concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur with Parts I, II, III, and IV. I respectfully dissent to Part V and would vacate Wells’ conviction for disorderly conduct. Unlike the majority, I conclude that in protesting his stop and arrest, Wells engaged in protected political speech.
Our supreme court has explained that Article I, Section 9 of the Indiana Constitution contemplates a broad notion of expressive activity, extending to all subjects and every conceivable mode of expression, including the projection of any words in any manner. Whittington v. State, 669 N.E.2d 1363, 1368 (Ind.1996). In addition, this court has previously held that the *1151language of Section 9 “affirms the rights of expression in language much more comprehensive than the First Amendment.” Mishler v. MAC Systems, Inc., 771 N.E.2d 92, 97 (Ind.Ct.App.2002). Thus, given the expansive language and reading of Section 9, there is no question that Wells was engaged in expressive activity, and that the state’s action, convicting Wells of disorderly conduct, in effect restricted that expressive activity. See Madden v. State, 786 N.E.2d 1152, 1156 (Ind.Ct.App.2003), trans. denied.
While I agree that not all political expression is shielded from criminal liability, I disagree with the majority’s distinction in the present case between political speech pertaining to government misconduct toward a third party and such misconduct pertaining to one’s own self. See id. at 1157. My reading of Price v. State leads me to conclude that Price engaged in political speech when she objected to the arrest of a third party, as well as when she objected to her own arrest. Price v. State, 622 N.E.2d 954, 964-65 (Ind.1993), reh’g denied. Among Price’s statements to the police officer were, “F— you,” and “I haven’t done anything.” Id. at 957. The Price court concluded that this expressive activity was political speech because Price was protesting the legality and appropriateness of police conduct. Likewise, my reading of the recent case, U.M. v. State, is that U.M. was not just protesting the police officers’ treatment of his friend, but also protesting the general conduct of the officers. Among U.M.’s statements were, “You guys are all racists,” and “f— the police.” U.M. v. State, 827 N.E.2d 1190, 1191 (Ind.Ct.App.2005). Albeit reluctantly, based on the precedent of Price, we ultimately concluded that U.M. was engaged in expressive activity that targeted the conduct of a government actor, the police. Id. at 1193.
Similar to Price and U.M., I find that the thrust of Wells’ speech was to comment on actions by government actors, specifically the arresting police officers’ possible involvement in a set-up by other government officials. Accordingly, I would hold that the restriction on Wells’ criticism of the officers imposed a material burden on his fundamental right to free speech. See id. at 1192. Even though, as the Price court also noted in that case, Wells’ conduct may have been sufficient to support a conviction for public nuisance, in light of the boundaries imposed on our disorderly conduct statute by the Indiana Constitution’s protection for freedom of expression, I conclude that Wells was improperly convicted of disorderly conduct.