OPINION
FLAHERTY, Justice.In these cross-appeals from partial summary judgment, we are called upon to interpret portions of G.L.1956 chapter 36.1 of title 34, entitled the Rhode Island Condominium Act. At issue is the status of certain condominium property on Goat Island in Newport, Rhode Island.
I
Facts/Procedural History
The plaintiffs, America Condominium Association, Inc., Capella South Condominium Association, Inc., and Harbor Houses Condominium Association, Inc. (collectively, the plaintiffs), filed a seven-count complaint against the defendants, Island Development Corporation, Inc. (IDC, Inc.), IDC Properties, Inc. (IDC Properties), and their president, Thomas R. Roos (Roos) (collectively, the defendants), seeking both compensatory and exemplary damages as well as declaratory and equitable relief.1 They maintained that the defendants had improperly extended their development rights on certain areas of common property within the condominium complex and that because these development rights actually had expired, title to the common property now vested in the plaintiffs in fee simple. The parties filed cross-motions for partial summary judgment. After a hearing on the motions, the hearing justice ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, precipitating the defendants’ appeal.
Although plaintiffs prevailed on their partial summary judgment motion, they contend in their appeal that the subsequently entered judgment did not accurately reflect the hearing justice’s bench decision. In addition to appealing the grant of plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment, defendants dispute plaintiffs’ appellate contentions.
*120This story begins on January 13, 1988, when Globe Manufacturing Co. (Globe), predecessor in interest of defendants, recorded a declaration of condominium designated as “Goat Island South — A Waterfront Condominium” (GIS Condominium) in the Land Evidence Records of the City of Newport.2 The condominium area was situated on Goat Island and consisted of approximately twenty-three acres. Included within the legal description of the condominium area were six defined parcels. Three of the parcels contained existing residential buildings. They were: America Condominium (America), which contained a forty-six-unit apartment building, Capella South Condominium (Capella South), which contained an eighty-nine-unit apartment building, and Harbor Houses Condominium (Harbor Houses), which contained nineteen stand-alone waterfront homes. The other three parcels were undeveloped and consisted of: the “Individual Unit” (later designated as the West Development Unit), “Development Unit # 1” (later designated as the South Development Unit), and “Development Unit #2” (later designated as the Reserved Area or the North Development Unit).3
On March 3, 1988, Globe and Goat Island South Condominium Association, Inc. (the master association) amended and restated the original declaration and entitled it the first amended and restated declaration of condominium.4 It was designated as the master declaration. In the master declaration, a distinction was made between master units, so-called, and sub-condominiums, so-called, and between their respective status and rights within the GIS Condominium. A master unit was defined as “a physical portion of the Goat Island South Condominium designated for separate ownership or occupancy or designated as a Sub-Condominium * * *.” A sub-condominium was defined as “any Master Unit of the Goat Island South Condominium that is itself a condominium.” Each sub-condominium had its own specific, individual, declaration of condominium.
“Master Common Elements” included utilities,- recreational facilities, all storage areas, grounds, gardens, plantings, walkways, parking areas, and “all other property normally in common use by the Owners and Unit Owners, all areas of the Project that do not fall within a Master Unit itself and are not labeled as part of the Master Unit, and all areas and facilities designated as ‘common elements’ in the [Condominium] Act.” Common elements were defined in the master declaration as “Common Elements of a Sub-Condominium as defined in the Declaration of such Condominium.”5
Section 3.2 of the master declaration provided that “[t]he land underlying each Master Unit is a Master Limited Common Element allocated to the exclusive use of such Master Unit subject to the easements and rights set forth herein.” A master limited common element was defined as:
*121“that portion of the Master Common Elements appurtenant to or associated with or reserved for use by one or more but fewer than all Master Units, and intended for the exclusive use of such Master Units and which are identified as Master Limited Common Elements herein and/or in the Plats and Plans.”
Thus, in essence, a master unit consisted of the airspace above a master limited common element, while the master limited common element itself consisted of the physical land beneath the master unit airspace.
The master declaration also defines two types of owners. An “Owner” is defined as “the Declarant or other person or persons owning a Master Unit, which Master Unit is not a Sub-Condominium * * *.” A “Unit Owner” is defined as “the Declarant or other person or persons owning a Unit of a Sub-Condominium * * *[,]” where a unit is defined as “a physical portion of a Sub-Condominium designated for separate ownership or occupancy.”
The master declaration says that the declarant reserved certain development rights in the original declaration,6 including the right to convert the land underlying America, Capella South, Harbor Houses and the West and South Development Units into master limited common elements with development rights in the above master unit airspace. It also reserved the right to convert Development Unit #2, or the Reserved Area, into a master common element with reserved development rights to either further convert the area into a limited master common element, with an associated master unit owning the above airspace and development rights, or to completely withdraw the area from the GIS Condominium. On March 3, 1988, the declarant exercised its rights as allowed in the original declaration. Thus, the declarant converted the land underlying America, Capella South, Harbor Houses, the West and South Development Units into limited master common elements, and converted the Reserved Area into a master common element with reserved development rights in the master declaration.
Accordingly, the airspace above the limited master common elements became master units consisting:
“of the airspace above and all buildings and improvements now or hereafter located on the land * * *, but excluding said land itself. The lower boundary of such Master Unit is the upper surface of the land under the Master Unit. * * * There is no upper boundary.”
Pursuant to the special declarant and development rights section of the master declaration, the declarant reserved certain rights to construct improvements until December 31,1994.
