County of Kane v. Carlson

PRESIDING JUSTICE NASH,

dissenting:

I respectfully dissent, in part, from the opinion of the court. While I agree that deputy circuit clerks are “public employees” within the context of the PLRA, I do not agree with the apparent conclusion of the majority that the chief judge or circuit clerk are necessarily “public employers,” as defined in the Act, and subject to its proscriptions. I also do not consider that the chief judge or circuit clerk “can only be deemed as authorities of the State of Illinois,” within the context of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat., 1984 Supp., ch. 48, par. 1603(n)) nor that only those offices and the county may be designated as the public employers of deputy circuit clerks.

Deputy clerks are patently public employees and are appointed by and work for the circuit clerk, who is a nonjudicial member of the judicial branch of State government. (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, sec. 18; Drury v. County of McLean (1982), 89 Ill. 2d 417, 424.) In my view, the deputy clerks are thus employees of the State of Illinois, or a political subdivision of the State, requiring that the judicial branch be considered as their “public employer” within the meaning of section 1603(n) of the Act.

Our constitution provides a certain degree of separation between the three branches of State government, stating:

“The legislative, executive and judicial branches are separate. No branch shall exercise powers properly belonging to another.” (Ill. Const. 1970, art. II, sec. 1.)

The constitution further mandates that:

“General administrative and supervisory authority over all courts is vested in the Supreme Court and shall be exercised by the Chief Justice in accordance with its rules.” (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, sec. 16.)

and that general administrative authority of a chief judge over his court is subject to the authority of the Supreme Court. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, sec. 7(c).

Our supreme court may ultimately choose to exercise its constitutional authority over the administration of the circuit court in this matter should the State Labor Relations Board designate as “public employer” an entity which the court deems inappropriate to the effective administration of the judicial function. This court should not here suggest that the chief judge or circuit clerk may be properly designated by the State Labor Relations Board as public employers of the deputy circuit clerks and thus be subject to the direction and sanctions of the Board in employment matters. It seems particularly inappropriate that a chief judge be so enmeshed in these nonjudicial functions, which provide for contempt and injunctive proceedings against a public employer, at the request of the board, in the court which he administers. As noted in the majority opinion, this matter will be addressed by the Board and then it may be determined whether, as applied, the PLRA conforms to the separation of powers standards of the Illinois Constitution.