dissenting.
I.
The voir dire examination into prospective jurors’ views concerning the death penalty was conducted on an individual basis. As pertinent to that inquiry, the petitioner asked the trial court to inquire whether “the fact that Vernon Evans has been convicted of two first degree murders in this case [would] cause you to automatically vote for the death penalty, regardless of the facts.” This question, the petitioner argued, was required by Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S.-,-, 112 S.Ct. 2222, 2232, 119 L.Ed.2d 492, 505-06 (1992). The trial court refused the request; instead, it propounded the following questions1:
1. Do you feel or do you have any strong feeling one way or the other about the imposition of the death penalty?
2. Do you feel that your attitude, regarding the death penalty, would in any way prevent or substantially impair you from making a fair and impartial decision as to defendant’s sentence in accordance with your oath as a juror, *700based upon the evidence presented in the court’s instructions as to the lav? which is applicable?
3. After listening to the evidence and applying the law, if you were convinced that the appropriate sentence would be death, would you be able to vote for the death penalty?
4. On other hand, after listening to the evidence and applying the law, were you not convinced that the appropriate sentence should be death, but were convinced life was the appropriate sentence, would you vote for that alternative?
The appellant argues that these questions, none of which directly addresses the precise circumstances of his resentencing, were simply “ ‘general fairness’ and ‘follow the law' type questions asked by the trial court [which] inappropriately required the prospective jurors to make their own ‘bottom line’ determination as to whether their beliefs would conflict with unspecified ‘instructions’ and ‘evidence.’ ” Appellant’s brief at 10, citing Bowie v. State, 324 Md. 1, 595 A.2d 448 (1991). That being the case, and because no follow up questions to those broad inquiries were permitted, he asserts that jurors who would automatically vote for the death penalty under the circumstances of his case would never be discovered. The majority, on the other hand, rejects the appellant’s argument and holds that the voir dire questions “were clearly sufficient for Evans and his counsel to determine whether prospective jurors were death-penalty dogmatists, and they were clearly sufficient to meet the standard enunciated in Morgan v. Illinois, supra." Majority op. at 675.
I agree with the majority. I do not, however, accept some of the rationale underlying its holding.
I recently set forth, in detail, my views on the proper scope of voir dire examination in Davis v. State, 333 Md. 27, 55, 633 A.2d 867, 881 (1993) (Bell, J., dissenting). I believe now, as I did then, that
Under Maryland law it is clear that the focal point of voir dire is the trial judge. It is the trial judge that has responsibility for regulating and conducting voir dire. It is *701the trial judge that controls the process; he or she determines: what questions to ask on voir dire; whether, and when, to allow counsel to ask follow up questions; and whether, and when, a prospective juror is dismissed for cause. It follows, therefore, that it is the trial judge that must decide whether, and when, cause for disqualification exists as to any particular venireperson. Neither the venire nor the individual venirepersons occupies such an important position.
Id. at 59, 653 A.2d at 883. In cases of this kind — when the issue is whether a prospective death penalty juror is predisposed for, or against, the death penalty — the critical inquiry is into the propriety of the trial court’s exercise of discretion in determining whether the prospective juror is qualified to sit in that particular case. Ordinarily, as in the case sub judice, that inquiry involves a determination of the prospective juror’s state of mind, i.e., whether the juror is biased or prejudiced. This, in turn, is informed by how the juror views, and reacts to, the death penalty.
The United States Supreme Court has discussed, and explained, the nature of the trial court’s decision-making relative to death penalty voir dire. In Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 429, 105 S.Ct. 844, 855, 83 L.Ed.2d 841, 855 (1985), the Court observed, “[t]he trial judge is of course applying some kind of legal standard to what he sees and hears, but his predominant function in determining juror bias involves credibility findings whose basis cannot be discerned from an appellate record.” See also Bowie, 324 Md. at 22-23, 595 A.2d at 459 (to be sufficient, voir dire must be such that “the basis for the juror’s conclusion and, therefore, for the court’s ruling [is] apparent in the record”); Hunt v. State, 321 Md. 387, 583 A.2d 218 (1990); Grandison v. State, 305 Md. 685, 506 A.2d 580, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 873, 107 S.Ct. 38, 93 L.Ed.2d 174 (1986). Thus, except when the venireperson admits an inability to be fair and impartial, the process necessarily must involve the trial judge asking questions designed to produce such factual information as may be relevant to the venireperson’s bias. If it were otherwise, the defendant would be “completely at the *702mercy of the good faith, objectivity, and astuteness of the individual venirepersons.” Davis, 333 Md. at 63, 633 A.2d at 885 (Bell, J., dissenting).
The question proffered by the appellant would result in automatic disqualification were a prospective juror to answer it in the affirmative. Hence, as this Court indicated in Davis, 333 Md. at 34, 633 A.2d at 871, to be proper voir dire, it must be directly related to juror disqualification. Under Davis, therefore, the proffered question would appear to be a proper voir dire question, and the trial court’s refusal to ask that question could very well be found to be an abuse of discretion. See 333 Md. at 34, 633 A.2d at 871. Nevertheless, I do not believe that is an abuse of discretion in this case.