Furthermore, under the master declaration, each master unit possessed a delineated, fixed percentage of the undivided ownership interest in the master common elements. Such master common elements would be controlled and maintained by a master association, which itself would be controlled by a master executive board consisting of representatives from each master unit. Thus, those representatives would act on behalf of, and make decisions for, the individual sub-condominium unit owners, or residents, at the master executive board meetings. Each sub-condominium also would have its own sub-association controlled by its individual sub-association executive board. These sub-associations *122would control and maintain the individual common areas exclusive to each sub-condominium. At the time of the master declaration, only America and Harbor Houses were considered to be sub-condominiums.7 The undeveloped West and South Development Units were wholly owned and controlled by the declarant.
The master declaration further provided that the percentage voting rights and financial obligations of each master unit was based upon its undivided, “master allocated interest” in the master common elements of the condominium scheme.8 The specific master allocated interest of each master unit was delineated in an attached exhibit to the master declaration as follows: (1) Harbor Houses — 21.42 percent; (2) America 19.25 — -percent; (3) Capella South — 39.61 percent; (4) South Development Unit — 9.6 percent; and, (5) West Development Unit — 10.12 percent. The aforementioned percentages represented the relative voting rights that each master unit was entitled to cast at a master association meeting. The exhibit also described the individual percentage master allocated interests of the individual units within America and Harbor houses. Significantly, however, votes at the master association meetings could be cast only by members of the master executive board.
After passage of the 1988 master declaration, Globe’s interests were transferred to IDC, Inc., and thereafter to IDC Properties, through a series of sales and assignments.9 As successor declarant, IDC, Inc., and later IDC Properties, possessed all of the development rights in the undeveloped West Development and the South Development master units, as well as in the Reserved Area. By early 1994, the declarant had not yet exercised the development rights set forth in the master declaration. Realizing that the December 31, 1994 deadline to develop was fast approaching, it attempted to extend the deadline through a series of amendments to the master declaration. These amendments were discussed and purportedly passed at special meetings of the master association conducted by the master executive board between April and December 1994. At the time, the declarant, had a controlling interest in the master executive board.10
In á notice dated April 15,1994, Roos, in his capacity as president of the master association, announced that a meeting of the master association would be conducted *123on April 27, 1994, for the purpose of extending:
“the period for the exercise by the de-clarant of the Development Rights contained in [the master declaration] until December 31, 1999 plus any additional period as may be approved by the Federal National Mortgage Association, such additional period to terminate by December 31, 2004.”
It is important to note that no notice of the meeting was given to the individual unit owners.
The actual specifics of the proposed change were not revealed until the special meeting. Styled as the Third Amendment to the master declaration, the change would extend special declarant rights to December 31, 1999. Until that date, the declarant would have the right to: (a) withdraw the Reserved Area from the GIS Condominium, provided that it has not already been converted into a master unit; (b) convert the Reserved Area into a Master Unit; (c) construct any legally permissible residential and non-residential improvements on the property, including a Sub-Condominium not exceeding 315 units on the property; (d) convert the land in the master units into master limited common elements that then could be excavated or otherwise altered “to the extent necessary or desirable to develop and/or operate and maintain such Master Unit[s] * *
The minutes from the special meeting noted that the sub-association representatives expressed reservations about the proposed amendment, stating that their consent “should be conditioned on their review and approval of any proposed development of those areas.” Roos indicated that no such proposals existed and that “the exact purpose of the Amendment [was] to provide the Declarant with additional time to develop a proposal for the Reserved Area.” After it was observed that “at least 67% in voting interest of all Owners and Sub-Association Board Members” was required in order to amend the master declaration, a vote was taken. The Third Amendment “was approved with 85.29% in allocated interest voting in the affirmative, 4.81% in allocated interest present but withholding its vote * * *, and 9.90% in allocated interest absent and not voting.”
Thereafter, in a notice dated November 1,1994, Roos informed the executive board that a special meeting would be conducted to extend certain development rights until December 31, 1999. Attached to the notice was an exhibit showing that the proposed amendment affected only the South Development Unit and also provided the granting of an easement over the common elements of America so that an access road to the South Development Unit could be built. This would be the Fourth Amendment to the master declaration.
On November 15,1994, the special meeting was convened. Several individual unit owners attended the meeting, and at least one of them objected to the proposed amendment. However, the individual unit owners were not permitted to vote because that privilege was reserved only for the master executive board members. The Fourth Amendment “was approved with 76.55 percentage in allocated interest voting in the affirmative and 23.45 percent in allocated interest absent and not voting.”
