concurring and dissenting.
I concur in the majority holding that the Pezzula testimony, and the documents from which she testified, were properly admitted into evidence. I also concur in the position that it was unnecessary for the trial court to read verbatim Section 335 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts in the jury charge.
However, I cannot agree that the jury charge on wanton misconduct was not ambiguous and misleading. Rather, I *612would grant appellant Graham a new trial based upon the inadequacy of this part of the charge.1
The primary purpose of the trial court’s charge to the jury is to apprise the members of the jury, in an understandable fashion, of the legal principles by which they must decide the case. It is well settled that this does not require the trial court to use any prescribed language, such *613as that requested by a party, to perform this function, provided the applicable law is fully conveyed. See Hawthorne v. Dravo Corp., Keystone Div., 352 Pa.Super. 359, 508 A.2d 298, 302-03 (1986); see also Seewagen v. Vanderkluet, 338 Pa.Super. 534, 488 A.2d 21, 26 (1985). Moreover, not every misstatement of the law is grounds for reversal. The charge must be viewed in its entirety against the background of the evidence to determine whether or not error was committed, and whether that error was prejudicial to the complaining party. Elder v. Orluck, 334 Pa.Super. 329, 483 A.2d 474, 481 (1984). Normally, for a party to be entitled to a new trial on the basis of prejudicial error flowing from the charge, the instructions complained of must be fundamentally in error, and it must appear that the erroneous instructions might have been responsible for the verdict. However, a new trial is also appropriate where the instructions, although perhaps not erroneous, are somehow ambiguous such that the jury may have been misled or confused. Hawthorne, supra.
The majority quotes a portion of the charge below, and, upon finding that portion to contain no fundamental error per se in its recitation of the applicable law, concludes that a new trial is not warranted. This approach, however, does not take the totality of the charge into account, for it ignores the problems created by that part of the charge directly preceding the quoted portion. It is the preceding part which appellant Graham contends misled the jury:
____ Once you have determined what the status was of these plaintiffs, you will then know what standard of care to apply to the defendant.
If you find from the evidence that the plaintiffs here were trespassers, if you find that they were on this property without consent, without permission, then the standard of care or the duty would be as follows: In that event if they are trespassers, if the defendant had reason to know of the plaintiffs’ presence, the defendant’s only duty to the plaintiffs was to refrain from *614wanton or reckless conduct which would necessarily cause injury to the plaintiffs?
If they were trespassers, the defendant — and if the Defendant knew or had reason to know of the plaintiffs’ presence, the defendant’s only duty to the plaintiffs was to refrain from wanton or reckless conduct which would necessarily cause injury to the plaintiff or plaintiffs.
Wanton or reckless conduct. That has been defined by the Court as follows: Wanton conduct is something different from negligence, however gross. Different not merely in degree but in kind and evincing a different state of mind on the part of the Defendant.
Negligence — and we’ll be going over ordinary negligence in just a moment. But negligence consists of inattention or inadvertence. Whereas wantonness exists where the danger to the plaintiff, the plaintiffs, though realized, is so recklessly disregarded that even — even though there be no actual intent, there is at least a willingness to inflict injury. A conscious indifference to the perpetration of the wrong____
(Graham R.R., pp. 513a-514a.) (Emphasis supplied.)
Appellant Graham contends that the above, whether taken in isolation or together with the portion quoted by the majority, was ambiguous and misleading to the jury in that it left the impression that a defendant must either know, or have reason to know, of the presence of the particular plaintiff or plaintiffs at issue to be liable for injuries caused by wantonness or recklessness. Appellant further contends that the supplemental point for charge number four would have cleared up any ambiguity in the court’s charge, but was erroneously refused, thereby making the instruction on wanton misconduct inadequate. I agree.
Under current law, the duty of care owed by a landowner or occupier of land to a trespasser, is to refrain from willful or wanton misconduct. Antonace v. Ferri Contracting Co., Inc., 320 Pa.Super. 519, 467 A.2d 833, 835 (1983); *615Evans v. Philadelphia Transportation Co., 418 Pa. 567, 212 A.2d 440, 442 (1965).
