concurring. Since I view the question presented in this appeal somewhat differently from that entertained in the majority opinion, I feel called upon to state the reasons for my concurrence in the result. It doesn’t seem to me that in the ordinary case, the uniformed opinion of lay witnesses, that an accused is sane, excludes reasonable doubt in the presence of undisputed and competent expert evidence to the contrary, advanced by a skilled and experienced psychiatrist. See Isaac v. United States, 109 U.S.App.D.C. 34, 284 F.2d 168, 170; Bradford v. Maryland, 234 Md. 505, 200 A.2d 150, 17 A.L.R.3d 134 and annotation at 181.
In the present case, however, Dr. Young was of the opinion that it was “possible” that the respondent’s mind was governed by an uncontrollable and irresistible impulse at the time of the shooting. In considering the competency of such testimony, reasonable probability is the standard, rather than conjecture or mere possibility. See Hebert v. Stanley, 124 Vt. 205, 210, 201 A.2d 698, and Howley v. Kantor, 105 Vt. 128, 133, 163 A. 628. More important, the doctor testified: “It was my impression that he was suffering what we call a dissociated reaction; that is, he was acting out of character with his inner personality, the sort of behavior that one sees when a person isn’t really thinking of what he is doing.”
The state’s attorney then inquired:
Q. Would you accept the definition of dissociation as being a person who functions in a prolonged period of amnesia and then returns to normal as being dissociate reaction during that amnesia period because that part of his personality apparently splits off from the rest of him and operated for awhile independently? Would you accept that definition ?
*233A. Yes, that’s a good lay definition.
Q. So in order for Mr. Bishop to have been suffering under dissociate reaction, he would have to have suffered a period of amnesia?
A. Yes.
Q. If, however, Mr. Bishop was able to recall the events preceding, during and after the shooting, he would not be suffering this dissociate reaction ?
A. Very unlikely.
It is clear from this that the doctor’s opinion, that the respondent was “temporarily insane,” was based on his judgment that Bishop suffered from a state of amnesia immediately before and at the time of the shooting. His diagnosis of amnesia was based on the lack of memory reported to him by the respondent during the course of his interview at the State Hospital on October 14, 1968, ten days after the alleged crime.
It appears in the evidence that on the afternoon of the crime the respondent made a voluntary statement of the events which preceded and occurred at the time of the alleged offense. No question is made that the statement was voluntarily given, consistent with the constitutionally protected rights of the accused. At that time the respondent remembered and informed the investigators, in considerable detail, exactly what happened. This included the particular location where he parked his vehicle, that he saw his wife when she left the plant and watched her as she approached his car. He quoted the substance of her conversation:
“She said, ‘What the Hell do you want?’ And that’s when I done it.
Q. And did you walk up to her ?
A. No, she walked up to me.
Q. And where was your-gun at that time ?
A. In my hand.
Q. Did you have the gun concealed before that?
A. No, sir.—
Q. Did you point it right at her ? Or put it right in her stomach?
A. Well she was about — she was about two feet from me, so I probably pointed it at her.
*234Q. How many shots did you fire ?
A. One.”
There is other evidence in the case to indicate that the respondent had substantial recall of what transpired. In the presence of this testimony it was within the province of the jury to reject the claim of the defense that the respondent experienced a period of amnesia.
Since the doctor’s opinion of “temporary insanity” was founded on this premise, the jury had adequate reason to conclude that his testimony on the issue of insanity was not convincing. The same considerations support the trial court’s refusal to direct a verdict of not guilty.