First of all, as the majority points out, the series of questions which the venire was asked were sufficient to permit the trial court to determine whether a prospective juror was biased or prejudiced to the point where he or she could not render a fair and impartial capital sentencing verdict. To be sure, the information voir dire elicited did not focus on identifying which side of the death penalty issue may have caused the prospective juror’s apprehension or bias; the purpose of eliciting the information was only to identify its effect from that juror’s perspective. And the fact that the voir dire was conducted on an individual basis, requiring the prospective juror to answer each of the questions, permitted the trial court to assess each juror’s credibility on the basis of factors that could not be discerned from the appellate record. See Witt, 469 U.S. at 429, 105 S.Ct. at 855, 83 L.Ed.2d at 855. Moreover, notwithstanding that the prospective jurors were not given the opportunity to respond to a question which directed their attention to the specific facts on which the sentence must be predicated, the voir dire questions asked, taken cumulatively, required each prospective juror to come to grips with the issue which the question proposed by the appellant addressed; each had to consider whether he or she would act automatically or only after considering all relevant issues and facts.
*703The voir dire procedure in the case sub judice is by no means equivalent to that employed in Bowie. There, the inquiry into the venire’s views concerning the death penalty was addressed to the group. Thus, the court never considered any individual venireperson’s qualifications to serve on a death penalty jury. The single question on the subject put to the venire, although it did not identify any cause for the prospective jurors’ conclusion that they could not be fair or impartial, resulted in disqualification of all who answered in the affirmative.
I cannot agree with the majority, however, that “[t]he specific circumstances of a particular crime are irrelevant to one’s pre-existing bias or predisposition and thus cannot be factored into the court’s evaluation of a jury’s ability to judge impartially,” majority op. at 675, or that, because it encompasses “an important aggravating factor” for the jury to consider, id., the inquiry proposed by the appellant is beyond the scope of voir dire because it seeks “advance clues from prospective jurors as to how they would vote on the facts of the case.” Id. Neither of these contentions is correct. Bias cannot be assessed in a vacuum. Thus, the facts of the case in which the juror will sit must be known if that juror’s bias is to be assessed in any meaningful way. It is for that reason that, consistent with the usual practice, the trial court provided a brief synopsis of the pertinent facts prior to beginning jury selection. In other words, the facts of the case to be tried are quite relevant to jury selection. Consequently, voir dire questions which include relevant facts about the case tend to assure that prospective jurors will be impartial — precisely what the voir dire process is designed to accomplish.
To be sure, the court would not have erred had it asked the precise question proposed by the appellant because there is no more direct, nor effective way of inquiring into a prospective juror’s bias than to ask that juror, plainly and without equivocation, referencing the facts of the case, whether he or she could be fair. This is true whether or not the facts of the case would reveal aggravating circumstances which the jury must take into account to fulfill its function under the death penalty *704statute. Consequently, while it may not have been an abuse of discretion in this case to have refused to make the inquiry proposed, it certainly is not beyond the scope of proper voir dire, or irrelevant to one’s pre-existing bias or predisposition. In fact, under this Court’s opinion in Davis, because it is extremely relevant, it is precisely the kind of question that ought to be asked on voir dire. See Davis, 333 Md. at 34, 633 A.2d at 871.
II.
I find merit in the appellant’s argument that the prosecutor’s reference, in closing argument, without evidentiary support in the trial record, to a prisoner who escaped from a maximum security prison while serving a life sentence was prejudicial error. The appellant maintains that the remarks were unduly prejudicial because they suggested to the jury that the appellant would likely escape and, thus, be a danger to society were he sentenced to life imprisonment, rather than death.