Willful misconduct means that the actor desired to bring about the resultant harm, or was at least aware that it was substantially certain to ensue; this means that willful conduct requires actual prior knowledge of the trespasser’s peril. Antonace, supra; Evans, supra.
Wanton misconduct, by contrast, means that an actor has intentionally done an act of an unreasonable character, in disregard of a risk known to him or so obvious that he must be taken to have been aware of it, and so great as to make it highly probable that harm would follow. It usually is accompanied by a conscious indifference to the consequences, and not a desire to bring them about; as such, actual prior knowledge of the particular injured person’s peril is not required. It is enough that the actor realizes, or at least has knowledge of sufficient facts that would cause a reasonable man to realize, that a peril exists, for a sufficient time beforehand to give the actor a reasonable opportunity to take means to avoid the injured person’s accident; the actor is wanton for recklessly disregarding the danger presented. Antonace, supra; Evans, supra.
The majority’s assertions to the contrary notwithstanding, the Antonace case is strikingly similar to the matter sub judice. The appellant, Ferri Contracting Co., Inc., had leased property for storage of equipment and materials to be used on a sewer project. Due to vandalism problems, Ferri had strung a steel cable across one of three dirt access roadways. The decedent, a dirt bike rider, went biking with friends on that particular road, came into contact with the cable, and was struck in the neck. The injury proved fatal. On the issue of the “knowledge” required for a finding of wanton, as opposed to willful, conduct, our Court reiterated that actual knowledge of a specific trespasser is not required, and continued as follows:
Applying the principles from the foregoing authorities to the case sub judice, it is clear that a jury could conclude that appellant knew dirt bike riders such as the *616decedent were using the property, and that in view of this knowledge, erection or maintenance of a steel cable, in a position of limited visibility, without markings or warning signs, constituted, “an act of unreasonable character, in disregard of a risk known to him or so obvious that he must have been aware of it, and so great as to make it highly probable that harm would follow.” Prosser, Torts § 33 at 151 (2nd ed 155), quoted with approval in Evans, supra, 418 Pa. at 574, 212 A.2d at 443.
Antonace, supra, 467 A.2d at p. 837. (Emphasis supplied.)
The majority attempts to circumvent the patent applicability of Antonace by asserting that the actual holding of Antonace pertained solely to the trial court’s error in charging only in terms of negligence and contributory negligence upon reaching the liability section of the charge, after giving an essentially correct recitation of the law on wanton misconduct. This, simply stated, is an incorrect characterization of the Antonace holding, for it ignores the fact that the Antonace court was called upon to resolve two separate allegations of error: 1) whether a new trial was warranted based upon the aforementioned problem with the liability section of the charge, i.e. its reference to negligence terminology alone; and 2) whether judgment n.o.v. should have been granted on the basis that the defendant had not known of this particular dirt biker’s presence on the property. Antonace, supra, 467 A.2d at pp. 836-37, 838. Our court found that judgment n.o.v. had been properly denied by the trial court, as a landowner needn’t know of a particular trespasser’s presence to act wantonly.
This portion of the decision, affirming the denial of judgment n.o.v., is no less precedential than the portion of the opinion granting a new trial. The Antonace court was required to resolve the legal sufficiency of the evidence as to the defendant’s knowledge of trespassers; it would have been improper to grant a new trial based upon the inadequacy of the liability charge, if the plaintiff had failed to produce sufficient evidence of knowledge to support a finding of wantonness. The majority may not, and I will not, *617ignore the clear applicability, and precedential value, of Antonace’s resolution of the knowledge issue in its holding on the n.o.v. question.
Moving, then, to a review of the charge sub judice, I would agree with appellant that the charge was somewhat ambiguous as to the knowledge required for wanton misconduct. As pointed out by counsel at trial, statements such as “if the defendant knew or had reason to know of the plaintiffs’ presence’’, and “where the danger to the plaintiff, the plaintiffs, though realized, is so recklessly disregarded”, are not outright erroneous, but fail to clarify whether an actor must know of a particular plaintiff-trespasser, or must only know of the presence of trespassers such as the plaintiff, in order to be wanton in his behavior.