In a subsequent notice, dated December 16, 1994, Roos informed the master executive board of yet another special meeting, to be held December 28, 1994. The stated purpose of that meeting was:
“1) To approve the extension of the period for the exercise by the Declarant of the Development Rights with respect to [the South Development Unit] and the Reserved Area;
*124“2) To permit the conversion of the land, excluding the air above, that comprises the Reserved Area into a Master Limited Common Element;
“3) To confirm that the Owner, Sub-Association and Unit Owners with respect to any Master Unit shall have the rights, as the case may be, to create a sub-condominium out of such Master Unit, to execute, amend, terminate and record a declaration with respect to such sub-condominium, and to construct improvements within such Master Unit and the Master Limited Common Elements associated therewith;
“4) To provide for the right of the De-clarant to withdraw the Reserved Area Master Unit (when created), including the Master Limited Common Element thereunder from the Goat Island South Condominium;
“5) To provide that Master Common Expenses benefiting fewer than all the Master Units shall be allocated among the Master Units that are benefited by such expenses * * *;
“6) To reallocate the Master Allocated Interests between the [West Development] Unit and the [South Development Unit]. This will not affect the Master Allocated Interest of any other Master Unit;
“7) To permit the Owners of [the South Development Unit] and the [West Development] Unit to reallocate the number of units between the [South Development Unit] and the [West Development] Unit. This will not increase the aggregate number of units permitted to be constructed within these two units
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“10) To make other amendments to clarify, restate or define Declarant’s Development Rights * * 11
In addition to the above announcement, a notice dated December 20, 1994, was sent to the individual unit owners inviting them to attend the special meeting. However, the notice specifically informed the residents that although they were welcome to attend, “voting on the amendments is limited to the members of the various condominium boards * * Thereafter, notice was given of a special executive board 'meeting to follow the special meeting on December 28, 1994. The purpose of that additional meeting was “to recalculate the monthly installments for Master Common Expenses against each Master Unit in accordance with the Amendments [being] contemplated * *
On December 28, 1994, both of the above-noticed meetings were conducted. The minutes of the first special meeting indicate that the individual unit owners of America, Capella South and Harbor Houses again were informed that they would not be permitted to vote because they were, represented at the meeting by “the Unit Owners Executive Board Members elected by them at the Sub-Association level by the Sub-Association Board Members.” The minutes further reflect that Dr. Philip Schub, one of the executive board members for Harbor Houses, stated at the meeting that any “vote was academic because the percentage as explained by the Chair was in favor of the declar-ant.” Another executive board member, who represented America, Dr. Frank D’Al-lesandro, objected to either amending the declaration or extending the development rights, believing that it did not conform with Rhode Island condominium law. *125Thereafter, he abstained from what he deemed to be an illegal proceeding.
During the meeting, a Sixth Amendment to the master declaration also was discussed. That amendment would convert the Reserved Area into a master limited common element whose above airspace would constitute a master unit with associated development rights.12 The converted area would be known as the North Development Unit. Thereafter, a vote was taken on the proposed amendments and “[a] calculation of the votes resulted in the necessary percentage to approve the Amendments of the Declaration and Bylaws.”
The parties continued to disagree over the disputed amendments to the master declaration and how those amendments were effectuated. The record reflects that on January 5, 1998, a tolling agreement was executed. The accord provided that, for purposes of the agreement, any legal action filed by the parties on or before June 30, 1998, concerning the creation of, amendments to, and operation of the condominium property would be deemed to “have been commenced, filed and served, for purposes of statute of limitations, lach-es, waiver, estoppel or similar defenses, on December 1, 1997.” This tolling agreement was extended three times thereafter. The final document indicated that any action filed on or before May 31, 1999, would be deemed to have been filed on December 1, 1997. Significantly, in 1998, well after the execution of the tolling agreement, IDC constructed a function center known as the Newport Regatta Club on the North Development Unit/Reserved Area.
On May 29, 1999, plaintiffs filed a seven-count legal and equitable action.13 Their complaint alleged that the voting procedure employed to extend the development rights did not conform with the Rhode Island Condominium Act; consequently, they averred, the amendments extending those rights were invalid. They further contended that when defendants failed to exercise their development rights on or before December 31, 1994, their reserved interest in the undeveloped units ceased to exist, thus implying that fee simple title then vested in plaintiffs.
On January 18, 2000, plaintiffs filed a motion for partial summary judgment on counts 1, 2, 3, 4 and 7 of the complaint. The defendants filed a counter-motion for partial summary judgment seeking the Superior Court to declare: (a) that IDC Properties, as owner of the North West and South Development Units, has the right to construct buildings and improvements on those areas at any time; (b) that IDC Properties, as successor declarant, may exercise its right to develop either or *126both of the North and West Development Units into condominiums, to convert the West Development Unit into a master common element, and to withdraw the North development Unit from the GIS Condominium until December 31, 2015; and (c) “that plaintiffs’ challenges to the aforementioned rights of IDC are without merit and are further barred by the applicable statute of limitations and by the doctrine of laches.”
After reviewing the parties’ cross-motions for partial summary judgment, the hearing justice granted plaintiffs’ motion and denied defendants’ motion. She determined that G.L.1956 § 34-36.1-2.17, governing the voting procedures required to implement amendments involving the creation or increase of special declarant rights, was applicable to the amendments in dispute. She found that the master declaration violated this provision because it permitted the disputed amendments to be implemented with a mere 67 percent vote, rather than by the unanimous consent of the unit owners, as specifically required by the statute. She then determined that because the amendments did not conform with the legislation, the one-year statute of limitations was inapplicable. Instead, the hearing justice found that the suit was timely within the ten-year period of limitations for civil suits enunciated in G.L.1956 § 9-1-13. The hearing justice also found that the tolling agreement, which was voluntarily entered into by the parties, precluded defendants’ affirmative defense of laches.
In concluding her decision, the hearing justice declared that:
“(1) the Defendant’s [sic ] right to develop Goat Island has expired.
“(2) the alleged voting rights are null and void, and
“(3) the Master Association is without legal authority to act on behalf of the . unit owners.”
Subsequently, each side submitted proposed partial judgments. The court accepted the partial judgment submitted by defendants and entered it pursuant to Rules 54(b) and 57 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. The partial judgment declared that “defendants’ purported extensions of its development rights are annulled” and that because the Third, Fourth and Fifth Amendments were improperly adopted, they were “void ab ini-tio and have been recorded ultra vires.” The partial judgment also provided that:
“a) Defendants’ developments rights on Goat Island have expired.
“b) Defendants’ alleged voting rights as exercised are null and void.
“c) The Master Association is without legal authority to act on behalf of the unit owners, as it did in adopting the Third, Fourth and Fifth Amendments.”
On appeal, plaintiffs contend that the partial judgment, as entered, did not accurately reflect the decision of the court because it did not state that fee simple title was now vested in plaintiffs. Although defendants dispute the inaccuracy of the judgment, they also maintain that the hearing justice erred in granting plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment.