The scope of closing argument is a matter addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Booth v. State, 327 Md. 142, 193, 608 A.2d 162, 197, cert. denied, — U.S.-, 113 S.Ct. 500, 121 L.Ed.2d 437 (1992); Thomas v. State, 301 Md. 294, 316, 483 A.2d 6, 17 (1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1088, 105 S.Ct. 1856, 85 L.Ed.2d 153 (1985). Because discretion can be abused, the scope of closing argument is not without limits, Booth, 327 Md. at 193, 608 A.2d at 187; Henry v. State, 324 Md. 204, 230-31, 596 A.2d 1024, 1037 (1991), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 1590, 118 L.Ed.2d 307 (1992); Jones v. State, 310 Md. 569, 580, 530 A.2d 743, 748-49, sentence vacated on other grounds, 486 U.S. 1050, 108 S.Ct. 2815, 100 L.Ed.2d 916 (1988), sentence vacated and remanded, 314 Md. 111, 549 A.2d 17 (1988); Poole v. State, 295 Md. 167, 191, 453 A.2d 1218, 1231 (1983); Wilhelm, 272 Md. at 415, 326 A.2d at 715-16, one of which is that a prosecutor generally cannot refer to matters not in evidence. Jones, 310 Md. at 580, 530 A.2d at 748. When the prosecutor does refer to matters not in evidence, reversal is required where those comments actually *705mislead or influence the jury to the prejudice of the accused. Booth, 327 Md. at 193, 608 A.2d at 187; Jones, 310 Md. at 580, 530 A.2d at 748; Wilhelm, 272 Md. at 415, 326 A.2d at 715-16; Wood v. State, 192 Md. 643, 652, 65 A.2d 316, 320 (1949); Reidy v. State, 8 Md.App. 169, 172, 259 A.2d 66, 67-68 (1969). As Chief Judge Murphy (then Chief Judge of the Court of Special Appeals) explained it:
It is fundamental to a fair trial that the prosecutor should make no remarks calculated to unfairly prejudice the jury against the defendant. Meno v. State, 117 Md. 435 [, 83 A. 759 (1912) ]; Holbrook v. State, 6 Md.App. 265 [250 A.2d 904 (1969) ]. And it is unquestionably wrong for the prosecutor in his argument to the jury to refer to any matter not testified to by the witness or disclosed by the evidence in the case. Toomer v. State, 112 Md. 285 [, 76 A. 118 (1910) ]. On the other hand, the fact that a remark made by the prosecutor in argument to the jury was improper does not necessarily compel that the conviction be set aside. Conway v. State, 7 Md.App. 400 [, 256 A.2d 178 (1969) ]. The Maryland Rule is that unless it appears the jury were actually misled or were likely to have been misled or influenced to the prejudice of the accused by the remarks of the State’s Attorney, reversal of the conviction on this ground would not be justified. Wood v. State, 192 Md. 643 [65 A.2d 316 (1949) ]; Holbrook v. State, supra.
8 Md.App. at 172, 259 A.2d at 67-68. This is consistent with the rule which is followed in the federal courts. See Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 86 L.Ed.2d 231 (1985) (reversal required where the prosecution’s remarks are focused, unambiguous, and strong to the point of depriving the accused of fundamental fairness). See also Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 94 S.Ct. 1868, 40 L.Ed.2d 431 (1974).
A closing argument is prejudicial to the defendant when, considering the closeness of the case, the centrality of the issue affected by the error and the steps the court took to mitigate the effects of the error, the reviewing court cannot say “ ‘with fair assurance, after pondering all that happened without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that *706the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error.’” Wilhelm, 272 Md. at 416, 326 A.2d at 716, quoting Gaither v. U.S., 413 F.2d 1061, 1079 (D.C.Cir.1969), quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 1248, 90 L.Ed. 1557, 1566-67 (1946). Applying this test, we have declared prejudicial a prosecutor’s closing argument calling attention to a criminal defendant’s right to appeal, Johnson v. State, 325 Md. 511, 517-18, 601 A.2d 1093, 1096 (1992), and, in a capital sentencing proceeding, a prosecutor’s reference to the possibility of parole. See Poole, 295 Md. at 196, 453 A.2d at 1233. See also Contee v. State, 223 Md. 575, 584, 165 A.2d 889, 894-95 (1960) (remarks reasonably calculated to appeal to racial prejudices); Cicero v. State, 200 Md. 614, 620-21, 92 A.2d 567, 570 (1952); Apple v. State, 190 Md. 661, 666-67, 59 A.2d 509, 511 (1948); Riggins v. State, 125 Md. 165, 174, 93 A. 437, 440 (1915) (all holding that it is improper for prosecutor to assert belief or personal conviction as to the accused’s guilt).
In the case sub judice, the majority rejects the appellant’s argument on two bases. First, it holds that the prosecutor in closing argument “is provided a wide range”, Henry, 324 Md. at 230-31, 596 A.2d at 1037, and, in this case, that range was not exceeded. Secondly, the majority asserts that, even if the remarks were improper, the error was harmless. I find neither justification to have merit.
The majority’s position, simply stated is, “it is proper for counsel to argue to the jury — even though evidence of such facts has not been formally introduced — matters of common knowledge or matters of which the court can take judicial notice.” Majority opinion at 679, quoting Wilhelm, 272 Md. at 438, 326 A.2d at 728. That may be so; however, that principle does not permit the State’s Attorney to evade the principle of relevancy applicable to criminal trials. In other words, while the prosecutor may refer to matters of common knowledge without laying an evidentiary foundation, that is true only if those matters are relevant to the issue before the court. In this case, because that is the only basis upon which it has any conceivable relevance to the appellant’s sentencing, Mr. Dean’s escape was offered to prove that the appellant, who *707would be a lifer should the jury opt for life imprisonment, would also escape from prison. But, without more, evidence of Dean’s escape, however much it might be a matter of common knowledge, simply was not admissible in the sentencing proceeding; it simply was not relevant to the issue before the jury. It did not contradict the appellant’s expert evidence and it did not provide any nexus between the escape and the appropriate sentence for the appellant, other than the fact that if the jury sentenced the appellant to life, they both would be “lifers.”
