dissenting.
Because my review of the postconviction proceedings in the Superior Court leads me to conclude that the hearing justice properly followed the mandates of G.L. 1956 chapter 9.1 of title 10, and our case law related to it, I respectfully disagree with the majority’s opinion in this ease.
While my colleagues find that an eviden-tiary hearing should have been conducted, especially since Tassone was sentenced to life without parole, in fact, § 10-9.1-6 clearly does not require one and permits dismissal of a postconviction-relief application “[w]hen a court is satisfied, on the basis of the application, the answer or motion, and the record,[14] that the appli*1288cant is not entitled to post conviction relief and no purpose would be served by any further proceedings * * Such dismissal is permitted as long as the applicant has been provided the opportunity to reply to the proposed dismissal and no genuine issues of material fact exist. See § 10-9.1-6(b). Likewise, “[t]he court may grant a motion by either party for summary disposition of the application when it appears from the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions and agreements of fact, together with any affidavits submitted, that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Section 10-9.1-6(c). Neither of these provisions requires the conducting of an evidentiary hearing. Indeed, a hearing justice is not required to conduct an evi-dentiary hearing if, from an applicant’s reply to the court’s proposed dismissal, the hearing justice determines that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that, therefore, no need for an evidentiary hearing exists. See Toole v. State, 713 A.2d 1264, 1266 (R.I.1998). “However, if the [hearing] justice believes, after considering [an applicant’s] reply, that an evi-dentiary hearing is necessary, then he [or she] must afford [the applicant] such a hearing.” Id.
Perhaps no area of the criminal justice system challenges the administrative skills of a trial justice more than the handling of postconviction-relief applications. Often filed by self-represented defendants, whose arguments are sometimes inartfully stated, the trial justice must carve out those deserving of legal consideration, while at the same time preserving the judicial process from frivolous claims.
To this end, in Shatney v. State, 755 A.2d 130 (R.I.2000), we held that
“counsel for an applicant may request permission from the court to withdraw, based upon an assessment that the application has no arguable merit. To do so, however, appointed counsel must file with the court and serve upon the applicant a motion to withdraw accompanied by a ‘no-merit’ memorandum that details the nature and extent of his or her review of the case, lists each issue the applicant wished to raise, and explains why in counsel’s professional opinion those issues and any others that he or she may have investigated lacked merit. The court then must conduct a hearing with the applicant present. If, based upon its review of counsel’s assessment of the potential grounds for seeking post-conviction relief and of any other issues that the applicant wishes to raise, the court agrees that those grounds appear to lack any arguable merit, then it shall permit counsel to withdraw and advise the applicant that he or she shall be required to proceed pro se, if he or she chooses to pursue the application.” Id. at 135 (citing Commonwealth v. Albrecht, [554 Pa. 31] 720 A.2d 693, 699 n. 7 (Pa.1998) (emphasis added)).
This Court’s opinion in Thornton v. State, 948 A.2d 312 (R.I.2008), demonstrates the manner in which a hearing justice may simultaneously apply both the statutory provisions permitting summary dismissal and the mandates of Shatney in considering an applicant’s postconviction-relief endeavor. In Thornton, after a series of three hearings and following the court’s consideration of multiple memoran-da by both the applicant and his counsel, who was seeking to withdraw, the hearing justice deemed the applicant’s claims to be without merit, concurrently dismissing the application without an evidentiary hearing and granting counsel’s motion to withdraw. Thornton, 948 A.2d at 317. In affirming the dismissal, this Court noted that the “applicant was given an opportunity to speak on his own behalf at all three hearings; and he was permitted to dispute the arguments made in each of the no-merit *1289memoranda, both at oral argument and in his supplemental filings.” Id. Thus, the hearing justice was not required under Shatney to permit further litigation following his “no-merit” determination.