II
Standard of Review
“In passing on a grant of summary judgment by a justice of the Superi- or Court, this [C]ourt conducts a de novo review.” United Lending Corp. v. City of Providence, 827 A.2d 626, 631 (R.I.2003). This court will uphold a trial justices’ grant of summary judgment “[o]nly when a review of the admissible evidence viewed *127in the light most favorable to the nonmov-ing party reveals no genuine issues of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id. (quoting Carlson v. Town of Smithfield, 723 A.2d 1129, 1131 (R.I.1999) (per cu-riam)). “[A] party who opposes a motion for summary judgment carries the burden of proving by competent evidence the existence of a disputed material issue of fact and cannot rest on allegations or denials in the pleadings or on conclusions or legal opinions.” Id. (quoting Accent Store Design, Inc. v. Marathon House, Inc., 674 A.2d 1223, 1225 (R.I.1996)). Consequently, we shall proceed to conduct our de novo review of the record to determine whether plaintiffs were entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Ill
The Condominium Act
In 1982, the Legislature adopted chapter 36.1 of title 34, entitled the Rhode Island Condominium Act (the act). The act essentially incorporated the language contained in the Uniform Condominium Act and was made applicable to any condominium created in Rhode Island after July 1, 1982. See § 34-36.1-1.02(a)(l). The condominium presently at issue was created in 1988; accordingly, the master declaration and its purported amendments are controlled by the act. The resolution of the issues raised in this appeal depends, for the most part, upon our statutory interpretation of the act, and whether the disputed master declaration and its amendments conform with that interpretation. First, we must address whether, as plaintiffs assert in their brief, “the Uniform Condominium Act is a consumer statute that regulates the terms under which condominiums are established and managed.”
“We review de novo questions of statutory interpretation.” Interstate Navigation Co. v. Division of Public Utilities and Carrieres of the State of Rhode Island, 824 A.2d 1282, 1287 (R.I.2003) (citing Stebbins v. Wells, 818 A.2d 711, 715 (R.I. 2003)). “When construing a statute ‘our ultimate goal is to give effect to the purpose of the act as intended by the Legislature.’ ” Id. (quoting Oliveira v. Lombardi, 794 A.2d 453, 457 (R.I.2002)). “In construing statutes, this Court ‘adhere[s] to the basic proposition of establishing and effectuating the intent of the Legislature[, * * * which] is accomplished from an examination of the language, nature, and object of the statute.’ ” In re Estate of Gervais, 770 A.2d 877, 880 (R.I.2001) (per curiam) (quoting State v. Pelz, 765 A.2d 824, 829-30 (R.I.2001)). “If the language of a statute is clear on its face, then its plain meaning must generally be given effect.” Id. (quoting Skating v. Aetna Insurance Co., 742 A.2d 282, 290 (R.I.1999)). Nonetheless, “[i]t is a well-known maxim of statutory interpretation that this Court ‘will not construe a statute to reach an absurd [or unintended] result.’ ” Id. (quoting Hargreaves v. Jack, 750 A.2d 430, 435 (R.I.2000)).
When it enacted the act, the Legislature authorized and directed the secretary of state to insert the official comments to the Uniform Condominium Act (1980). Unless the statutory language clearly and expressly states otherwise, those comments are to be used as guidance concerning the legislative intent in adopting the chapter. See Compiler’s Notes to § 34-36.1-1.01 (citing P.L.1982, ch. 329, § 3).14 In addi*128tion, “any right or obligation declared by this chapter is enforceable by judicial proceeding” and the remedies “shall be liberally administered * * Section 34-36.1-1.12.
“The Act as a whole contains a strong consumer protection flavor * * One Pacific Towers Homeowner’s Association v. HAL Real Estate Investments, Inc., 148 Wash.2d 319, 61 P.3d 1094, 1100 (2002) (observing that the Washington Condominium Act significantly corresponds to the Uniform Condominium Act). That is because, “[o]ne of the reasons the Uniform Act was created was that there was a perceived need for additional consumer protection.” Id. Furthermore, “[w]hen there exists a dominance of control by one owner, it becomes more important to allow minority owners greater participation in the administration of the commonly owned property, and increases the need for the majority owner to follow all the statutes and the declaration.” Artesani v. Glenwood Park Condominium Association, 750 A.2d 961, 963 (R.I.2000) (per curiam).
Section 34-36.1-1.04 states that, “[ejxcept as expressly provided in this chapter,” any agreements to vary the provisions or waive the rights conferred by the statute are prohibited. See also Commissioners’ Comment to § 34-36.1-1.04 (stating that “this section adopts the approach of prohibiting variation by agreement except in those cases where it is expressly permitted by the terms of the Act itself’). Consequently, “[i]n many instances * * * provisions of the Act may not be varied, because of the need to protect purchasers, lenders, and declarants.” Id. “One of the consumer protections in this Act is the requirement for consent by specified percentages of unit owners to particular actions or changes in the declaration.” Id. Accordingly, “[i]n order to prevent declarants from evading these requirements by obtaining powers of attorney from all unit owners, or in some other fashion controlling the votes of unit owners, this section forbids the use by a de-clarant of any device to evade the limitations or prohibitions of the Act or of the declaration.” Id. (Emphasis added.) The Rhode Island Condominium Act is a consumer protection statute.