The appellant’s expert witness acknowledged that there were exceptions to the rule that “lifers” tended to make a better adjustment to prison life than other prisoners. Thus, the reference to Dean could not have been to contradict the witness. On the other hand, to be relevant, there must have been evidence which would have established a connection between the Dean escape and the potential for escape by the appellant.
Other than that they would both serve life sentences, no attempt was made to establish a correlation, close or otherwise, between the two. Indeed, rather than availing himself of the opportunity to question the appellant’s expert witness concerning admitted exceptions to his theory that “lifers” generally adjust well to long term imprisonment, the prosecutor waited until closing argument to bring to the jury’s attention Mr. Dean’s escape, no doubt in the hope of causing it to infer that the appellant, too, would escape. The reason for choosing closing argument as the appropriate point to raise the subject no doubt was calculated to obtain the most profound impact on the jury which was being asked to choose between whether the appellant should live or die.2 Given the *708timing of the argument, it seems apparent that the State’s Attorney saw advantage in making the argument without developing the evidentiary predicate; without it, the jury would probably draw the apparently logical, if improper, inference. More to the point, the reference to Mr. Dean’s escape was irrelevant without a showing that it was probative of a characteristic or tendency of the appellant, demonstrated by the record, and that persons with that characteristic were more likely than not to escape. No such showing was made. It was error, therefore, for the trial court to have allowed the prosecutor’s improper closing argument referencing the Dean escape.
Moreover, the error was prejudicial and, thus, far from harmless. The test of harmless error applicable in this state is the one enunciated in Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638, 659, 350 A.2d 665, 678 (1976):
[W]hen an appellant, in a criminal case, establishes error, unless a reviewing court, upon its own independent review of the record, is able to declare a belief, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the error in no way influenced the verdict, such error cannot be deemed “harmless” and a reversal is mandated. Such reviewing court must thus be satisfied that there is no reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of — whether erroneously admitted or excluded— *709may have contributed to the rendition of the guilty verdict, (footnote omitted).
Harmless error analysis is intended to be strict, that is, it “has been and should be carefully circumscribed.” Younie v. State, 272 Md. 233, 248, 322 A.2d 211, 219 (1974). This is so because of the effect were it to be otherwise applied. See id., in which we explained that effect (quoting People v. Jablonski, 38 Mich.App. 33, 195 N.W.2d 777, 780 (1972)):
“Continued expansion of the harmless error rule will merely encourage prosecutors to attempt to get such testimony in, since they know that, if they have a strong case, such testimony will not be considered reversible error, yet if they have a weak case, they will use such testimony to buttress the case to gain a conviction and hope that the issue is not raised on appeal.”
The harmless error test therefore, does not equate to an “otherwise sufficient” test. See Rubin v. State, 325 Md. 552, 592-93, 602 A.2d 677, 696-97 (1992) (Bell, J., dissenting).
The critical issue before the court was whether the appellant should receive the death penalty or life imprisonment. That decision, necessarily a subjective one, depends very heavily upon the facts and circumstances, not only of the case, but also on whether the jury views the appellant as potentially dangerous. The prosecutor’s remarks in closing argument had no purpose other than to influence the jury to believe that the appellant was a danger to escape and thereby caused the jury to opt for death as opposed to life imprisonment. The only basis for the argument, however, was the fact that Mr. Dean, another “lifer,” had previously escaped.
It is the notoriety that the escape occasioned and the closeness in time to the trial of the appellant that take on significance and color the inference the jury is being asked to draw. In point of fact, it is clear beyond cavil that it was the fact of the notoriety that prompted the State’s Attorney to appeal to the jury to draw the inference that, if given a life sentence and even if placed in a “Super Max” facility, the appellant, like Dean, would escape. Furthermore, the sitúa*710tion is aggravated by the fact that the evidence concerning Dean was inadmissible. As the appellant points out, the Dean case was a separate and distinct case, proof of which could not have been introduced in his case as substantive evidence. On the other hand, the fact that Dean escaped could have been introduced to impeach the appellant’s expert witness if it contradicted that witness’s testimony. As it was noted earlier, the appellant’s expert -witness did not purport to state a general, inflexible rule; rather, he acknowledged that there were exceptions. Thus, the evidence concerning Dean’s escape was not contradictory of the appellant’s evidence at all. Of course the trial court, perceiving no error, took no steps to mitigate its effects. Certainly, the mere fact that the trial court advised the jury that opening statements and closing arguments of counsel are not evidence is not sufficient, in and of itself, to have ameliorated the prejudicial effect of the argument.3 The error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and, therefore, the death sentence must be vacated and, a new capital sentencing hearing ordered.
III.
The appellant refused to discuss the offenses with the probation agent who prepared the presentencing investigation report. That fact was mentioned in the PSI report on two separate occasions. The appellant sought to have those two references redacted from the report. The trial court refused, thus giving rise to this issue.
