dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. The facts are: On January 2, 1990, Indiana State Police Detective Ken Houck received an anonymous telephone call stating that Larry Dolliver, appellant in this case, who lived near MeCordsville, was dealing in drugs and described the vehicles he drove. The caller also stated that Dolliver had furnished the caller's girl friend with drugs and that she had ob*530served large quantities of drugs in his residence.
This information was recited in an affidavit made by Officer Houck to obtain a search warrant. The affidavit also contained a statement that the affiant believed the information of the informant to be accurate because his own personal knowledge was that:
"The description and location of the residence was exactly the way the residence appeared and was in the location he stated it was in. The post office confirmed that a Larry A. Dolliver lived at the trailer located at RR. #1 Box 800[,] McCordsville. At the residence I observed the Cadillac and truck that the caller stated he had. Dolliver has know [sic] sign of employment. Caller stated he was approx. 40 years old and his D.0.B. is 5-16-50[,] 89 yrs. old. A criminal records check was made on Dolliver and it was learned that he had prior arrest[s] for safe burglary and three (8) for possession and dealing controlled substances. A check with the Indiana Parole Office showed he was on parole in 85 for possession of marijuana. A check with other local law enforcement showed Dolliver was a known drug dealer and all around criminal since he was in high school. Dolliver has been under investigation in the recent past for narcotics and attempted conspiracy to commit murder. It was also believed that he was also recently arrested in another state for transporting 200 pounds of marijuana in his vehicle. (This info. was not confirmed.) It has been my experience and the experience of others that persons with the criminal background like Dolliver[']s our [sic] good candidates and could very well be dealing controlled substances. Based on the following [sic] information and information provided by a concerned citizen I respectfully request a search warrant be issued for the residence of Larry Dolliver."
The search warrant was issued and officers found a large quantity of drugs and drug paraphernalia at appellant's residence. While officers were still at the residence carrying out the search, appellant drove into the driveway. However, he immediately backed out and proceeded down the street. Officers pursued him, arrested him, and impounded his vehicle. An inventory search of the vehicle was conducted and certain items removed therefrom.
Appellant claims the trial court erred by failing to grant his motions to suppress based on what he claimed to be the invalidity of the search warrant. He claims the search warrant was invalid because the affidavit made by Officer Houck to obtain the warrant contained false information. He points out the affidavit states that the officer's information came from "a reliable and confidential informant" when in fact the officer knew that he gained his information from an anonymous telephone call.
The affidavit is made on a form which Officer Houck obtained from the progsecutor's office. The statement that the information came from a reliable and confidential informant is part of the printed form. There is no question that Officer Houck should have been more careful in the use of the printed form and should have corrected the statement that his information came from{a reliable and confidential informant. However, an examination of the affidavit in its entirety clearly discloses that the officer made no attempt to induce the judge to issue the warrant based upon the statements made by the informant. The latter part of the affidavit quoted above was based entirely upon the officer's investigation of appellant after having received the anonymous call.
In support of his position, appellant cites among his cases Aguilar v. Texas (1964) 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723, Spinelli v. United States (1969), 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 LEd.2d 637 and Illinois v. Gates (1983), 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 LEd.2d 527. The facts in Gates are remarkably similar to the facts in the case at bar. There, the police received an anonymous letter advising them of the drug activities of Gates and his wife. Based upon the anonymous letter, the police conducted an independent investigation which resulted in information which they *531used to obtain a search warrant. They also appended the anonymous letter to their affidavit for the warrant.
The Illinois Circuit Court ordered the evidence gained by the search warrant suppressed on the ground that the affidavit submitted to the judge failed to support the necessary determination of probable cause. That decision was affirmed by the Ilinois Appellate Court and by the Illinois Supreme Court. The State was granted cer-tiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States and Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, discussed Spinelli and the misapplication of that case by many other jur'isdictions. He stated:
"The rigorous inquiry into the Spinel prongs and the complex superstructure of evidentiary and analytical rules that some have seen implicit in our Spinelli decision, cannot be reconciled with the fact that many warrants are-quite properly ...-issued on the basis of nontechnical, common-sense judgments of laymen applying a standard less demanding than those used in more formal legal proceedings." Id. at 235-36, 103 S.Ct. at 2331, 76 LEd.2d at 546.