IV
The Third, Fourth and Fifth Amendments
The defendants appeal the hearing justice’s determination that the Third, Fourth and Fifth Amendments were void ab initio. These amendments purportedly extended IDC’s deadline to develop the South and West Development Units and to exercise its rights to the Reserved Area from December 31, 1994, to December 31, 1999. The defendants maintain that the amendments were approved validly through unanimous votes by the six master condominium unit owners in accordance with the act, and that the hearing justice erred in finding that statute required the unanimous consent of the sub-condominium unit owners. We disagree.
Section 34-36.1-2.17(d) provides:
“Except to the extent expressly permitted or required by other provisions of this chapter, no amendment may create or increase special declarant rights, increase the number of units, change the boundaries of any unit, the allocated interests of a unit, or the uses to which *129any unit is restricted, in the absence of unanimous consent of the unit owners.” 15
Section 34-86.1-2.05(a)(8) provides that condominium declarations must contain:
“A description of any development rights and other special declarant rights * * * reserved by the declarant, together with a legally sufficient description of the real estate to which each of those rights applies, and a time limit within which each of those rights must be exercised [.]” (Emphasis added).
Special declarant rights are defined as:
“rights reserved for the benefit of a declarant to:
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“(ii) To exercise any development right (§ 34-36.1-2.10),
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“(vi) To make the condominium subject to a master association, (§ 34-36.1-2.20) * * Section 34-36.1-1.03(26).
The reserved right to develop both the South and West Development Units therefore constituted special declarant rights under the act. Consequently, any amendment to increase these special declarant rights, such as an extension of the time limit to exercise declarant’s development rights, was subject to the unanimity requirements mandated by § 34-36.1-2.17(d).
According to the master declaration, the successor declarant (IDC Properties), retained development rights in the South and West Development Units, as well as its rights in the Reserved Area, until December 31, 1994. Since development rights are special declarant rights, it follows that any attempt to extend development rights was subject to the statutory requirement that unanimous consent of the owners be obtained pursuant to § 34-36.1-2.17(d).16
The defendants maintain that this unanimous consent requirement was fulfilled when the amendments were passed by a unanimous vote of the master condominium unit owners. They argue that the sub-condominium unit owners were represented at the relevant meetings by their sub-condominium board members. As previously noted, the master declaration defines a “unit owner” as “the Declarant or other person or persons owning a Unit of a Sub-Condominium * * *.” Unlike the master declaration, however, the act makes no distinction between master condominium *130unit owners and sub-condominium unit owners. Instead, a “unit owner” is defined in the act as:
“a declarant or other person who owns a unit, or a lessee of a unit in a leasehold condominium whose lease expires simultaneously with any lease, the expiration or termination of which will remove the unit from the condominium, but does not include a person having an interest in a unit solely as security for an obligation.” Section 34-36.1-1.03(29).
It is clear from the foregoing language that the owner of a sub-condominium unit constitutes a unit owner for purposes of the act. Under the act, unit owners are given the right to vote upon any amendments to special declarant rights; however, under the master declaration’s definition of owners and unit owners, owners of a sub-condominium unit are prohibited from casting such votes except through the declarant-controlled master association. Considering the clear and unequivocal language of § 34-36.1-2.17(d) requiring unanimous consent to any increase of special declarant rights, coupled with the strong consumer protection aspect of that section, there is no doubt that the Legislature intended to protect plaintiffs, as unit owners, from amendments favoring the declarant made without their consent. Thus, we hold that the master declaration prohibition on voting is precisely the type of artifice or device that the statute proscribes and that the voting scheme at issue is inconsistent with the act.
The record reveals that even the master declaration itself contravened § 34-36.1-2.17(d) by permitting amendments to the special declarant rights through a vote of only 67 percent of the master condominium unit owners and sub-association board members rather than through the unanimous consent of the individual unit owners required by the statute. More importantly, however, the Third, Fourth and Fifth Amendments were passed without any votes from the individual unit owners because only the master condominium unit owners and the sub-association board members were permitted to vote to extend IDC Properties’ special declarant rights. Furthermore, the record reveals that the individual unit owners did not even receive notice of the special meetings for purposes of discussing and voting upon the Third and Fourth Amendments.
Thus, we conclude that the voting procedure employed at the special meetings improperly deprived the individual unit owners of their statutory right to give consent. Consequently, the hearing justice did not err in declaring that the Third, Fourth and Fifth Amendments were void ab initio and that the declarant’s development rights had expired after December 31, 1994.17
We observe that in the zoning context, "action taken by a board that has not satisfied the notice requirements is a nullity.” Ryan v. Zoning Board of Review of New Shoreham, 656 A.2d 612, 615-16 (R.I.1995). See also Gardner v. Cumberland Town Council, 826 A.2d 972 (R.I.2003). Likewise, failure to give notice to a necessary party invalidates a tax
*131Y
The Reserved Area
Under the terms of the master declaration, the land underlying the Reserved Area was converted into a master common element subject either to conversion into a limited master common element or to complete withdrawal from the GIS Condominium on or before December 31, 1994. Conversion into a limited master common element would transform the airspace above the land into a declarant-owned master unit with associated development rights. On December 29, 1994, the declar-ant recorded the Sixth Amendment making such a conversion.18
The plaintiffs do not challenge the propriety of the Sixth Amendment, maintaining that defendants had a unilateral right to convert the Reserved Area from a master common element into a limited master common element with associated development rights. However, as with the development rights in the South and West Development Units, we believe that those rights automatically expired when the de-clarant failed to exercise them on or before December 31,1994.
VI
Ownership of the Disputed Parcels
Now that it has been determined that IDC’s development rights expired after December 31, 1994, the next issue to be addressed is the ownership of the disputed parcels of land. The plaintiffs maintain that because all of the parcels were common elements in the GIS Condominium, title to the parcels had always vested in the unit owners subject to divestment by the declarant through the proper exercise of its development rights. They contend that when the declarant’s development rights expired, its interests in the parcels ceased to exist and that, consequently, the hearing justice erred in failing to declare that title to the parcels was vested in the unit owners in fee simple.