I agree with the appellant that his right against self-incrimination extends to capital sentencing, see Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 462-63, 101 S.Ct. 1866, 1872-73, 68 L.Ed.2d 359, 368-69 (1981), and that it was error for the court to refuse to redact references to the appellant’s election not to *711discuss the offenses with the probation agent. Like the trial judge, who did not dispute the premise upon which the appellant proceeded, the majority deems any error in that regard to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. With that proposition I strongly disagree.
The majority’s harmless error analysis is as follows: Given the jury’s knowledge of the facts of the crime, the existence of uncontradicted evidence of aggravating circumstances, and the lack of any reference by the prosecutor to the fact that Evans declined to be interviewed by the presentence investigator in 1984, we cannot say that Evans’ decision not to be interviewed in 1984 influenced the sentence imposed in 1992. Upon our independent review of the record, we are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that if error was committed, it did not influence the jury’s verdict.
Majority opinion at 692-694. As a predicate to that analysis, the majority noted the fact that the PSI was but one item of evidence, among all of the evidence concerning aggravating and mitigating facts and that the two statements were a part of a ten page PSI report. Having determined that the evidence was otherwise sufficient to support the jury’s death penalty sentence, the majority has simply found a way to rationalize affirmance of that decision. I was not aware that whether evidence is prejudicial depends upon how the State chooses to use the evidence. I gather from the majority opinion that, had the State’s Attorney commented on the appellant’s election not to discuss the offense with the probation agent, that the error may very well have been harmful. Nor was I aware that it is the quantity, rather than the quality, of the evidence, that is dispositive. The majority, however, makes much of the fact that there were only two references to the appellant’s decision not to discuss the offense amid a mass of other evidence available for the jury’s review. Under the majority’s view of the matter, rarely could there be harmless error no matter how prejudicial the reference; if the reference is brief and is not otherwise commented upon by the State, it would be unable to say that the reference contributed *712to the verdict. That is an even more expansive application of the harmless error rule than that utilized in Rubin.
I am persuaded by the appellant’s very logical and persuasive argument:
A substantial argument in favor of mitigation was remorse. In his allocution appellant conceded that the crime was “hideous” but also insisted that he was “truly sorry” for having been involved in the crime. The problem is that this jury had before it the statement that in June, 1984, appellant had declined to talk to the presentence investigator. From this, the jury could conclude that appellant’s alleged remorse, at best, of recent vintage and entitled to little weight. In some circumstances, this reasoning would be justified. However, in this case, such a conclusion penalizes appellant for exercising his right against self-incrimination and is therefore improper.
Appellant’s Brief at 21.
IV.
In Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808,-, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 2609, 115 L.Ed.2d 720, 736 (1991), the Supreme Court held “that if a state chooses to permit the admission of victim impact evidence and prosecutorial argument on that subject, the Eighth Amendment erects no per se bar,” no more and no less. See 501 U.S. at-, 111 S.Ct. at 2612, 115 L.Ed.2d at 739-40 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“we hold merely that if a state decides to permit consideration of this evidence, ‘the Eighth Amendment erects no per se bar.’ ”). While it also noted that “[a] State may legitimately conclude that evidence about the victim and about the impact of the murder on the victim’s family is relevant to the jury’s decision as to whether or not the death penalty should be imposed,” the Court observed that “[i]n the event that evidence is introduced that is so unduly prejudicial that it renders the trial fundamentally unfair, the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides a mechanism for relief.” Id. at-, 111 S.Ct. at 2608, 115 L.Ed.2d at 735.
*713The determination whether the admission of victim impact evidence in a capital sentencing procedure offends due process involves an analysis of whether its introduction will cause the proceedings to be fundamentally unfair. This, in turn, involves a consideration of the impact of that evidence on the exercise of discretion by the trier of fact. It is, of course, now well settled that “where discretion is afforded a sentencing body on a matter so grave as the determination of whether a human life should be taken or spared, that discretion must suitably be directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action.” Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2932, 49 L.Ed.2d 859, 883 (1976). See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972). Whether the fact finder’s discretion is suitably directed and limited necessarily must depend upon the purpose for which the evidence is offered and its relevance to the issue to be decided, that is, whether it is admitted for a legitimate purpose and it actually performs that purpose.
Concerning victim impact evidence, the Payne Court stated that “[i]t is designed to show ... each victim’s ‘uniqueness as an individual or human being,’ whatever the jury might think the loss to the community resulting from his death might be.” 501 U.S. at -, 111 S.Ct. at 2607, 115 L.Ed.2d at 734. Stated differently, the Court indicated “[vjictim impact evidence is simply another form or method of informing the sentencing authority about the specific harm caused by the crime in question, evidence of a general type long considered by sentencing authorities.” Id. at-, 111 S.Ct. at 2608, 115 L.Ed.2d at 735. Thus, extrapolating from these comments, it is clear that if victim impact evidence is intended to, and does, inform the sentencing authority about the specific harm caused by the crime in question, it is admissible at a capital sentencing proceeding. The Payne Court found the testimony of the mother of one of the victims to fall within that definition.4 It is significant, however, that Payne did not character*714ize victim impact evidence as an aggravating circumstance, available to be weighed against any mitigating circumstance the appellant might produce or to be used in determining his fate. 501 U.S. at-, 111 S.Ct. at 2608, 115 L.Ed.2d at 735 (“In the event that evidence is introduced that is so unduly prejudicial that it renders the trial fundamentally unfair, the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides a mechanism for relief.”).
