concurring.
I am constrained to join in the result reached by the Majority, as I believe that it is required by the application of the Recreation Use of Land and Water Act (Recreation Act), 68 P.S. § 477-1 et seq., and the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (Tort Claims Act), 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8541 et seq., to this case. However, I write separately to express my disdain for such a result and to point out the harm and injustice that will follow from this decision.
The Majority correctly concludes that Appellee Lory’s claim is barred by the immunity granted to Appellant City pursuant to the Recreation Act when read in pari materia with the Tort Claims Act.1 Specifically, the Majority reasons that even if Appellant City is not deemed to be immune from suit under the Recreation Act because of Appellant City’s willful or malicious failure to guard or warn against a dangerous condition, it is nonetheless immune under the Tort Claims Act. The Majority concludes that the Tort Claims Act’s immunity for acts of willful misconduct2 immunizes Appellant City against the Appellee’s claim of a willful failure to guard or warn.3
*45I am compelled to agree that this is a proper reading of the Recreation Act and the Tort Claims Act. However, I am troubled by this application of the Recreation Act and the Tort Claims Act as it leads to the incredible result that even when it is aware of a dangerous and life threatening condition existing on its land, Appellant City is totally insulated from suit and owes no duty to citizens who enter lands covered by the Recreation Act.
When this Court held that the Recreation Act was applicable to the Commonwealth in Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources v. Auresto, 511 Pa. 73, 511 A.2d 815 (1986), we did so because it was clear that the Commonwealth’s exposure to suit should, at least, be the same as that of a private citizen.4 Thus, because a private citizen was protected from a suit like that in Auresto, the Commonwealth was properly and justly afforded the same immunity. After the decision in the case sub judice however, the Commonwealth will enjoy an immunity greater than that of a private citizen and in fact will enjoy absolute immunity from suit with respect to lands subject to the Recreation Act.
The bizarre and unjust outcome of this reading of the Recreation Act and the Tort Claims Act is that Appellant City may be fully aware of, in essence, a death trap on City property which is subject to the Recreation Act, fail or refuse to remove the deadly condition, fail or refuse to guard the deadly condition, or fail or refuse to warn of the deadly condition, and yet remain absolutely immune from any action filed by an innocent victim of this condition.
The absurdity of this result is evidenced by the contorted reasoning employed by the Commonwealth Court to reach a just outcome. Although I cannot adopt the Commonwealth Court’s reasoning, I certainly understand the Commonwealth *46Court’s ingenious attempt to inject a sense of fairness into the case. While I ultimately conclude that the distinction between a willful failure to guard or warn and willful misconduct is insupportable, the absolute immunity of Appellant City with respect to lands covered by the Recreation Act is simply unconscionable and not in accord with modern trends of liability.
. The Recreation Act grants immunity from tort actions to landowners permitting their property to be used for recreational purposes. However, immunity is not granted for willful or malicious failure to guard or warn against a dangerous condition, use, structure, or activity. 68 P.S. § 477-6. The Tort Claims Act imposes liability for, inter alia, negligent acts. However, for purposes of the Tort Claims Act, expressly excluded from the term negligent acts are acts or conduct which constitutes a crime, actual fraud, actual malice or willful misconduct. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8542(a)(2).
. I assume that where the Majority states on .pages 41-42 and 42-43 of the Majority Opinion, that the Tort Claims Act renders the City immune from claims based on "willful or malicious conduct” it means the exceptions from the definition of negligent acts, e.g., acts or conduct which constitutes a crime, actual fraud, actual malice or willful misconduct.
. Thus, the Majority, without explicitly stating so, rejects the Commonwealth Court's distinction between a willful failure to guard or warn *45under the Recreation Act and willful misconduct under the Tort Claims Act. Indeed, the Majority implicitly states that willful misconduct includes a willful failure to guard or warn.
. Our Auresto decision dealt with the Sovereign Immunity Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8501 et seq., as opposed to the Tort Claims Act. However, for present purposes, the difference between the Acts is inconsequential.