(specially concurring) — I concur specially in the majority opinion. The issues in the case are a little confusing to me but in the main appellant contends it has the right to review the budget requirements of the park board, when the budget request does not exceed the statutory limit of one mill, and the board has no legal .power or authority to maintain this suit against the city. The trial court held against these contentions and to that extent his judgment should be affirmed. The reason the city cannot review the park board’s budget request when it does not exceed one mill for the purpose of purchasing real estate for park purposes and permanently improving the same is because paragraph 4, section 25, chapter 159, Acts of the Fifty-fourth-General Assembly, specifically so provides.
The majority here, as in the opinion in. the Yarn -case, reaches the same result by holding sections 370.7 and 370.8, Code, 1950, were not superseded, modified or repealed by chapter 159, Acts 54th G.A., and paragraph 4 of section 25, chapter 159, merely “furnishes support” for its decision.
The majority correctly points out that the full one-mill levy involved would not exceed the 30 mills under section 2 or the 5-mill recreation levy allowed by section 11, chapter 159, Acts 54th G.A. But the majority does not state the levy is to be a part of the five-mill recreation levy. This part of the case is exactly like the Yarn case, and, on the basis of what I said by way of special concurrence in that ease I think we should *856state' tbe levy in question should be part of the recreation levy.
I do not concur in the statement in the majority opinion that section 370.8 places the mandatory duty on the park board to certifjr and cause to be collected the additional tax during all the years for which the same has been approved and ordered by the voters.
The proposition voted upon was: “Shall the Board of Park Commissioners of the City of Marshalltown be authorized to levy and certify for collection a further additional tax for Park Purposes, not exceeding one mill * * (Italics supplied.)
This is exactly like the proposition voted upon in Chappell v. Board of Directors, 241 Iowa 230, 231, 39 N.W.2d 628, 629, and what we said in that case is particularly applicable here. There we said: “It will be noted this authority is permissive— the directors are authorized. This authority empowers the directors, at their discretion, to levy an amount not exceeding two and one-half mills in any one year. The authorization is limited to a period of ten years.”
OLIVER, J., joins in this special concurrence.