The defendants contest these claims. They assert that the disputed parcels of land were, and still are, limited master common elements allocated for the exclusive use of the declarant-owned master units that occupy the above airspace.19 They maintain that such master units constitute real estate under the act and that even if the declarant’s development rights expired after December 31, 1994, its improvement rights in its master units did not, and could not, expire. In other words, even if its rights to develop had ceased, it *132maintained its right to improve the real estate in its capacity as owner.
Development rights are defined as:
“any right or combination of rights reserved by a declarant in the declaration to:
“(A) Add real estate to a condominium, “(B) Create units, common elements, or limited common elements within a condominium,
“(C) Subdivide units or convert units into common elements, or
“(D) Withdraw real estate from a condominium.” Section 34-36.1-1.03(11).
Under the act, “real estate” is:
“any leasehold or other estate or interest in, over, or under land, including structures, fixtures, and other improvements and interests which by custom, usage, or law pass with a conveyance of land though not described in the contract of sale or instrument of conveyance. ‘Real estate’ includes parcels with or without upper or lower boundaries, and spaces that may be filled with air or water.” Section 34-36.1-1.03(24).
The defendants contend that, according to the act, ownership of a master unit necessarily is ownership of real estate because it constitutes an interest in the airspace over the land. They maintain that the construction of a building within a master unit merely represents an improvement to the real estate and does not, therefore, fit within the statutory definition of a development right.
Even if we were to accept defendants’ assertion that a master unit in the airspace above a third-party owned unimproved lot with development rights is, in fact, real estate for purposes of the Act,20 we do not accept their tortured conclusion that the construction of a building upon that lot is merely an improvement, rather than the exercise of a development right. Indeed, such an “improvement” constitutes one of the specific development rights reserved in the master agreement. Because the de-clarant’s proposed construction effectively would subdivide the so-called master unit into smaller residential units, it falls squarely within § 34-36.1-1.03(ll)(B)’s definition of development rights. As discussed above, those rights expired after December 31,1994.
Under the master declaration, the GIS Condominium consists of one large tract of land. Although defendants assert that the condominium is composed of separate lots, nothing in the record suggests that the parcel is divisible or contains more than one legal lot. See Dibiase v. Jacovowitz, 43 Mass.App.Ct. 361, 682 N.E.2d 1382, 1383 (1997). The master declaration granted the declarant a limited period to develop certain parcels of land within the condominium, but it could not convey title to the airspace if the development rights were not exercised. Because the master declaration “described the entire parcel of land from the outset, * * * the entire parcel * * * was common area from the time the master [declaration] was recorded * * Id. at 1385.21 Thereafter, the land never was subdivided and when the development rights expired, the disputed portions vested in fee simple in “the unit owners as tenants in common in proportion to their respective undivided *133interests.” Id. Considering that all the underlying land constituted common property, we conclude that when the associated development rights expired, so also did all of the declarant’s rights in the master units. Accordingly, the hearing justice should have declared that title to the disputed property vested in the individual unit owners in fee simple.22
VII
The Statute of Limitations
The defendants maintain that plaintiffs’ challenge to the amendments was not timely filed pursuant to § 34 — 36.1—2.17(b); accordingly, they assert that the claim should have been dismissed for failure to comply with the one-year statute of limitation.
In her decision, the hearing justice rejected this claim. She noted that section 34 — 36.1—2.17(b) prohibited any increase in special declarant’s rights without the unanimous consent of the unit owners and that because “the challenged amendment was not adopted in conformance with the procedures” set out by the statute, the statute of limitations did not apply. Instead, she found plaintiffs’ action to be timely pursuant to § 9-l-13(a), which has a ten-year limitation period for civil actions. Although we affirm the hearing justice on this issue, we do so on a ground different to that enunciated by the hearing justice. See United Lending Corp., 827 A.2d at 634.
Section 34-36.1-2.17(b) provides that:
“No action to challenge the validity of an amendment adopted by the association pursuant to this section may be brought more than one year after the amendment is recorded.”
However, when, as here, the amendment being challenged is determined to be void ab initio, the one-year statute of limitations does not apply to any subsequent action taken by an interested party. See Theta Properties v. Ronci Realty Co., 814 A.2d 907 (R.I.2003). Consequently, the hearing justice did not err in rejecting defendants’ statute of limitations defense.
VIII
The Laches Defense
The defendants have also raised the affirmative defense of laches in the proceedings below, contending that this doctrine should bar plaintiffs’ challenge to the Reserved Area because the plaintiffs sat on their rights while defendants invested heavily in developing the parcel into a function center known as the Newport Regatta Club. The hearing justice rejected defendants’ assertions, finding that the claim was precluded by the tolling agreement that was willingly entered into by the parties. The defendants assert that the hearing justice erred in denying their lach-es defense because it was not waived by the tolling agreement.
“Laches is an equitable defense that involves not only delay but also a party’s detrimental reliance on the status quo.” Adam v. Adam, 624 A.2d 1093, 1096 (R.I.1993) (citing Grissom v. Pawtucket Trust Co., 559 A.2d 1065 (R.I.1989)). “Mere delay alone is not enough, the delay must be unreasonable.” Adam, 624 A.2d at 1096. That is because,
*134“Laches, in legal significance, is not mere delay, but delay that works a disadvantage to another. So long as parties are in the same condition, it matters little whether one presses a right promptly or slowly, within limits allowed by law; but when, knowing his rights, he takes no steps to enforce them until the condition of the other party has, in good faith, become so changed that he cannot be restored to his former state, if the right be then enforced, delay becomes inequitable and operates as an estoppel against the assertion of the right. The disadvantage may come from loss of evidence, change of title, intervention of equities and other causes, but when a court sees negligence on one side and injury therefrom on the other, it is a ground for denial of relief.” Id. (quoting Chase v. Chase, 20 R.I. 202, 203-04, 37 A. 804, 805 (1897)).