The appellant argues that admission of the victim impact evidence in the case sub judice, consisting of oral testimony and statements in the PSI report, is violative of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. He maintains that it creates an unacceptable risk of the death penalty being imposed on an arbitrary and capricious basis, ie. emotion, rather than upon an objective weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors under the constitutionally mandated sentencing scheme. I agree.
While it is acceptable to produce evidence “informing the sentencing authority about the specific harm caused by the crime in question,” the victim impact evidence adduced in this case goes beyond that. It focuses exclusively on the emotional impact of the crime on the victim’s family and, therefore, it is constitutionally irrelevant. See 501 U.S. at-, 111 S.Ct. at 2626, 115 L.Ed.2d at 756-57 (Stevens,- J., dissenting). Moreover, because it necessarily shifts the attention of the fact finder from the culpability of the defendant, the focus of the sentencing scheme promulgated by the Maryland Legislature, see Maryland Code (1957, 1992 Repl. Vol.) Art. 27, § 413; Md. Rule 4-343, to the character of the victim and grief of his or her survivors, with the very real “possibility that the jury will be so distracted by ‘[those]’ prejudicial and irrelevant considerations that it wiil base its life-or-death decision on whim or caprice.” Payne, 501 U.S. at-, 111 S.Ct. at 2630, 115 *715L.Ed.2d at 761 (Stevens, J., dissenting), quoting Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 506-07, 107 S.Ct. 2529, 2534-35, 96 L.Ed.2d 440, 450-51 (1987).
Rather than address the substantive issue, the majority, in effect, holds that, if error, the admission of the victim impact evidence was, in any event, harmless beyond a reasonable doubt:
In light of the jury’s extensive knowledge about the facts of these murders, we cannot say that the jury’s additional knowledge about Cheryl Piechowicz’s natural feelings of grief and guilt or about a young child’s understandable trauma concerning the loss of her father deprived Evans of due process.
Majority Opinion at 699. In reaching this conclusion, it referred to the victim impact evidence in Payne, which, it noted, Justice O’Connor, in her concurring opinion, determined “did not inflame [the jury’s] passions more than did the facts of the crime, due to its briefness and the jury’s unavoidable familiarity with the facts of the crime.” Payne, 501 U.S. at-, 107 S.Ct. at 2612, 115 L.Ed.2d at 740 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
I cannot agree with that conclusion. First of all, it is not possible meaningfully to assess the impact of evidence on a jury in one case by reference to the impact of similar evidence on another jury in another case. In other words, that evidence in one case did not affect that jury’s death penalty decision, ipso facto, does not mean that evidence, which, on the surface may appear comparable, would not, or cannot, prejudicially impact a different jury charged with making the same decision. Furthermore, as already indicated, see part III, supra, it is at best simplistic to assume that, because a reference to one type of evidence in a trial is brief and the references to other evidence in the case are extensive, that the former can never have any impact on the trier of fact. Indeed, there are examples in which this Court has taken the opposite position. See, e.g., State v. Enriquez, 327 Md. 365, 374, 609 A.2d 343, 347 (1992); Johnson v. State, 325 Md. 511, *716522, 601 A.2d 1093, 1097-98 (1992); Bowie v. State, 324 Md. 1, 11, 595 A.2d 448, 452 (1991); Hook v. State, 315 Md. 25, 42, 553 A.2d 233,242 (1989). More important than the quantity of the evidence or the number of the references is the quality of the evidence; the subject of the reference, and, in context, its potential significance on the decision the jury is called upon to make are much more likely to be dispositive.
The majority’s analysis does away with the need ever to address the due process concerns of victim impact evidence; whenever the victim impact evidence is brief and the facts of the case extreme, under the majority’s view, victim impact evidence is always admissible because it could not impact upon the fact finder’s decision. No matter how heinous the crime, it is the call of the trier of fact whether, in light, of all the circumstances, the death penalty is justified. However heinous the crime, death may be imposed only after aggravating factors have been weighed against mitigating factors and found to outweigh those factors. It is not the law of Maryland that a sentence of death may be imposed, as a matter of law, whenever the circumstances of the crime reveal that it was perpetrated in a vicious and brutal fashion. But that is the effect of the majority’s harmless error analysis. As Mr. Justice Marshall aptly pointed out, referring to the victim impact evidence in Payne and the Tennessee Supreme Court’s “harmless error analysis,” it is necessary to “address how the victim-impact evidence introduced during the sentencing proceedings in this case likely affected the jury’s determination that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances dictated a death sentence.” Payne, 501 U.S. at-n. 4, 111 S.Ct. at 2625 n. 4, 115 L.Ed.2d at 755 n. 4 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Where, he continued, “in the penalty phase the only evidence introduced by the State, other than some evidence of the circumstances of the crime, is the victim impact evidence, it is simply impossible to conclude that this victim-impact testimony ... was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. .
