dissenting.
At 1:27 p.m. on September 25, 1986, appellant accompanied the police to the Evansville Regional Laboratory, where he was given a polygraph examination. It was preceded by the execution of a polygraph waiver form. The form is entitled “POLYGRAPH WAIVER”. The body contains the standard Miranda warnings. The final paragraph contains the statements, “I do wish to take the polygraph test” and “I am signing this statement after having been advised of my rights and before taking the polygraph test.” Appellant signed the form. After the test was administered, appellant was interrogated for five hours. At 5:00 p.m. he was told that if he would provide the interrogators with something worthwhile, they could induce the prosecutor to come there and he would make a deal. Appellant agreed and confessed. The confession was not used to induce the prosecutor to join in, and no deal was offered.
At 6:20 p.m. on September 25, 1986, the same conafter having given his oral con-Miranda was given the standard Miranda warnings, signed the waiver form, and proceeded to make a detailed and recorded confession, repeating his prior oral confession.
Following the recording session, the following colloquy occurred:
(Defendant) I can’t afford a lawyer but is there anyway I can get one?
(Officer) Yeah
(Defendant) Is there anyway I can talk to some doctor or someone too?
(Officer) Well, that will be up to the ... that will be up to the Court or up to your attorney....
(Defendant) The only thing I was wondering about is if I could go home tonight and somebody pick me up tomorrow. ...
was ed and cuffed. The police then repeatedly asked appellant if he would show them what he had done with the murder weapon at the crime scene. They then went to the crime scene with appellant but apparently did not locate the weapon. Appellant gave a third statement the following morning which did not differ substantially from the first two.
The polygraph waiver did not constitute an advice of the right to remain silent and to have counsel present during interrointerro-gation session which might follow adad-ministration of the polygraph test, but in meaning and in context was limited instead to the questions and answers given during that test, and thus there was no effective waiver of those rights prior to followfollow-ing interrogation of appellant resultresult-ed in his oral confession. That confession, and the recorded repetitions of it were not admissible against him in a criminal trial. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). confesconfes-sions were also inadmissible as they were obtained by a promise of immunity mitimiti-gation of punishment. Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 18 S.Ct. 183, 42 L.Ed. 568 (1897). Ashby v. State (1976), 265 Ind. 316, 354 N.E.2d 192. Furthermore, the oral testimony describing concon-duct and statements following his request for counsel were inadmissible, erroneerrone-ously admitted. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 *211(1981). The burden was upon the State to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that appellant’s confessions were admissible. Burton v. State (1973), 260 Ind. 94, 292 N.E.2d 790; Magley v. State (1975), 263 Ind. 618, 335 N.E.2d 811. The State failed to satisfy this burden in this case. The judiciary is assigned and has assumed the burden of safeguarding the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination and right to counsel. To do so here requires that appellant’s convictions be reversed and the case remanded to the trial court for a new trial at which appellant’s confessions are suppressed.