Although defendants correctly assert that they did not waive laches as an affirmative defense when they signed the tolling agreement, they cannot avail themselves of that defense under the circumstances in this case. The record reveals that defendants knowingly and willingly entered into the tolling agreement and thereafter agreed to extend it on three separate occasions. The original tolling agreement provided that any legal action filed by the parties on or before June 30, 1998, with respect to the creation of, amendment to, and operation of the condominium property, would be deemed to “have been commenced, filed and served, for purposes of statute of limitations, lach-es, waiver, estoppel or similar defenses, on December 1, 1997.” The final agreement continued the applicability of the presumed December 1, 1997 filing date to all actions filed on or before May 31,1999.
Despite the fact that the tolling agreement specifically acknowledged and contemplated the possibility that plaintiffs might file the instant civil suit, and while the agreement was still in full force and effect, defendants knowingly invested substantial sums of money in the Reserved Area by constructing the Newport Regatta Club in 1998. Given that fact, defendants cannot now contend that the present action, filed on May 28, 1999, constituted an unreasonable delay upon which they detrimentally relied for purposes of invoking the laches doctrine as an affirmative defense. Consequently, the hearing justice properly rejected defendants’ argument on this issue.
IX
Accounting
The defendants contend that they continued to pay common expenses on the disputed parcels after the December 31, 1994 development rights deadline had passed and the property vested in the unit owners in fee simple.23 Furthermore, they assert that they made a considerable investment in developing the Newport Regatta Club. The defendants now maintain that these financial considerations should weigh heavily in their favor because, otherwise, plaintiffs would benefit from a considerable and inequitable windfall should they prevail upon appeal.
We have stated previously that “[o]ne who knows of a claim to land which he [or she] proposes to use as his [or her] own, proceeds at his [or her] peril if he [or she] goes forward in the face of protest from the claimant and places structures *135upon the land.” Renaissance Development Corp. v. Universal Properties Group, Inc., 821 A.2d 233, 238 (R.I.2003) (citing Ariola v. Nigro, 16 Ill.2d 46, 156 N.E.2d 536, 540 (1959)). That is because “the duty of the courts is to protect rights, and innocent complainants cannot be required to suffer the loss of their rights because of the expense to the wrongdoer.” Id. In reviewing defendants’ assertions that plaintiffs should not benefit from defendants’ development of the Newport Regatta Club, we observe that defendants commenced such development with full knowledge of plaintiffs’ claims and after they voluntarily entered into the tolling agreement. Considering that they developed the Reserved Area at a time when they were on notice that their right to do so was in dispute, we conclude that they constructed the parcel at their peril and cannot now contend that equity should prevent plaintiffs from prevailing because of their expenditures.
However, with respect to the defendants’ payments of common expenses on the disputed parcels after the declarant’s development rights had expired, we concur that to permit the plaintiffs to enjoy the benefits of such expenditures would constitute an inequitable windfall. However, we do not agree that this should form the basis for denying the plaintiffs’ appeal and, instead, we remand the matter to the Superior Court for an accounting on this issue.24
X
Conclusion
Consequently, and for the foregoing reasons, the plaintiffs’ cross-appeal is granted and the defendants’ cross-appeal is denied. The papers are remanded for the entry of a partial judgment consistent with this opinion and for a trial on the remaining issues.
. After joining plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment, Harbor Houses Condominium Association, Inc., moved to voluntarily dismiss itself from the case. The Superior Court granted the motion and dismissed its claims for compensatory and exemplary damages without prejudice; however, its declara-toiy and equitable claims for relief were dismissed with prejudice. Pursuant to Rule 19 of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, Harbor Houses was then realigned as an involuntary plaintiff with respect to its declaratory and equitable claims.
. At the time, defendant Roos was Globe's director.
. For the sake of simplicity, the Individual Unit and Development Unit # 1 will be referred to as the West Development Unit and the South Development Unit, respectively.
. The master declaration, or First Amendment to the original declaration, has not been challenged.
.The Capella South declaration of condominium states that common elements include "without limitation, all elements of the Building and Property not included in any Unit” and lists examples such as improvements on the land, foundations, lobbies, hallways, utility services and "[a]ll other property normally in common use by the Unit Owners[.]”
. A copy of the original declaration, was not available in the file; consequently, we have had to rely upon the representations made in the master declaration concerning that document.
. The declarant later converted the Capella South master unit into a sub-condominium on May 12, 1988, pursuant to its special declar-ant and development rights under the master declaration.
. Specifically, a "master allocated interest":
"shall mean: (i) With respect to a Master Unit that is not a Sub-Condominium, the undivided interest in the Master Common Elements allocated to such Master Unit, which shall equal the percentage liability for the Master Common Expenses, and which shall equal the percentage vote in the Master Association associated with such Master Unit as set forth in Exhibit Y; (ii) with respect to a Sub-Association, the percentage liability for the Master Common Expenses, which shall equal the percentage vote in the Master Association associated with such Sub-Association as set forth in Exhibit Y; and (iii) with respect to a Unit Owner in a Sub-Condominium, the percentage of undivided interest in the Master Common Elements allocated to such Unit Owner's Unit as set forth in Exhibit Y.”