In my view, the hearing justice was scrupulous in following these mandates. Not only did she review the first “no-merit” memorandum filed by Tassone’s appointed attorney, terming it “the most comprehensive memorandum regarding a post conviction relief application in a Shatney proceeding this [cjourt has ever received[,]” but, she allowed Tassone to submit additional complaints and documentation and ordered his attorney to prepare a supplemental memorandum addressing those issues. Still further, while considering the second “no-merit” memorandum filed by the attorney, the hearing justice permitted Tassone to make more arguments and to submit a folder of additional material, which she agreed to consider before rendering a written decision. She specifically asked Tassone whether these “comprise[d] all of the evidence and arguments that you want to present to [the court] as to why your application has merit and why you disagree with [appointed counsel].” Tassone assured the hearing justice that his argument was complete. In my view, Tassone was provided ample opportunity to reply to the proposed dismissal of his application.
In her decision, the hearing justice studiously considered all of Tassone’s claims, finding that none had merit and remaining “mindful of [this] Court’s observation [in Thornton, 948 A.2d at 317,] that permitting [an applicant] whose claims for relief have been deemed to be ‘unavailing’ to proceed pro se with his application for post-conviction relief would constitute ‘an exercise in futility and an inefficient use of [judicial] resources.’ ” Accordingly, she denied and dismissed his application.15
The majority notes that a court’s authority to rule on an application in the absence of an evidentiary hearing is “predicated on the court’s having the ability to review the trial record.” I respectfully suggest that the factual circumstances of this case reveal that the hearing justice indeed reviewed the available trial record, which comprised more than just the trial transcripts. Moreover, in his appeal to this Court, Tassone, at least until shortly before oral argument, contended that the hearing justice erred in denying his application for postconviction relief without an evidentiary hearing because, at the time she issued her ruling, the transcripts of Tassone’s underlying murder trial had been lost or destroyed and therefore were unavailable for her review. See State v. D’Alo, 477 A.2d 89, 91 (R.I.1984). Although those transcripts were reviewed by Tassone’s postconviction-relief attorney in preparing his first memorandum, they apparently were missing by the time of the hearing, during which the court, with Tas-sone present, discussed this issue. Tas-*1290sone suggested that his copy was lost due to a water leak at the Adult Correctional Institutions (ACI) or somehow otherwise was misplaced. While this contention may have presented an interesting issue for our consideration, it was totally deflated when his appellate attorney notified us on February 1, 2012, that
“[a]s a result of the defendant-appellant’s recent letter to the Court in which he discloses that he has a complete copy of the trial transcripts in his cell at the ACI that he could have made available to the trial court, undersigned counsel withdraws the first claim of error [the need for evidentiary hearing if there is no transcript] in the defendant-appellant’s [p]re[b]riefing [statement and [supplemental memorandum.”
With this prong of his appeal gone, Tas-sone was forced to rely on what he viewed, and I reject, as error in the hearing justice’s denial of his three claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Finally, I repeat my concern that nothing in either chapter 9.1 of title 10 or our postconviction-relief case law requires an evidentiary hearing in a life without parole case. I believe that if one is required, it should be accomplished by legislative amendment or, if under our supervisory powers, only by suggesting that the “better practice” is to have one.16 In any case, because of the thorough analysis of the hearing justice, I see no need for one here.
Because of these differences, I must respectfully dissent.
. "Record” is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary as ”[t]he official report of the proceedings in a case, including the filed papers, a verbatim transcript of the trial or hearing (if any), and tangible exhibits.” Black's Law Dictionary 1387 (9th ed.2009).
. The hearing justice’s careful analysis is evinced by the following excerpt of her decision:
"[The applicant] raises no credible allegations to support any viable grounds for post-conviction relief. Moreover, because none of these issues were raised at trial, and none of them fall under any of the exceptions to the 'raise or waive' rule, they are barred from this action for post-conviction relief. [The applicant] clearly does not have any legitimate claims for relief. He makes any allegation, however unsubstantiated, that could even theoretically undermine his conviction or sentence. With each memorandum, his claims mutate and multiply. [Tassone’s] application for post-conviction relief can charitably be characterized as a ‘moving target.’ Thornton, 948 A.2d at 315. Accordingly, this [c]ourt agrees with counsel and finds all of [applicant’s] stated grounds for post-conviction relief to be wholly frivolous and without merit.”
. We use the term "better practice” in suggesting allocution after a person has been found to be a violator of probation. See State v. Jones, 969 A.2d 676, 681-82 (R.I.2009); State v. Ratchford, 732 A.2d 120, 123 (R.I.1999).