) ... (c) A ‘family farm corporation’ means a corporation engaged in farming all of whose shareholders are related as lineal ancestors or lineal descendants, or as spouses, brothers, sisters, uncles, aunts, cousins, sons-in-law, daughters-in-law, fathers-in-law, mothers-in-law, brothers-in-law, or sisters-in-law of such lineal ancestors or lineal descendants.”
“A frog is a bird — almost,
When he leaps he flies — almost,
When he croaks he sings — almost.”
Anon.
“It’s a miracle how one roof can cover such diverse characters and maintain the name of family. The Abbot is one father who can honestly say, ‘No two of my children are alike.’ ” Alfred H. Deutsch, O.S.B., “Refining Fire,” Bruised Reeds And Other Stories, p. 194, (St. John’s University Press, Collegeville, Mn., 1971) [An account of monastic life].
Donald Knapp testified on direct examination that the residents of the home “are not under commitment and live at Meadow Lane on a voluntary basis.” John Lowenstein of the Wisconsin Department of Health and Social Services, Bureau of Mental Retardation testified that “[a]ny resident of the Lori Knapp home could leave the home at their own choice. . . .” (R. 433, 542). We can reasonably conclude that if any one of them leaves they will have to be replaced to keep operation profitable.