. IDC, Inc., transferred its interests to IDC Properties on October 19, 1994.
. As previously mentioned, the executive board of the master association is composed of master unit owners and sub-association representatives. IDC, Inc. controlled the majority of the board's votes by virtue of its outright ownership of the West and South Development Units and as the owner of the majority of the individual residential units in America, Capella South and Harbor Houses.
. At the meeting, the declarant’s development rights were extended until December 15, 2015. The extension was reflected in the Fifth Amendment.
. The plaintiffs do not challenge the validity of the Sixth Amendment to the master declaration, conceding that the master declaration granted the declarant the right to make such a conversion on or before December 31, 1994.
. In counts 1 and 2, plaintiffs petitioned the Superior Court to declare that the voting procedures were statutorily invalid and that the amendments were void ab initio, respectively. Count 3 asked the court to declare that the declarant no longer had any ownership interest or voting rights in the disputed master units because said rights had expired on December 31, 1994, and to estop declarant from exercising development rights in those units. Alternatively, they sought compensatory damages in count 3. In count 4, plaintiffs challenged the allocation of the master common expenses as prescribed by the Fifth Amendment and sought injunctive and compensatory relief. Count 5 involved a compensatory claim for breach of fiduciary duty and count 6 sought injunctive relief from an alleged interference with an easement. Finally, in count 7, plaintiffs sought punitive damages and attorney's fees against declarant under counts 1, 2, 3 and 4, and against Roos under count 5 of the complaint, for their willful failure to comply with the Condominium Act, the master declaration and the master bylaws. *131sale. See Kildeer Realty v. Brewster Realty Corp., 826 A.2d 961, 966 (R.I.2003).
. Specifically, P.L.1982, ch. 329, § 3 provides:
"The secretary of state is hereby authorized and directed to print in the [G]eneral [L]aws following each section of this act, *128the corresponding official comments as defined in the Uniform Condominium Act (1980) which shall be used as guidance as to the intent of the [L]egislature in adopting this chapter unless the statutory language shall clearly express otherwise in which case the statutory language shall prevail." (Emphases added.)
. The Commissioners’ Comment to G.L.1956 § 34-36.1-2.17(d) provides that:
“Section [34-36.1-1.04] does not permit the declarant to use any device, such as powers of attorney executed by purchasers at closings, to circumvent subsection (d)’s requirement of unanimous consent.”
. The dissent contends that this conclusion was erroneous because § 34-36.1-2.20(d) "expressly provides that 'the rights and responsibilities of unit owners [with respect to the unit owners’ association set forth in §§ 34-36.1-3.03, 34-36.1-3.08 — 34-36.1-3.10, and 34-36.1-3.12] apply in the conduct of the affairs of a master association only to those persons who elect the board of a master association.' ”
We note, however, that although § 34-36.1-3.03 does permit the executive board to "act in all instances on behalf of the association[,]” it also provides for certain exceptions. One of those exceptions is that “[t]he executive board may not act on behalf of the association to amend the declaration (§ 34 — 36.1-2.17) * * Section 34-36.1-3.03(b). Considering that § 34-36.1-2.17(d) states that “no amendment may create or increase special declarant rights * * * in the absence of unanimous consent of the unit owners[,]” and considering that the actions taken here by the master association did, in fact, increase special declarant rights, the dissent’s reliance upon § 34-36.l-2.20(d) to support the conclusion that the master association validly extended IDC’s development rights is misplaced.
. Another possible basis for declaring the Third and Fourth Amendments to be void would be the failure to provide notice of the relevant meetings to the individual unit owners. Section 34-36.1-3.08 provides that:
“Not less than ten (10) nor more that sixty (60) days in advance of any meeting, the secretary or other officer specified in the bylaws shall cause notice to be hand delivered or sent prepaid by United States mail to the mailing address of each unit or to any other mailing address designated in writing by the unit owner. The notice of any meeting must state the time and place of the meeting and the items on the agenda, including the general nature of any proposed amendment to the declaration or bylaws, any budget changes, and any proposal to remove a director or officer.”
. The amendment also redistributed the percentage master allocated interests of each existing master unit. The changes are reflected as follows:
Pre-Sixth Amendment Post Sixth Amendment
21.42 percent 11.55 percent (1) Harbor Houses
19.25 percent 10.39 percent (2) America
39.61 percent 21.35 percent (3) Capella South
9.6 percent 7.31 percent (4) South Development Unit
10.12 percent 3.31 percent (5) West Development Unit
46.09 percent (6) North Development Unit (Reserved Area)
. We are puzzled by the dissent's statement that "even if the development rights expired, IDC still owned these units in fee simple.” At no time have defendants ever asserted that they own the land underlying the master units in fee simple.
. We have recognized that, under appropriate circumstances, a condominium may be developed in the airspace above land pursuant to the Condominium Act. See McConnell v. Wilson, 543 A.2d 249 (R.I.1988).
. According to the master declaration, the Reserved Area also consisted of common area. The Sixth Amendment merely converted the parcel from a master common element into a limited master common element.
. By individual unit owners, we include all the individuals who own sub-condominiums, so-called, not unit owners, as defendants restrict that term. Such individuals include plaintiffs in this case, as well as IDC in its capacity as the owner of several sub-condominiums.
. Before the declarant’s development rights expired, the declarant was liable under the act for all the expenses associated with the parcels that were subject to said development rights. See § 34-36.1-3.07(b).
. This accounting is confined to the common expenses paid by defendants on the master units after the expiration of their development rights on December 31, 1994. It does not include any profits that the defendants may have earned from its operation of the Newport Regatta Club.