The supplemental point for charge initially requested by appellant, pertaining to the requisite knowledge for wantonness, and requested again after the charge was given, was as follows:
4. For you to find wanton misconduct on the part of the defendant, actual prior knowledge of the danger to the plaintiffs need not be established. Antonace v. Ferri Contracting Co., Inc., 320 Pa.Super. 519, 467 A.2d 833 (1983). If you find that the defendant realized, or at least had knowledge of sufficient facts to cause a reasonable man to realize the danger existed, and that the defendant could have taken reasonable measures to avoid the accident, then the defendant was guilty of wanton misconduct by recklessly disregarding the danger posed by the cable. (Emphasis supplied.)
This was a clear and accurate statement of the law, and could have remedied the ambiguity created by the trial court’s charge. Furthermore, had the trial court had reservations about reading the point verbatim, it was nonetheless at liberty to act upon the request by Graham’s counsel to, at the least, clarify for the jury that it was “not necessary ... for the defendant Sky Haven to be actually aware of the presence of these specific individuals ...”2
*618Moreover, as the jury did find that decedent Graham, Miller, and Ricotta had been trespassers, but that Sky Haven had not been guilty of wanton misconduct, I cannot accept that this ambiguity could not have contributed to the verdict. While it is possible that the jury, perhaps, felt that Sky Haven could not have appreciated the general danger to trespassers presented by the cable, it is equally possible that the jury felt that Sky Haven could not have possibly known or anticipated the presence of these particular men, and thus, had not acted wantonly.
Hence, while I would affirm the denial of the Ricottas’ post-trial motions, I would reverse and remand for a new trial on the Graham cause of action; such is the only method available to ensure a verdict based upon the applicable law.
. In its dismissal of this issue as meritless, the trial court opinion states, in part, that all appellants waived this issue by failing to raise objection to this part of the charge in chambers prior to the charge. However, the trial court does not deny, and the record substantiates, that counsel for appellants Graham and Miller made two attempts before the jury retired to preserve their objections, and to have the court read the requested supplemental point, to be discussed at greater length infra. See Graham R.R., pp. 538a, 561a-562a. As the main purpose behind requiring a specific objection to the court’s charge, is to permit the trial court the opportunity to correct alleged errors before the jury retires, see Dilliplaine v. Lehigh Valley Trust Co., 457 Pa. 255, 322 A.2d 114, 116 (1974), we find that their counsel took sufficient action to preserve their objection, and did not waive this issue for purposes of appellate review.
The Millers, however, have reached a settlement with Sky Haven during the pendency of this appeal.
The Ricottas, on the other hand, have waived this issue. The Ricottas’ counsel did not raise this objection, and did not join in the objection of co-counsel, at trial. To preserve a specific objection to a portion of the charge, it is settled that "the complaining party or parties must ... make a timely specific objection to the charge as given”. Vernon v. Stash, 367 Pa.Super. 36, 532 A.2d 441, 447 (1987) (Emphasis supplied.) In the absence of some outward indication that counsel joins in the objection raised by co-counsel, the trial court is being asked to guess or infer from the circumstances whether all parties share the same objection to the charge as given. Such speculation is not the trial court’s responsibility; it is counsel’s responsibility to protect the client's interests.
I am aware of the claim by Ricottas’ counsel that all plaintiffs’ counsel had a pre-trial understanding that the objection of one would act as the objection of all. However, as Ricottas’ counsel freely concedes, that agreement is not of record. Furthermore, the Ricottas’ counsel has not exercised his options, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1926, to have the record corrected or modified to reflect this agreement. We may not consider any averments by counsel that are not supported in the record, see Spain v. Vicente, 315 Pa.Super. 135, 461 A.2d 833, 838 n. 3 (1983), citing McCaffrey v. Pittsburgh Athletic Assoc., 448 Pa. 151, 293 A.2d 51 (1972).
Hence, the Ricottas have lost their entitlement to a new trial based on this issue.
I therefore would be recommending the grant of a new trial for appellant Graham only.
. Graham R.R., p. 561a.