*717V.
The trial court instructed the jury:
Now you have heard testimony and have received written statements of family members of David Scott Piechowicz and Susan Kennedy. This testimony and these statements are known as victim impact evidence and are intended to show each victim’s uniqueness as a human being and the impact on the families of their loss.
This evidence should be given whatever weight you feel it deserves. The victim impact evidence is not to be considered by you in determining whether the defendant is a principal in the first degree.
You are further instructed that this evidence is not to be taken as an aggravating circumstance in your deliberation. You may consider this evidence in determining, pursuant to my instructions and pursuant to the verdict from, whether the sentence shall be death or life imprisonment as to each victim.
Presumably, the predicate for these instructions was Maryland Code (1957, 1990 Repl. Vol.), Art. 41, § 4-609(d), which provides:
In any case in which the death penalty or life imprisonment without the possibility of parole is requested under Art. 27, § 412, a presentence investigation, including a victim impact statement, shall be completed by the Division of Parole and Probation, and shall be considered by the court or jury before whom the separate sentencing proceeding is conducted under Art. 27, § 412 or § 413.
See also Maryland Code (1957, 1992 Repl. Vol.), Art. 27, § 643D, which permits the trial court, on request of the State’s attorney, to permit oral victim impact evidence.
The appellant objected to the court’s instructions. He stated:
Also, specifically, we take exception to this court’s instruction on victim impact and we urge the court to substitute this, and I will read it into the record.
*718“Victim impact evidence has been submitted in this case. Victim impact evidence is designed to show each victim’s uniqueness as an individual human being. It is not an aggravating circumstance and may not be used to weigh against mitigating factors.”
There is a second one, a follow up. It has to do with victim impact and I will read that into the record now.
“I further instruct you that victim impact is not a legal basis to impose the death penalty. It is not an aggravating circumstance that you may consider within the framework of the sentencing form.”
The appellant’s exception and proffered instructions appear to be premised on Maryland Code (1957, 1992 Repl. Vol., 1993 Cum.Supp.) Art. 27, § 413(h), which provides:
Weighing mitigating and aggravating circumstances. — (1) If the court or jury finds that one or more of these mitigating circumstances exist, it shall determine whether, by a preponderance of the evidence, the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances.
(2) If it finds that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances, the sentence shall be death.
(3) If it finds that the aggravating circumstances do not outweigh the mitigating circumstances, a sentence of death may not be imposed,
and on the fact that § 413(d), which enumerates the aggravating circumstances, does not refer to victim impact evidence. The appellant argues that, had the General Assembly so intended, it would have specifically mentioned victim impact evidence in § 413(d); thus, its absence clearly indicates the Legislature’s restriction of the section to those aggravating circumstances enumerated. The appellant also does not believe that the requirement in Art. 41, § 609(d) that the trier of fact consider presentence investigations, including victim impact evidence, is a sufficient basis upon which to conclude, as the trial court apparently did, that, in giving victim impact evidence “whatever weight you feel it deserves,” the jury could consider such evidence “in determining ... whether the *719sentence shall be death or life imprisonment as to each victim.”
In interpreting a statute’s provisions, our goal is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature. Kaczorowski v. City of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 513, 525 A.2d 628, 632 (1987). Our focus is, therefore, centered upon the statute’s purpose or policy. Mustafa v. State, 323 Md. 65, 73, 591 A.2d. 481, 484-85 (1991). Where the statutory language is unambiguous, and clearly consistent with the statute’s apparent purpose, the words will be accorded their ordinary meaning. Mustafa, supra; Trimble v. State, 321 Md. 248, 265, 582 A.2d 794, 802 (1990). If a statute is susceptible of more than one construction, it should be given that construction which will effectuate or carry out its purpose or object, and adopt that construction which avoids an illogical and unreasonable result, or one which is inconsistent with common sense, Kaczorowski, 309 Md. at 513, 525 A.2d at 632, but not a construction that would do more than effect the legislative object or purpose. Harbor Island Marina, Inc. v. Board of County Com’rs of Calvert County, 286 Md. 303, 311, 407 A.2d 738, 742 (1979); Smith v. Higinbothom, 187 Md. 115, 125, 48 A.2d 754, 759 (1946). This is especially true when a court is construing a penal statute. Penal statutes are to be strictly construed, i.e., in favor of the accused, and against the State. State v. Fabritz, 276 Md. 416, 422, 348 A.2d 275, 279 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 942, 96 S.Ct. 1680, 48 L.Ed.2d 185 (1976); Wanzer v. State, 202 Md. 601, 611, 97 A.2d 914, 918 (1953); Weinecke v. State, 188 Md. 172, 176, 52 A.2d 73, 74 (1947); State v. Flemming, 173 Md. 192, 195 A.392 (1937); Ruth v. State, 20 Md. 436 (1864).
