with whom WATHEN, Justice, joins, concurring.
I concur in the result reached by the court that Janisczak’s conviction must be vacated. I disagree, however, that State v. John W., 418 A.2d 1097 (Me.1980), compels such a result.
Janisczak was charged and convicted under 17-A M.R.S.A. § 751(1) (1983) which provides that
[a] person is guilty of obstructing government administration if he uses force, violence, intimidation or engages in any criminal act with the intent to interfere with a public servant performing or purporting to perform an official function.
It is clear that in arresting Kovtuschenko, the officers were performing an official act, and a jury could certainly infer from Janisczak’s actions that he intended to interfere with the arrest.
The trial court instructed the jury that in order to find Janisczak guilty of obstructing government administration, it had to find either that he used intimidation, or that he engaged in a criminal act, namely disorderly conduct. Because of the narrow construction required to be given to criminal statutes, I agree with the Court that the actions of Janisczak do not constitute *742intimidation within the meaning of 17-A M.R.S.A. § 751(1).
Therefore, in order for Janisczak to be guilty of obstructing government administration, he would have to be found to have engaged in a criminal act with the intent to interfere with Kovtuschenko’s arrest. If he engaged in any criminal act, it was disorderly conduct within the meaning of 17-A M.R.S.A. § 501(2) (1983),1 on which the jury was not instructed.2 In defining disorderly conduct, the trial court limited the jury’s consideration to the provisions of 17-A M.R.S.A. § 501(A)(1) (1983 & Supp. 1989)3 prohibiting the making of loud and unreasonable noises. In my judgment, what Janisczak did here was not a violation of section 501(A)(1) and it is for that reason that his conviction must be set aside. I disagree with the Court that the conviction must be vacated because of our decision in John W.
In John W., we vacated a conviction of disorderly conduct pursuant to 17-A M.R. S.A. § 501(2) for loud and abusive language not unlike the language Janisczak used here, holding that the conviction violated the speaker’s constitutionally protected right of free speech. Id. at 1103-06. Although there are some similarities to John W., namely, the language used and that it was addressed to police officers, there are striking differences that make a blanket application of that case most inappropriate. In John W. the police “initially had intruded into the activities” of the defendant. Id. at 1108. In this case, at the time of the incident for which Janisczak was charged, the police were engaged in a difficult struggle with a large and obstinate man, Kovtuschenko, requiring the efforts of all five officers present to subdue him.4 One officer had been injured in attempting to remove Kovtuschenko from his vehicle. Janisczak bolted from the angry and hollering crowd of 30 to 40, rushed up close to the officers and proceeded to yell and scream at them in loud and abusive language. Although no officer testified as to being placed in fear,5 Janisczak’s actions did disrupt the concentration of one officer, concentration that can be crucial to the safe arrest of an unruly subject before an ugly crowd. The “imminence and magnitude of the danger," id. at 1102, flowing from Janisczak’s words were far greater than in the circumstances of John W. The defendant in John W. protested an arrest that was peaceful, had been completed, and was not witnessed by an unruly crowd. Janisczak crossed the line from protest to interference and his actions created a “clear and present danger of disorder.” Id. at 1103.
A jury, had it been properly instructed on the elements of disorderly conduct pursuant to 17-A M.R.S.A. § 501(2), could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Janisczak "insult[ed], tauntfed] [and] challenge[d]” the officers with “offensive, deri*743sive or annoying words,” and that in doing so he engaged in a criminal act with the intent to interfere with the arrest of Kov-tuschenko. Such words, in the context spoken in this case, because they are likely to cause a violent response and create a danger of disorder, are not constitutionally protected as a matter of law. In my judgment the court reads John W. too broadly, and in doing so sanctions pernicious interference with legitimate law enforcement activity that could paralyze and endanger not only law enforcement officers, but the public as well.
. 17-A M.R.S.A. § 501(2) (1983) provides that a person is guilty of disorderly conduct if:
(2) In a public or private place, he knowingly accosts, insults, taunts or challenges any person with offensive, derisive, or annoying words, or by gestures or other physical conduct, which would in fact have a direct tendency to cause a violent response by an ordinary person in the situation of the person so accosted, insulted, taunted or challenged.
. Because the State did not object to the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on the elements of section 501(2), the issue of whether Janisczak could be found to have committed disorderly conduct under section 501(2) as a criminal act within the meaning of 17-A M.R. S.A. § 751 has not been preserved.
. 17-A M.R.S.A. § 501(1)(A) (1983 & Supp.1989) provides that a person is guilty of disorderly conduct if:
(1) In a public place he intentionally or recklessly causes annoyance to others by intentionally:
(A) Making loud and unreasonable noises.
. In State v. Kovtuschenko, 576 A.2d 206 (Me.1990), we affirmed the convictions of Kovtus-chenko for assault, 17-A M.R.S.A. § 207 (1983 & Supp.1989), and operating a motor vehicle after suspension. 29 M.R.S.A. § 2184 (1978 & Supp. 1989).
. In determining whether words spoken are constitutionally protected free speech or are likely to cause a breach of the peace, the "subjective response of the actual addressee” need not be looked to but the "situation of that addressee” has to be considered. State v. John W., 418 A.2d 1097, 1104 (Me.1980) (emphasis in original).