Justice Rehnquist went on to say:
"Finally, the direction taken by decisions following Spinelli poorly serves [tlhe most basic function of any government': 'to provide for the security of the individual and of his property.' Miranda v. Arizona 384 U.S. 436, 539, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1661 (1966) (White, J., dissenting). The strictures that inevitably accompany the 'two-pronged test' cannot avoid seriously impeding the task of law enforcement, see e.g., n. 9, supra. If, as the Illinois Supreme Court apparently thought, that test must be rigorously applied in every case, anonymous tips would be of greatly diminished value in police work. Ordinary citizens, like ordinary witnesses, ... generally do not provide extensive recitations of the basis of their everyday observations. Likewise, as the Illinois Supreme Court observed in this case, the veracity of persons supplying anonymous tips is by hypothesis largely unknown, and unknowable. As a result, anonymous tips seldom could survive a rigorous application of either of the Spinelli prongs. Yet, such tips, particularly when supplemented by independent police investigation, frequently contribute to the solution of otherwise 'perfect crimes."" Id. at 237-38, 103 S.Ct. at 2331-32, 76 L.Ed.2d at 547-48.
The majority makes the same mistake made by the Illinois court in Gates. Notwithstanding the officer's error in stating that his information came from a reliable informant, it is obvious from the face of the affidavit that the officer in no way attempted to induce the issuing court by the information he had received in the telephone call. The thrust of his affidavit was obviously based upon his investigation of appellant following the receipt of the anonymous call. That information quoted above is ample to supply the trial judge with information sufficient for the issuance of the search warrant. The trial court did not err in admitting the evidence produced by the search warrant.
The majority holds that the trial court erred in failing to suppress the evidence found as a result of the search of his automobile. Appellant contends there was not sufficient probable cause for the police officers to pursue him after he had pulled into his driveway then backed out and was driving down the road. The police officers were in the process of a valid search of appellant's residence when he drove into his driveway, realized the officers were present, and immediately left; this was ample ground for the officers to pursue him to question him. See Terry v. Ohio (1968), 392 U.S. 1, 20-22, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879-80, 20 LEd.2d 889, 905-06 Adams v. Williams (1972), 407 U.S. 143, 146, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 1923, 32 LEd.2d 612, 617; Coates v. State (1989), Ind., 534 N.E.2d 1087.
Inasmuch as considerable evidence of drug dealing had been discovered pursuant to the valid séarch of appellant's home, police officers had probable cause to arrest him. His arrest having been made on a public highway, it was necessary for the officers to impound appellant's vehicle not only for their purposes but for the preser*532vation of appellant's property. It is not only the right but the duty of the officers, under such circumstances, to conduct an inventory search of appellant's vehicle onee it has been impounded. See Foulks v. State (1991), Ind., 582 N.E.2d 874; Rabadi v. State (1989), Ind., 541 N.E.2d 271. There was no error in the trial court's refusal to suppress the evidence based upon the search of appellant's automobile.
Appellant claims the trial court erred in imposing a manifestly unreasonable sentence. Appellant contends that since the trial court found a mitigating circumstance due to the significant substance abuse habit of appellant that it therefore erred in assessing the maximum penalty. All that is required of the trial court in passing sentence is that if more than a presumptive sentence is to be imposed, the court must consider the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and articulate the aggravating cireumstances which support the increased sentence. Fry v. State (1988), Ind., 521 N.E.2d 1302.
In the case at bar, the trial court listed several aggravating circumstances including appellant's prior criminal history which alone would have sufficed to support the enhancement of the sentences. See Duvall v. State (1989), Ind., 540 N.E.2d 34 and Guenther v. State (1986), Ind., 501 N.E.2d 1071. I find no error in the sentence imposed by the trial court.
I would affirm the trial court.