Section 413(h) does require the jury to weigh the statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances to determine the sentence. See, e.g., Thanos v. State, 330 Md. 77, 83, 622 A.2d 727, 729 (1993); Woodson v. State, 325 Md. 251, 267-68, 600 A.2d 420, 428 (1992); White v. State, 322 Md. 738, 745, 589 A.2d 969, 972 (1991); Collins v. State, 318 Md. 269, 296, 568 A.2d 1, 14, cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1032, 110 S.Ct. 3296, 111 L.Ed.2d 805 (1990); Harris v. State, 312 Md. 225, 256, 539 *720A.2d 687, 650 (1988); Scott v. State, 310 Md. 277, 287, 529 A.2d 340, 345 (1987); State v. Calhoun, 306 Md. 692, 739-40, 511 A.2d 461, 485 (1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 910, 107 S.Ct. 1339, 94 L.Ed.2d 528 (1987). In fact, the determination of the jury shall state, specifically:
(1) Which, if any, aggravating circumstances it finds to exist;
(2) Which, if any, mitigating circumstances it finds to exist;
(3) Whether any aggravating circumstances found under subsection (d) outweigh the mitigating circumstances found under subsection (g) of this section;
(4) Whether the aggravating circumstances found under subsection (d) do not outweigh mitigating circumstances under subsection (g); and
(5) The sentence, determined in accordance with subsection (f) and (h).
Art. 27, § 413(j)(1)-(5). The sentence must be life unless the State proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the statutory aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances. White, 322 Md. at 745, 589 A.2d at 972; Harris, 312 Md. at 256, 539 A.2d at 650; Scott, 310 Md. at 284, 529 A.2d at 343.
It seems clear that, in the absence of Art. 41, § 609(d), victim impact evidence would not be admissible, not to mention considered, in a capital sentencing procedure. By its enactment, this issue is at the least confused. There is some question as to whether section 609(d) requires the trier of fact to consider the presentence investigation report, and not specifically the victim impact evidence, even though such evidence is required to be made a part of the report. But, in any event, by not amending section 413(d), the Legislature has left unclear just what role victim impact evidence plays in the death penalty decision. That being the case, and this being a capital case, the doubt must be resolved in favor of the appellant and against the State.
The subject jury instruction permits victim impact evidence to be equated with a statutory aggravating circumstance un*721der § 413(d) and, in reality, to take on the aspect of a super aggravating factor. See Collins, 318 Md. at 296, 568 A.2d at 14; see also Calhoun, 306 Md. at 739-40, 511 A.2d at 485. Under that instruction, the court clearly sought to permit the jury to treat victim impact evidence as an aggravating factor sufficient to impose the death penalty. Because, however, Payne does not characterize such evidence as an aggravating circumstance and, in any event, there is no statutory aggravating factor into which such evidence comfortably fits, it actually licenses the jury to trump the mitigating evidence with victim impact evidence, thus skewing the weighing process. Hence, I agree with the appellant that the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury as he requested — that it could not use victim impact evidence either to weigh against mitigating circumstances or as a statutory aggravating factor in determining the appellant’s fate — was prejudicial error, requiring a new sentencing proceeding.
. Not all of the venirepersons were asked these identical questions. Indeed, some of the venirepersons were asked the precise question which gives rise to this issue. The series of questions, however, reflect the typical examination of the venirepersons.
. By waiting to raise the issue until closing argument, the State avoided the possibility that the appellant would be able to respond effectively to it and show it to be a misstatement of fact, a situation not totally to be ignored. In an exchange between the prosecutor and the appellant’s expert witness, the following occurred:
Q. [State’s Attorney] Let me get you to (1) that you did study. Jackie [sic] Harris remember that name? *708A. Yes.
Q. You testified on his behalf, did you not?
A. Yes.
Q. He was a lifer?
A. Yes.
Q. And Jackie [sic] Harris, it is true, is it not, on an occasion, with two other either long-termers or lifers attempted an escape and held several correctional officers in custody?
A. Actually now, this is an interesting case-
•Q. Answer my question first and I will give you a chance.
A. He wasn’t a lifer at that time. He was under a death sentence. That occurred eight years before I interviewed him. The important point is that certainly had I met him back in, I think it was '81, after involved in this violent escape statement, I would be reasonably confident that he did not fit this adjustment. But some seven, eight years later he compiled a remarkably good prison adjustment.
. The majority refers to the trial court’s instructions concerning opening and closing arguments as being “curative.” These instructions were not given in response to the prosecutor’s ill advised argument; rather, they were given as a part of the court’s usual instructions. Thus, it is a misnomer to call those instructions “curative.”
. The testimony concerned how the surviving victims was affected by the murder of his mother and sister. That testimony was:
*714He cries for his mom. He doesn’t seem to understand why she doesn’t come home. And he cries for his sister Lacie. He comes to me many times during the week and asks me, grandmomma, do you miss my Lacie. And I tell him yes. He says, I'm worried about my Lacie.